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BY 
KENNETH CHARLES EYRE 
ABSTRACT 
The notion of the Canadian North is best understood as the region 
beyond the frontier of civilization defined by the national road and rail 
grid. The northern frontier has continually receded in the face of en- 
croaching development to where today, the North could be defined roughly 
as encompassing the Yukon and Northwest Territories--the lands and seas 
"North of 60". 
Strategic perceptions of the North have changed several times 
during the twentieth century. Initially, the North was simply ignored; 
later--by the mid 1930s--it was perceived as a strategic barrier more 
formidable than either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. During the Second 
World War and the Cold War, with the views of the United States in the 
dominance, the area was seen as an approach--initially to Europe and 
Asia; later to the heartland of North America. In contemporary Canada, 
the North is seen as having instrinsic value, and as such is deserving to 
be watched over, protected and, if necessary, defended. 
Military forces have been involved periodically in the North since 
the days of the Klondike Gold Rush in 1898. The intensity and degree of 
this involvement has reflected the changing perceptions of the North. 
Military presence can be analyzed as relating to defence, protection of 
sovereignty and national development, although naturally many specific 
programs have overlapped. American involvement, starting with the United 
States' entry into the Second World War and continuing into the present 
has been extensive' but primarily concerned with defence. 
Military activity has been a significant factor in the develop- 
ment of northern infrastructure both as deliberate national development 
programs and as the by-product of defence-related construction activities. 
While the military has had a considerable impact on the North, the 
northern fact has had surprisingly little impact upon the Canadian mili- 
tary. The Canadian Forces are just beginning to comprehend the unique 
aspects of the North and to develop programs and policies appropriate to 
contemporary northern realities and the assigned military responsibility 
to be Custos Borealii--Keepers of the North. 
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PREFACE 
I was a high school student living in the Yukon in the late 1950s 
when I had my first contact with the military in the Canadian North. 
During summer holidays I worked for the Canadian Army on a construction 
crew rebuilding the bridge at Mile 588 on the Alaska Highway, the point 
where American engineers working from the south met their compatriots 
descending from the north to open up the pioneer military road to Alaska 
in the dark days of 1942. Later I worked on the road along the Canol 
Pipeline--possibly one of the greatest white elephants in military his- 
tory, but nevertheless an im-pr_eýýsive feat of engineering in itself. 
Ten years later as a professional soldier I had my first look at 
the barren lands during a winter warfare course held at Churchill, 
Manitoba. A few years later, training with the Canadian component of 
NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force North took me back to my old 
stamping grounds along the Alaska Highway in preparation for a deployment 
to Norway. 
When my battalion returned from winter training in northern 
Norway, I brashly informed my commanding officer that I had been cold 
long enough, and that I was ready "to hang up my snow shoes". His sympa- 
thy was minimal. He sent me off on the first regular serial of New 
Viking, a foot patrol exercise series in the Canadian North designed to 
provide arctic indoctrination while at the same time creating a modest 
military presence in the interests of Canadian sovereignty. My patrol 
area took me to the north and west of the village of Coral Harbour on 
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Southampton Island in Hudson Bay. Here I came into contact with the 
utter isolation that characterizes so much of the Canadian North and the 
navigator's bug-bear, the unreliable magnetic compass. I also met my 
first Eskimo, an elderly gentleman on his way to his char fishing grounds 
"two sleeps away". He used up most of our meagre supply of sugar in the 
cup of tea he shared with us, but more than repaid us for our humble 
hospitality by supervising our initial attempt to build an igloo. 
My next posting was as a company commander in 1 
er Commando of the 
Canadian Airborne Regiment at the time of major northern exercises in 
1971 and 1972. These took me on training parachute assaults into Reso- 
lute and Frobisher Bays in the High Arctic and in later years back to 
Churchill and Whitehorse. 
In the spring of 1974, as a staff officer at Regimental Head- 
quarters, Canadian Airborne Regiment, I was assigned the task of preparing 
a staff college presentation on "Northern Operations". I had as much 
northern experience as any officer then serving in the Regiment, but when 
I actually sat down to write the script I was astounded to discover how 
little I really knew about the military in the North. Major published 
works on the Canadian military contain only passing references to northern 
operations; the same may be said of standard texts on the North itself. 
I did discover that fragments of northern military history can be found 
in some rather obscure military periodicals. On the whole, it was a 
rather discouraging revelation. These thoughts were still in my mind when, 
a few weeks later, I was named a National Defence Scholar for 1974-76. 
This- thesis is the outcome of my northern experience and interest. 
A word about the time frame is perhaps in order. I have chosen 
1898 to begin as it marked the first occasion that a Canadian military 
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force was deployed into the North. 1975 was selected as a closing date 
for detailed analysis, as it marked a point of stabilization of military 
activity in the North following the re-orientation of Canadian defence 
policy in 1969. 
The term "North", as used in this study, refers to those Canadiar 
lands and waters lying generally north of the 60th parallel of latitude. 
The term "Arctic" is used to describe lands and waters situated north of 
the treeline. "Far North" and "High Arctic" are used synonymously and 
apply to those regions lying north of the continental land mass. The term 
"Northwest" is used, not in the political sense of Northwest Territories, 
but in the popular sense to encompass the Yukon Territory and the 
Mackenzie Valley. 
The title, Custos Borealis (Keepers of the North) is taken from the 
motto of Canadian Forces Northern Region, the contemporary military head- 
quarters with the responsibility of coordinating all military activity in 
the Canadian North. 
The thesis is written from a Canadian perspective, draws upon 
Canadian sources in the main, and is primarily concerned with the act- 
ivities of the Canadian defence establishment. Since the beginning of 
the Second World War, however, Canadian and American policies relating to 
continental defence have been intertwined in a most complex fashion. The 
United States has had a hand in all the great defence projects undertaken 
in the North since that time. American military activities in the 
Canadian North are therefore included in this study since most of these 
were, at least nominally, joint projects and have done much to shape the 
modern North. 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the historic involvement of 
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military forces in the Canadian North between 1898 and 1975. The study 
seeks to answer two main questions: what effect has the Canadian North 
had on the defence policies of Canada and, to a lesser extent, of the 
United States; and, secondly, what effect has the presence of Canadian 
and American military forces had on the Canadian North. Military act- 
ivity and programs in the North relating to this focus are analysed in 
terms of national defence, national sovereignty, and national develop- 
ment. 
Since both military studies and northern studies are legitimate 
academic disciplines in Canada, I have attempted to satisfy the needs and 
interests both of defence scholars who may know little of the North, and 
of northern scholars who may know little of military matters. This study 
takes the form of a total overview. Hopefully, it will serve as a struc- 
tural form and perspective for other scholars who will subsequently 
address the wide range of topics and issues raised here but which remain 
to be studied in detail. 
There are a number of individuals and agencies whose support in 
the writing of this thesis I wish to acknowledge. 
The Canadian Department of National Defence released me from 
regular duties for a two-year period and funded both my attendance at 
King's College and my research travel program. In particular, 
Captain (N) Bernard C. Thillaye, the Director of Strategic Policy Plan- 
ning, supported my efforts in many ways. The opinions expressed in this 
study are not necessarily those of'the Department of National Defence. 
Dr Wolf Mendl of the Department of War Studies of King's College, 
London, supervised the thesis. 
Brigadier-General K. J. Thorneycroft, Commander, Canadian Forces 
Northern Region between 1975 and 1978, and his staff were most helpful 
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in arranging for me to see much of the modern North during the four 
month period I was attached to Northern Region Headquarters for research 
purposes. 
Dr W. A. B. Douglas, Director of History, National Defence Head- 
quarters, and his staff, provicLed me with a working area, access to the 
open documents held by the directorate and the company of an astute group 
of military historians. 
Dr G. de Q. Robbins and the staff of the Scott Polar Research 
Institute, Cambridge University, made me welcome in that great centre 
of northern studies during the period that I was actually writing the 
thesis. 
The typescript and bibliography were prepared by Ms Raymonde 
Bissonnette. 
The maps were prepared by the Graphic Arts Section of Mobile 
Command Headquarters. 
The above list is by no means all-inclusive. Many other people 
contributed in different ways to this project; I apologize for not 
listing everybody here. 
What errors and omissions that do remain are, of course, entirely 
my own responsibility. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The "North", to Canadians, is more of an idea than a place. 
At the time of Confederation in 1867, Canada encompassed a 
relatively small area centered on the-St-Lawrence River watershed and 
the Atlantic seaboard. Anywhere north or west of Lake Nipigon was 
termed "The North". A full range of economic, political, social, and 
nationalistic factors were at play, however, and combined in the new 
nation to create a strong imperative of expansion. In those early 
years, there was some question as to the ultimate direction expansion 
should take, and of the priorities for national development- 
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In 1870, Canadian territory was increased by 2.5 million square 
miles. The Pacific coast colony of British Columbia became a province, 
and the imperial government gave Canada the vast tracts of land formerly 
controlled by the Hudson's Bay Company. This latter area, composed of 
Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory, gave the Dominion de jure 
control over the entire continental land mass north of the 49th Parallel 
with the exception of Labrador, part of the British Crown Colony of 
Newfoundland, and th, & American territory of Alaska. 
While the Canadian government grappled with the problems of a 
1 See Morris Zaslow, The Opening of the Canadian North 1870-1914 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971), for a detailed dis- 
cussion of Canadian national expansion. The most use-ful single volume 
history of the Canadian North is R. -A. J. Phillips, Canada's North 
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967). 
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route for the essential transcontinental railway and other development 
problems, another territorial accession came into the offing--the Arctic 
Archipelago. Knowledge of the North American High Arctic was still 
imperfect in 1870, but the majority of the larger islands had been ident- 
ified and claimed for Britain by early explorers of the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries, and by the Royal Navy in the nineteenth 
century. In 1874, Britain asked the Canadian government if the Dominion 
had any interest in taking up sovereignty over these Arctic Islands. 
The Liberal government of Alexander Mackenzie replied affirmatively, and 
the imperial government issued an Order-in-Council to that effect. 
It took six years and constant prodding by Britain to effect the 
transfer. The reality of the situation was that Canada was already faced 
by an embarrassment of terriio-rial riches, and the prospect of more land 
was almost overwhelming. Few Canadian public figures had any idea of 
what to do with the islands. At best, it was thought that they might 
prove to be of use at some distant future date. Probably the most per- 
ceptive analysis of the Canadian attitude at the time of the transfer of 
the islands was made by a member of the Colonial Office who observed: 
The object in annexing these unexplored territories to Canada is, 
I apprehend, to prevent the United States from claiming them, and 
not from their likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada. 
With the accession of the Arctic Archipelago, the northward 
expansion of Canada ýtas complete. Canadians as a whole, and the govern- 
ment in particular, could not have cared less. There is no evidence 
that anybody gave a thought to these far northern lands at the time. 
The Canadian Pacific Railway finally was completed in 1885. By 
I Cited in Gordon W. Smith, 
Canadian Aspect of an International 
ed., The Arctic Frontier (Toronto: 
p. 203. 
"Sovereignty in the North: The 
Problem", in R. St. J. Macdonald, 
University of Toronto Press, 1966), 
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selecting a southerly route, the government effectively set the pattern 
for Canadian population expansion and industrial development for at least 
two generations: Canada was to develop on an east-west axis. The lands 
beyond the communities that sprang up along the rail lines became "The 
North", and were, on the whole, forgotten. Given the limited population 
and available capital of the country, the North could be developed later. 
In many ways, the North is still waiting. 
If the North was forgotten in the sense that it was eliminated 
from national programs of development, North Americans and many Britons 
retained a deep and abiding romantic interest in the area. Images of 
mystery and unbounded potential were strong. Adventure stories of the 
fur trade and the arctic whale fishery, the only two northern industries, 
were heady stuff in the age of Victoria. The challenge of the unknown 
was equally compelling, and accounts of attempts to gain the North Pole, 
to discover the Northwest Passage, or to find the lost Franklin ex- 
pedition were avidly read in Canadian, American, and British homes alike. 
The potential of the North was seen as being latent. In terms of 
common mineral resources, the southern reaches of the country had already 
proved all that could possibly be exploited in the nineteenth century. 
Iron, lead, zinc, nickel--these were the minerals of early Canada. 
Precious metals were different, for no matter how far from civilization 
the sources might bq4 a man could always make a fortune beyond his wildest 
dreams if only he could make that one big strike. There already had been 
major finds in the undeveloped territories of North America. Silver had 
been found in Colorado, and gold in California and the Caribou Mountains 
of British Columbia. As the nineteenth century drew-to a close, a few 
hardy souls were probing distant reaches of the Canadian Northwest convinced 
9 
that somewhere there was gold for the taking. 
The third aspect of the North that interested nineteenth century 
Canadians and others were the peoples of that frozen land. The Eskimo 
T 
fascinated southern dwelling white men. Accounts of the harsh environ- 
ment in which the Eskimo lived and the incredibly fine adaption of his 
culture and technology to that environment were read with great interest. 
Those whites who actually came into contact with Eskimos tended to chron- 
icle their contacts in no small detail. Northern dwelling Indians, on 
the other hand, were ignored as literary subjects in favour of their 
culturally more sophisticated kinsmen of the plains and the Pacific coast. 
This then was the Canadian North around the turn of the century: 
an area cloaked in mystery and romanticism; an area partially explored 
and largely unmapped; an area where Canadian title and sovereignty had 
not been tested. The Eskimos in the Arctic barrens and the northern 
Indians below the tree line still lived, in the main, as they had since 
time immemorial, touched here and there by the white man's culture in the 
persons of explorers, fur traders, whalers, and the occasional missionary. 
It was a land of unrealized potential, a land encompassing a frontier and 
a mind-numbing expanse of territory beyond that frontier. 
There is an unfortunate tendency for Canadians even today to 
think of the entire North as a snow covered treeless wasteland. Nothing 
could be further froT the truth. The Yukon consists of plateaus and 
'The term "Eskimo" came into the English language when early 
explorers were told of that northern race by Cree Indians. The term is 
pejorative in that in the Cree tongue it means "eater of raw flesh". 
(Not to be outdone, the Eskimo called the Cree "louse eggs". ) Modern 
Canadian convention and the Eskimos themselves favour the term "Inuitil, 
(the people). Inasmuch as the majority of events exa7mined in this study 
occurred during the period when "Eskimo" was the common usage, the term 
is used as a standard convention throughout, except in those cases where 
the term "Inuit" is essential to the point of the argument. 
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towering mountains. Coniferous trees are found throughout the territory 
except, of course, at higher altitudes on the mountain slopes. The North- 
west Territories are dominated by the Canadian shield, a low lying, rough 
land with innumerable lakes on the continental land mass, but tipped up 
along the islands that fringe the Eastern Arctic into mountains that rise 
to over 8,000 feet. The islands of the western Arctic Archipelago, on 
the other hand, are flat and rolling. 
The treeline, which defines the southern limit of the Arctic 
begins near the mouth of the Mackenzie River and cuts southeast to the 
foot of James Bay and then swings northeast to the south of Ungava Bay. 
The treeline is not sharply defined. The coniferous trees of the boreal 
forest, or taiga, become smaller and sparser until eventually they are 
gone, giving way to the scrub, moss and lichens of barrens, or tundra. 
It is the tundra that most closely coincides with the popular image of 
the North. 
Permanent ice caps and glaciers cover much of Devon and Ellesmere 
Islands and the islands of the Sverdrup Group. These are the only areas 
that are permanently covered with ice or snow. Throughout the rest of the 
North, summer can be as long as June-September in the southern portions 
of the territories to a brief month on Ellesmere, the most northerly 
arctic island. The traditional seasons of spring and autumn are replaced 
by break up and freeze up--referring to the departure of the winter ice 
from rivers, lakes and bays and its inevitable reformation marking the 
onset of the next winter. 
I 
*** 
I Terrence Armstrong, George Rogers, Graham Rowley, The Circum- 
polar North: A Political and Economic Geography of the Arctic and Sub- 
Arctic (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1978), pp. 73-76. 
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The military is a comparative newcomer to the North. Before 
the coming of the white man, there doubtlessly were unchronicled clashes 
between hunting bands of Eskimos and Indians in those few areas where 
these races were in occasional contact. There was nothing, however, 
that even remotely approached the tribal warfare that was endemic in the 
more southerly reaches of the continent. It is possible that the constant 
struggle with the environment left-northern inhabitants with little energy 
for organized violence. 
Europeans came to the North for many reasons. 
1 There is evidence 
that around 1000 CE Vikings from Greenland or Iceland were prowling around 
Baffin Island, either because they were lost or simply curious. Martin 
Frobisher first came in 1576 searching for the Northwest Passage to the 
Orient. He returned again and again looking for gold. It is difficult 
to say which of his objectives was the more chimerical. The North's 
treasure house of resources remained locked for another century: "The 
Gentlemen Adventurers of England trading into Hudson's Bay" were granted 
a charter on May 2,1670 to exploit the classic northern resource--fur. 
Over three centuries the fur trade has had its moments of glory and its 
times of disaster; today it still thrives. The Hudson's Bay Company is 
unquestionably one of the great northern institutions that has done much 
to shape the face and culture of the region. The dozens of northern 
communities that have "fort" place names--Fort Reliance, Fort Good Hope, 
Fort Resolution, Fort Nelson, Fort St-John--were founded, not as military 
garrisons, but as trading posts. 
"A 
useful and immensely readable collection of primary source 
accounts of the opening of the Far North is the PolarTrilogy, edited by 
Farley Mowat. included in the series are: Ordeal -by Ice: The Search fo 
the Northwest Passage, 1960; The Polar Passion: The Quest for the North 
Pole-, 1967; and Tundra; Selections from the Great Accounts of Arctic 
Uan-U Voyages, 1973 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited). 
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The North has known war only once. In the latter years of the 
seventeenth century and into the early years of the eighteenth, France 
and Britain struggled for mastery of a continent. The conflict spilled 
into the southern reaches of Hudson Bay. Today, massive Fort Prince of 
Wales stands abandoned, a forlqrn reminder of those days. The North has 
been at peace ever since. 
In the nineteenth century military men of Great Britain and, to 
a lesser extent, of the United States, 
- 
swarmed into the North. They came 
not to fight, not to conquer, but to explore. They explored the upper 
reaches of the boreal forest and the barrens of Keewatin. Most of all, 
their efforts were concentrated in the arctic waters where they sought 
first, a Northwest Passage, and later, the Pole. They also came as part 
of official naval cruises and as leaders of privately funded ventures to 
search for Franklin. 
1 
For the military men of Canada, however, the North 
remained terra incognita until the turn of the century. 
The preliminary exclusion of the military from a frontier role 
was a result of the special set of circumstances and political perceptions 
that existed in Canada during the early 1870s. In 1870, the maintenance 
of law and order in the new territories became a problem. The Red River 
Rebellion, which flared up in the summer, resulted in a small expedition- 
ary force being raised to put it down. An illicit whiskey-fur trade 
which had sprung up pear the American border destabilized relations between 
settlers and the Indian tribes of the area. It was apparent to the federal 
government that some sort of garrison force would have to be raised for 
service in the Northwest. 
A by-product of the Franklin search was the preliminary mapping 
and charting of much of the Arctic Archipelago. The gazeteer of the 
Arctic Islands reads like a nominal roll of the nineteenth century 
Royal Navy. 
13 
The western situation continued to deteriorate and in the summer 
of 1872, Colonel P. Robertson-Ross was dispatched on "A Reconnaissance of 
the North-West-Provinces and Indian Territories of the Dominion of Canada". 
He strongly advocated the creation of a force to provide law and order. 
1 
Similar demands came from Hudson's Bay Company traders and other law 
abiding citizens living in the area. The cry was taken up in both the 
House of Commons and the Senate. -The general consensus was 
that what was 
needed was either a military force with the powers of police, or a police 
force with military organization, discipline, and equipment. 
Robertson-Ross, perhaps reflecting his background and perspec- 
tives as a professional soldier, recommended the raising of a military 
force and a supporting local constabulary. Sir John A. Macdonald, the 
Prime Minister, had different id-eas: he envisioned a para-military 
police force modelled on the Royal Irish Constabulary. 
2 As early as the 
winter of 1869-70 he outlined his ideas to a prospective commander, 
saying: 
The best Force would be Mounted Riflemen, trained to act as cavalry. 
but also instructed in the Rifle exercises. They should also be 
instructed, as certain of the Line are, in the use of artillery; 
this body should not be expressly Military but should be styled 3 
Police, and have the military bearing of the Irish Constabulary. 
Various factors combined to bring a halt to the initial attempt 
1 Capt Ernest Ji Chambers, The Royal_North-West Mounted Police - 
A Corps History (Monýreal: The Mortimer Press, 1906), P. 11. The full 
text of Robertson-R6ss' report is published herein pp. 11-16. Robertson- 
Ross was a regular British officer seconded to Canada to act as Adjutant 
General of the Militia. 
2 S. W. Horral, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Mounted Police Force 
for the Northwest Territories", The Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 53, 
No. 2, June 1972. Horral, the preseRt official Historian of 'fhe Royal 
Canadian Mounted Polices deals with many of the myths7that surround the 
establishment of the RCMP. 
3Cited in Horral, p. 181. 
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to raise a frontier security force, and the matter remained in abeyance 
for three years while the government considered the seriousness of the 
problem and possible other means of dealing with it. Macdonald spoke 
frequently of "mounted rifles", but it is clear that he remained stead- 
fast in his determination to have a police force. The North-West Mounted 
Police Act, an enabling act, was given Royal Assent on May 23,1873. 
The organization of the force proceeded slowly during the summer 
and autumn. Macdonald, whose government was facing the scandal that 
would ultimately bring it down, was fighting for his political life and 
had little time to spare to consider the problems of the North-West. His 
successor, Alexander Mackenzie, was less convinced than Macdonald that a 
federal police force was preferable to a military garrison. In point of 
fact, Macdonald's ideas had not gained wide acceptance in political 
circles and the Canadian military establishment continued to maintain 
that only regular troops could adequately control the situation. It 
would appear that support for the police force was strongest in the 
Department of Justice, and it was arguments from that quarter that ulti- 
mately led Mackenzie to continue the police project. 
' The rest of the 
story is the history of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 
The 1873 decision to raise a special police force effectively 
eliminated the Canadian military from what could have been a challenging 
responsibility, a magnificent training vehicle, and a real raison d'@tre. 
When the tide of development later began its slow flow northward, suc- 
ceeding Canadian governments turned instinctively to the Mounted Police 
to carry the flag;, the success of the Force in the prairies was a fine 




Gold Rush, down the Mackenzie River, around the rim of Hudson Bay, and 
later, into the far reaches of the High Arctic, it was the men of the 
Mounted Police who brought the authority of the federal government into 
the new territories. Canadian soldiers remained in the South with the 
thankless task of preparing to protect a country which most politicians 
and many citizens felt required little, if any, defence. 
* -R- * 
Canada inherited the beginnings of a military establishment from 
Great Britain at the time of Confederation. In 1871 the Treaty of 
Washington dealt with the points of contention between Britain and the 
United States that had arisen out of the American Civil War. With re- 
lations regularized, the British battalions which had garrisoned Canada 
even after Confederation were withdrawn and, in a sense, Canada was left 
to fend for herself. In reality, Canada was probably as secure from 
aggression as any nation on earth. Sheer distance removed her from the 
European and Asian arenas of conflict. The Atlantic and the Pacific were 
formidable barriers to invasion. That some nation might attempt to invade 
Canada across the polar wastes was unthinkable and technologically im- 
possible. To further strengthen the Canadian bulwarks of defence there 
was the ubiquitous Royal Navy. The only possible foe was the United 
States, and as long as the maintenance of friendly relations with that 
country remained one of the cardinal tenets of British foreign policy, 
Canada was secure. Given these strategic considerations, it is little 
wonder that the Canadian defence establishment was impoverished from the 
very start. 
Immediately following the Treaty of Washington, the Canadian 
military establishment plunged into a decline from which it was just 
16 
emerging when the country was engulfed by the First World War. Military 
enthusiasm, which had run high during the time of the Irish-American 
Fenian Raids, waned. The withdrawal of the British units represented 
the loss of the professional core and the vital training cadre of 
Canada's soldiers. An economic. depression led to slashed defence budgets, 
smaller establishments, and curtailed training periods. There was a 
nation to build, a continent to conquer: opportunities and challenges 
abounded. Few Canadians had much interest in "playing soldier". 
The heart of the Canadian military establishment was the Active 
Militia, a part-time volunteer force that trained up to two weeks per 
year. A tiny Permanent Force was raised in the 1870s to maintain the 
military installations abandoned by the British Army and to provide a 
training cadre for the Active Militia. With its small size and plethora 
of tasks, the Permanent Force was hard pressed to attend even to its own 
training, let alone that of the Active Militia. A fair description of 
the army nearing the turn of the century would be a minimal force, 
indifferently trained, and poorly equipped. 
Canada, with the longest coastline of any nation on earth, had 
no navy. 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, few Canadians had ever 
seen, let alone understood, even part of the North. Of the whites who 
had probed various r9gions, few, in fact, were Canadians. Of the handful 
of Canadians who had shared the North with American whalers, Scots fur 
traders, English missionaries, and the native peoples, none were soldiers. 
No situation had ever arisen which, in the government's view, required 
a Canadian military presence in the North. No Canadian military leader 
had ever shown the slightest interest in the country's northern frontier. 
17 
Before the century closed, however, the discovery of gold in the Yukon 
presented a situation which neither the government nor the Militia could 
ignore. This marked the beginning of an association between the Canadian 
military and the North which has endured, sporadically, to the present. 
CHAPTER II 
FALSE START 
The Yukon Field Force: 1898-1900 
In February, 1898, Parliament opened in a Canada rushing towards 
the twentieth century. Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal party was at the be- 
ginning of its long tenure of power and the dynamism of the new admin- 
istration was still growing. The country was finally sloughing off the 
effects of a long depression and moving confidently towards prosperity. 
The Empire was at peace. In the Northwest, the Klondike Gold Rush, that 
fine example of fin du si6cle madness, was in full swing. 
Gold had been discovered in the Klondike region of the Yukon 
District in the summer of 1896. During the winter, the handful of pros- 
pectors who were in the area and staked the early claims made their for- 
tunes. The rest of the world knew nothing of this. In the summer of 
1897, two steamers arrived in San Francisco and Seattle bearing jubilant 
miners who literally staggered off the ships under the weight of the gold 
they were carrying. The news of the strike spread like wildfire, and 
captured the imagination of a continent. The Rush was on. In many ways, 
the news of the strike happened at just the right point in history. 
Describing the mood of the era Pierre Berton wrote: 
it was an era occupied with money or preoccupied with the lack Wii. It was an ages in the words of its historian Mark Sullivan, 
when moneymaking was the most prized career. " N6wonder the 
continent went insane when two ships loaded with gold steamed in 
from out of the Arctic mists. 
19 
For "gold" was the magic word of the nineties. 
1 
If the popular attitude was "right", so was the time: 
The Klondike stampede did not start slowly and build up to a 
climax, as did so many earlier gold rushes. It started instantly 
with the arrival of the 
, 
Excelsior and Portland, and reached a fever 
pitch at once, and remained at fever pitch until the following 
spring, when, with the coming of the Spanish-American War, the 
fever died almost as swiftly as it arose. 2 
As Parliament met, its members could not have known that the rush 
was already over. The previous year, both the American and Canadian Min- 
isters of the Interior had issued public warnings against attempting the 
arduous trip to the Klondike. They were ignored. 
3 What was known was 
that a horde of people were in the process of descending upon the town of 
Dawson. How many more were on their way was anybody's guess. Some said 
fifty thousand, others said-a-hundred thousand; still others claimed that 
a full quarter million would arrive in the Yukon. 
The subtle nature of this problem emerges in the prolonged debate 
in the House*of Commons and the Senate over the proposed Canadian Yukon 
Railroad. There was general agreement on both sides of the House that an 
all-Canadian railroad to the Yukon would be a desirable feature for both 
nationalistic and economic reasons. There was a general underlying fear 
held by most Canadian politicians that a crisis could develop in the 
Yukon. It was envisioned that a lack of food, a breakdown in government 
services, or even a failure of the law enforcement agency to control the 
situation might resuit in a complete loss of Canadian control of the area. 
The situation was further complicated by the stated intention of the 
1 Pierre Berton, Klondike - The Life and Death of the Last Great 
Gold Rush. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1ý58)9 p. 101. 
2 Ibid., p. 100. 
3 Jbid., p. 122. 
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United States to send a relief expedition with food supplies into the 
Alaskan area of the gold fields via the Canadian route. The fact that 
it was the hope of the United States to use troops to carry out this 
resupply mission, albeit not under arms, caused no little concern in 
Ottawa. 
The Yukon Railway Bill was introduced in the House of . Commons 
on February 8,1898. In arguing the case for the proposed system, the 
Liberals painted a grim picture of what might happen were the Yukon 
transportation system to fail, given the huge influx of people into the 
region. They spoke of the possibility of thousands of starving men 
struggling for a scanty food supply. Such a situation, it was claimed, 
would result in "a perfect carnival of crime" which the North West 
Mounted Police would be unable to control. 
From the opposition benches, a Mr. Wallace rose to refute the 
breakdown of law and order scenario. He noted that in the various mining 
communities in the isolated wilds of British Columbia there had been no 
such breakdown of government services in similar conditions to that which 
the Yukon miners were facing. He did allow, however, that: 
I think it a quite proper safeguard to send a force to the Yukon 
territory, a moderate force, not one involving such an enormous 
expense; because I think the returns will show that the expense of 
sending so large a force up there at the time has been very great. 
Wallace's concern was more with the perceived threat posed by the 
United States. He f6'resaw the need for a small expeditionary force to 
counterbalance the anticipated foray into the area by the troops of the 
United States Army on the planned relief mission: 




1898, p. 222. 
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(T)hey wanted to get a military foothold, they wanted to get some 
sort of possession of our Canadian territory. We know what their 
dealings with Canadians and British people have been. They get a 
foothold here and a foothold there and when they once get possession, 
it is extremely hard to dispossess them. 1 
At this point, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Clifford Sifton, 
entered the debate. He scorned the opposition's view of the United States 
as a hostile and aggressive power with respect to the Yukon situation. 
He could envision no deliberate act on the part of the government of the 
United States that would weaken Canadian sovereign claims to the Yukon. 
He returned to the theme of the breakdown of law and order, but here he 
admitted implicitly that there was an American threat. It was noted that 
the majority of the Klondike adventurers were citizens of the United 
States. He emphasized the need for a Canadian railroad into the area so 
that food supplies, government services, and law enforcement personnel 
could easily enter the region. Without the railroad, he anticipated a 
winter in which: 
We would have to face the fact that 200 or 300 of our officers would 
be surrounded by starving thousands of armed men, of alien men, not 
citizens of Canada, but citizens of foreign countries, and these men 
would have possession of the Yukon district instead of the Govern- 
ment of Canada .... 
(W)e have before us the great danger of the 
authority of this Government being overridden, being destroyed, and 
the Government of that district being, theoretically, if not 
actually, taken out of our hands. 2 
Railroad or no, the government began to consider steps to be taken to 
reinforce the forces of law and order operating in the Yukon. 
Those forcesr'of law and order were, admittedly, rather weak. In 
August of 1897, when Klondike fever was only a few months old, there were 
forty members of the North West Mounted Police stationed in the Yukon. 
'Ibid., 1898, P. 234. 
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Their numbers were quickly increased to a hundred, and then increased 
again. In February, 1898, their strength rose to 162, including scouts, 
special constables, and dog handlers; by June the figure was 239. The 
recruiting of new constables forged ahead, but it soon became evident 
that for both financial and manpower reasons, there were simply not 
enough federal police to fill the anticipated need in the Yukon. 
' The 
government turned to the Department of Militia and Defence. 
Military planning for the Yukon force began immediately. 
2 Rumours 
of the expedition began to circulate throughout the Active Militia and a 
veritable flood of volunteers applied to the Adjutant General for a place 
in the force. 
3 The need, however, was for trained men, and the personnel 
of the Active Militia in 1898 could not have been considered trained by 
any stretch of the imagination. The burden fell on the Permanent Force. 
On 10 March, when an opposition member asked in the House of 
Commons about the rumours that were circulating about "a detachment of 
the militia or of the permanent force of Canada to be sent to the Yukon 
to supplement the Mounted Police force there, " the Prime Minister replied: 
(I)n view of the very large influx of people who are expected to 
crowd into the Yukon, it has been thought advisable to have a 
sufficient force there to maintain law and order. This could not 
be done unless the Mounted Police, which is practically a military 
body, were largely increased. But we have thought it well to 
follow the practice that has obtained in other countries and since 
Ibid., 1898. pp. 452,7353. 
2 There is no major published work on the Yukon Field Force. The 
Force is the subject of an unpublished honours BA thesis. See John B. 
Windsor, "The Yukon Field Force" (Victoria, B. C.: University of Victoria, 
m. s. unpublished, 1972). Unfortunately this study is not generally 
available. There are no known existing personal journals or diaries 
written by members of the Force. 
3 Public Archives of Canada (henceforth: PAC), RG 9 11 BI 
(Correspondence of the Adjutant General's Office), Vol. -I-. 499, miscel- 
laneous entries. 
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we have a small permanent force, to employ it in that country, where 
the need has recently ariSen. 1 
Accordingly, on 21 March, 1898, an Order-in-Council was signed 
to the effect that "a Field Force composed of volunteers from the perma- 
nent troops of the Dominion should be despatched to Fort Selkirk. ,2 The 
issue was not immediately raised in the House, and in point of fact, the 
troops were already on their way when an opposition member asked for de- 
tails, noting that, "it is going fb cost a large amount of money, and that 
,3 the matter has not been discussed in the House at all . 
In replying to the question, F. W. Borden, the Minister of Militia 
and Defence, provided an insight into the government's rationale in what 
was for Canada, an unprecedented event, saying: 
the principal object of the militia is to support the civil power, 
and it is for the purpose of aiding in this respect thah it is 
proposed now to send this force into the Yukon country. 
The Minister went on to note: 
it was intended to increase the mounted police force, but on further 
consideration it was thought that it would better serve the objects 
in view to send a detachment of the permanent force, which would 
establish a central force in that country, would have a certain 
decided moral effect upon the scattered population through the 
district and if necessity demanded, would e ready to assist in 
enforcing law and maintaining order there. 
Questioned on comparative costs of the two options, the Minister was quick 
to point out that the force of soldiers would cost the government con- 
siderably less than would an equivalent-sized body of Mounted Police. 
6 
Debates, 1898, p. 1577. 
2Cited in Canada, Sessional Papers, Report of the Department of 
Militia and Defence (henceforth: Militia Report , 1898, p. 24. 
3Debates, 1898, p. 4604. 
, 
ýJbid., p. 4795. 
51bid. 61bid. 
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The deployment of the Yukon Field Force in many ways went beyond 
simple aid of civil power. A centralized military force in the heart of 
the Yukon also stood as a formidable symbol of national sovereignty. In 
this respect, the soverei gnty function of a pure military force went 
beyond even that which could bqestablished by a para-military force such 
as the Mounted Police were at the time. When deployed, the force would 
indicate to all and sundry the will and intention of the government to 
use as much force as necessary to maintain the fule of Canadian law in 
the Yukon. 
A further aspect of the decision to form the Yukon Field Force 
that merits attention is the cost factor. It was intended to use the 
military as virtual auxiliaries to the Mounted Police. To this end, the 
government went so far as to confer honorary military ranks on the two 
senior police officers in the district. 
1 All other things being equal, 
the savings offered by the military alternative were attractive to the 
government. 
There is no evidence that any responsible official of the United 
States government advocated a policy of American territorial expansion 
into the central Yukon. Similarly, Laurier's government did not believe 
that the Americans were seeking to expand geographically at Canadian 
expense in this particular instance. Extreme remarks by a few elected 
representatives on both sides of the border may safely be ignored. 
The "loss of control" scenario, however, was a real Canadian 
concern. At least eighty per cent of the gold seekers in the Yukon were 
citizens of the United States. Virtually every adventurer had a personal 
firearm of some kind. It was feared that a spontanecFus riot, or even a 
'PAC, RG 9 11 Al (Correspondence of the Deputy Minister of 
Militia and Defence), folio 16937. 
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planned "coup", could effectively neutralize the agents of the Canadian 
government in the area. From there it would be a short step to the es- 
tablishment of a "provisional government" and a request to the United 
States to take over the administration of the territory. A development 
such as this was by no means without precedent: California and Oregon 
had come into the American Union along generally similar lines. 
I 
The Yukon Field Force emerged as a hybrid unit. It appears that 
there was no way in which any of the three Permanent Force units alone 
would have been able to meet the requirement for troops, given their mul- 
titude of other tasks related to the training of the Active Militia. 
Thus, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, the Royal Canadian Artillery, and the 
Royal Regiment of Canadian Infantry were all ordered to provide troops. 
Command of the Force was given to Major T. D. B. Evans of the Royal 
Canadian Dragoons, who was promoted to the local rank of lieutenant-colonel 
for the period of his command. 
2 The Force concentrated in the Ottawa area 
in April, 1898. 
It was immediately apparent that the kitting and equipping of the 
Force would be no simple matter. For the first time, the Canadian defence 
establishment was forced to consider the single most important military 
characteristic of the North: isolation. In the Yukon, there were no es- 
tablished sources of services and supply. There could be no local pur- 
chase of essential cpmmodities. The Force would have to be prepared to 
operate self-sufficiently once it was in the Yukon. The lists of the 
I There is no explicit expression of this concern by Canadian 
government officials, but it is implicit in many of the statements made 
in the House of Commons by members of the cabinet. Windsor draws the 
same conclusion. See pp. 90-93. 
2(E. Pye), "The Yukon Field Force", Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 4, 
No. 6, November, 1956, p. 30. 
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general stores that had to be transported and even of the items of the 
individual soldier's kit, is huge. 
' Even such a mundane item as uniforms 
presented problems, for not only did the troops require their regular 
field and garrison dress, but they also needed a durable fatigue uniform 
and special environmental clothing that would allow them to face the 
rigours of the winter. 
It is not surprising that all the necessary equipment and en- 
vironmental clothing for northern operations had to be obtained from civ- 
ilian sources on special contract. The fact that Canada's soldiers were 
neither trained nor equipped to operate in the northern half of the nation 
had never previously concerned Canadian political or military leaders. 
As the scheduled departure date for the force drew near, various 
individuals and groups made efforts to have themselves attached to the 
party, for the great problem facing anybody intending to work in the 
Klondike was to get there. A government organized expedition presented 
itself as a heaven-sent opportunity for civilians to solve the transpor- 
tation/shelter/food problem. Four members of the Victorian Order of 
Nurses were accepted into the group. Their mission was to provide medi- 
cal services in the Yukon, 
2 
and their presence in the district was in the 
interest of the government in terms of supplying needed services. Two 
Roman Catholic priests managed to join the expedition based on what appears 
to have been nothing. more than the personal friendship of one of the 
clerics with the Prime Minister. A similar application by a British 
'PAC, RG 9,11 Al, folio 71958. 
20ttawa Evening Citizen, 26 March 18N. That the ladies managed 
to get themselves attached to the Yukon Field ForceJs perhaps attribu- 
table to the fact that Lady Aberdeen, the wife of the Governor General, 
was the founder of the order. 
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scientific party was turned down. 
1 
By May, 1898, the news of the Klondike had been pushed off the 
front pages of Canadian newspapers by reports of the events of the 
Spanish-American War. Pe rhaps inevitably, some of the "glamour" spilled 
over onto the Yukon Field Force. After all, there was Canada too dis- 
patching her own, albeit small, expeditionary force. As the Ottawa 
Evening Citizen pointed out, the C-anadian troops too were going to a far 
off land where they would face danger and hardship, although of a differ- 
ent scale and magnitude than that being encountered by American troopers 
and bluejackets. 
2 
The capital gave the Force an impressive send-off. The troops 
were inspected by both the Prime Minister and the Governor General on dif- 
ferent occasions. On the eve of their departure, the Minister of Militia 
and Defence hosted a farewell dinner for the officers to which several 
parliamentary notables and senior military officers were invited. On the 
morning of 6 May, 1898, just prior to entraining for the west, the Force 
officers breakfasted with the Governor General and the Prime Minister. A 
substantial crowd saw the troops off at the station. 
3 
The crossing of the continent via the Canadian Pacific Railroad 
special train was something of a triumphant procession. The Force was 
feted in Winnipeg where they spent the night and paused briefly to pick up 
an additional draft of troops from the Royal Canadian Dragoons. Their 
arrival in Vancouver just after noon on 11 May was similarly a grand 
occasion. The Vancouver Province noted that the Force was "welcomed to 
the city by a huge crowd of citizens", and was later extended a formal 
'PAC, RG 9,11 Al, folios 16688,16713. 
20ttawa Evening Citizen, 7 May 1898.3 Ibid. 
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welcome by the mayor and aldermen. 
1 
It is interesting that both of the newspapers cited here fully 
supported the government's reasons for the dispatch of the troops. The 
sovereignty and law and order themes were paramount. The Ottawa Evening_ 
Citizen, editorializing on the_need for a Yukon railroad noted: 
We were given to understand that famine and rebellion were lurking 
among the fastnesses and along the trails and that, if troops could 
not be hurried into the Klondtke on short notice, the richest mining 
districts of the world might pass under the control of an alien 
population. 2 
The 203 members of the force, plus their associated hangers-on, 
departed Vancouver on 14 May aboard the steamship Islander. 
3 The selected 
route was certainly not the easiest. The simplest and most direct route 
to the Klondike was undoubtedly via the American port of Skagway and over 
the White or Chilcoot Passes into the Yukon. There were several exclus- 
ively political reasons that led to the rejection of the direct route. 
The selected route followed the proposed course of the Canadian Yukon 
Railroad. After having touted the advantages of such a route in the 
House of Commons for months preceding the dispatch of the Force, the 
government was more or less obliged to support its own contentions about 
the advantages of the "all Canadian" route and to order the troops to 
follow it. The second reason was the diplomatic problems that might have 
ensued if a formed body of Canadian troops had to cross through American 
territory. There were many vocal objections in Canada against allowing 
American troops to traverse the Yukon on their way to Alaska. The govern- 
'The Vancouver Province, 11 May 1898. 
2 See The Vancouver Province, 11 May 1898, and The Ottawa Evening 
Citizen, 11 k-a5yv -1898. -w- 
3 R. C. Featherstonhaugh, The Royal Canadian Regiment, 1883-1933 
(Montreal: Gazette Printing Company, 1936y-, p. 67. 
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ment could hardly have gone hat in hand to Washington and ask that Cana- 
dian troops be permitted to cross Alaska on their way to the Yukon. Thus 
the Yukon Field Force was to be subjected to the rigours and difficulties 
of the Wragnel-Telegraph Creek-Teslin route: the Stikine Trail. 
In point of fact, the so called all-Canadian route was not all 
Canadian at all, as it was necessary to pass through American territorial 
waters in the Alaskan Panhandle and also to tranship from ocean going 
steamer to riverboat at the American port of Wragnel. The best that could 
be said for the route was that it was less American than the alternatives. 
No difficulties were encountered in the United States territory. The 
weapons and supplies of the troops cleared US Customs in bond and the 
troops of the American Army garrison at Wragnel welcomed their Canadian 
counterparts in the community during the two days it took to transfer the 
Force's supplies to a pair of river boats. 
' 
The river voyage to Glenora was accomplished with no more than 
the usual number of mishaps, groundings, and mechanical breakdowns. At 
Glenora, the Force began an intensive training period designed to accustom 
the troops to the rigours of marching over what passed as a trail in the 
vastness of the North. There was no railroad from Telegraph Creek to the 
head of navigation at Teslin. The great railroad project had foundered 
in the Senate where the Conservative majority would have nothing to do 
with what was consid? red an excessive land grant-accompanying the con- 
tract. The troops, like the rest of the hapless gold seekers using the 
route, would have to walk. 
The rigours of the Stikine Trail, and indeed all of the routes to 
the Klondike, have been well chronicled. The troops--of the Yukon Field 
I Ibid., p. 230. 
30 
Force suffered no more and probably a good deal less than their fellow 
civilian trekkers. Pierre Berton paints a picture of the conditions on 
the trail: 
(A) wagon road was supposed 
hundred and fifty-six- miles 
existent .... The route 
animals of all description 
along the wayside sacks of 
of broken sleds. 1 
to lead overland to Teslin Lake, one 
distant, but the road was largely non- 
to Teslin became black with people and 
... piles of useless equipments strewn sugar, discarded clothing, the wreckage 
The presence of the Yukon Field Force was also noted: 
(A)nd in the midst of all-this hurlyburly, the most outlandish ; ig*ht* of all: two hundred and three uniformed soldiers in scarlet 
jackets and white helmets marching as best they could in close 
order ... trudging in step through the mudholes and over rocks 
and stumps, performing barrack-square evolutions, spearing fish with 
their bayonets, and dragging their Maxim guns along with them. 2 
In retrospect, the march to Teslin was a significant accomplish- 
ment for the Force. No casualties were sustained and the main body 
arrived in that small community by mid August. In his Report for the 
year, the Major General commanding the Canadian Militia, E. T. H. Hutton, 
wrote: 
The march of the force across an hitherto but little known and very 
difficult country was conducted with judgement and skill on the part 
of the officer in command. 
The difficulties encountered were not unlike those experienced 
by the Red River Expedition in 1870. It may fairly be said that 
'Berton, p. 230. 
2 Ibid. Berton exaggerates in some respects here. There is no 
evidence That the trbops attempted to march in formation or to keep step 
as they struggled along the trail; nor did they wear dress uniform. At 
evening bivouac sites, however, drill periods were regular features of 
the Force's daily routine. Parade square drill in the middle of the 
wilderness may seem ludicrous today, but the notion was in keeping with 
turn of the century ideas of military discipline and how best to maintain 
it. The officers of the Force justified the drill sessions on the grounds 
that it helped to remind the troops that they were part of an organized 
military force and not members of the rabble that surrounded them. See 
Featherstonhaugh, p. 70. Documents held in the Public Archives of Canada 
do not record what the troops thought of it all. 
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this small force of Canadian troops has well sustained the reputa- 
tion of British soldiers for perseverance, persistence of purpose, 
endurance and discipline under trying circumstances. 1 
On 11 September, the Force reached Fort Selkirk, a former 
Hudson's Bay Company post. Selkirk had been selected by an optimistic 
government as the future-administrative center of the Yukon because it was 
centrally located in the region and was not plagued by the swampy condi- 
tions of low-lying Dawson. Accordingly, Evans had been ordered to esta- 
blish his main base at that site. An advanced party of artisans and 
skilled axemen had preceded the main body, and work was well advanced on 
the construction of the barracks and the associated buildings. The epic 
journey--by rail, steamship, river boat, foot and scow--was over. The 
Yukon Field Force had arrived in its theatre of operations. 
In Dawson, there was-s-om-e question as to whether the Force was 
needed. The editor of The Klondike Nuggett, which began publication in 
June, had commented in July on the "police reinforcements" who were ru- 
moured to be on their way. The story had become somewhat warped in trans- 
mission and the members of the Yukon Field Force were identified as "a 
2 
body of two hundred and fifty Winnipeg special policemen" . In any case, 
the editor observed that the great rush of people that the Dominion 
government had envisioned had not really materialized. As a result, 
that number will be superfluous. The present force is ample and is 
effectually and satisfactorily policing the district without any 
addition to their number. 3 
The opinions of the local journalist to the contrary, however, 
upon the Force's arrival in Selkirks Superintendent S. B. Steele of the 
1 Militia Report, 1898, p. 25. 
2The (Dawson) Klondike Nugget, 12 July 1898. '- 
31bid. 
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Mounted Police in Dawson immediately applied to the Yukon Commissioner 
to have fifty men deployed to Dawson to supplement the police. Again, 
the law and order issue was paramount, as Steele felt that there were not 
sufficient police available in the gold field area to respond to possible 
emergencies. By December, 1898, the strength of the Dawson detachment had 
been increased to two officers and seventy other ranks. 
1 
While the first winter for the Force in the North passed, thought- 
ful people in Ottawa began to consider the Force and ask questions as to 
precisely what the troops did. An inquiry by the Minister to Militia 
Headquarters concerning the exact nature of the troops' duties must have 
caused some embarrassment to the senior staff officers there. They were 
forced to admit that they were not really sure just what two hundred of 
their men were doing, but it was allowed that they would ask the commander. 
Colonel Evans replied to the query at some length on 1 August, 
1899. At Fort Selkirk, he reported, there was a barrack guard of five men 
and a regimental fire piquet of four. Aside from these regular duties the 
troops were occupied in "routine garrison drills and duties". At Dawson, 
the list of responsibilities of the Force was somewhat more impressive. 
The troops mounted guard on a regular basis on the office and residence of 
the Commissioner of the Yukon Territory and a guard was mounted during the 
evening hours on the three banks of the community. The Dawson detachment 
also provided escorts for civil prisoners when the latter were engaged on 
labour projects. In addition, a section was employed two or three times 
a month in escorting the gold shipments that came in from the diggings on 
the creeks to the city banks. 
2 
It is obvious that the Force was making itself useful by acting 
I PAC, RG 9,11 Al, folio 17743.2 Ibid. 
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as a form of police auxilliary. In addition, as the Klondike Nugget 
noted, their presence was most welcome whenever Dawson suffered one of 
the periodic fires that devastated the town. It is equally obvious that 
the anticipated crisis that prompted the Force's deployment in the first 
place had not emerged. 
Whether or not the presence of the troops contributed signifi- 
cantly to the continued peace cannot be determined. By the summer of 
1899, the rush was over and the population of Dawson was rapidly dwindling. 
The North West Mounted Police had been established in the community from 
the very beginning and had never lost control. In retrospect, Dawson was 
a very peaceful city, particularly in comparison to American frontier 
mining communities of the nineteenth century. 
Pressure began to mount to withdraw the Force, and this pressure 
came from both within the military establishment itself and from the ranks 
of the opposition in the House of Commons. As early as the winter of 1898, 
General Hutton wanted his troops back. Hutton, a British officer, had been 
seconded by the War Office to Canada and came to the Dominion dedicated to 
the concept of imperial defence and the development of a militia army. 
There were several much needed reforms that he wanted to institute in the 
Active Militia, and to carry out these reforms, he required the services 
of the troops of the Permanent Force stationed in the Yukon. As he noted 
in his annual Report,, 
With reduced number of Permanent troops now available, it is found 
to be impossible to satisfactorily carry out the instructional system 
for officers and N. C. officers of the Active Militia at the various 
Schools of Instruction. It is even difficult to carry out the ordi- 
nary routine duties appertaining to troops in'. barracks. I have 
already represented that officers and men at the various schools of 
instruction are overworked. 
'Militia Report, 1898, pp. 36-37. 
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Hutton wanted the troops to be withdrawn in the summer of 1899. Failing 
that, he recommended that the establishment of the Permanent Force be 
increased to offset the loss of men to the Yukon. He noted that the 203 
soldiers of the Permanent Force serving in the North amounted to 24.4 
per cent of the regular army of Canada. 
I 
The eventual result was a compromise. A portion of the Force was 
withdrawn, including the commander-, who was slated to go to South Africa 
as part of the Canadian contingent serving there. The 88 soldiers who 
remained, now styled "The Yukon Garrison", abandoned Fort Selkirk and 
established themselves in Dawson City. 
2 
In the House of Commons, an opposition member accused the govern- 
ment of wasting money on the Force, claiming that the Yukon was perfectly 
peaceful and the Mounted Police who were on the scene at the time of the 
rush would have been adequate to control the situation. Frederick Borden 
replied that the increase in the police establishment and the raising of 
the Yukon Field Force was a precautionary measure based upon the antici- 
pated influx of people into the territory. He went on to produce a fine 
argument for the value of military presence and the deterrent and stabil- 
izing effect a garrison has on the population: 
** 
(I)n mining communities such as that in the Yukon, there is ýlways danger to peace and order ... as the presence of a force 
amongst the population ... will serve to preserve order .... It is altogether unjustifiable ... to attempt to argue that be- 
cause that force. -has not been actually called out to use its fire- 
arms, it, therefore, is unnecessary. It is true there has been 
good order in that country, but there has been good order because 
the Government had taken the precaution of sending the Mounted 
Police there and sending the militia there to see good order was 
preserved. 3 
The difficulty inherent in such a proposition is that it is impossible 
1 Ibid. 2 Ibid., 1899, pp. 18-19. 
3 Debates, pp. 6321-6322. 
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to prove one way or the other. Prudence dictates that it is better to 
react on the side of strength. 
The winter of 1899 passed for the Yukon Garrison much as had the 
previous year. The rush was clearly over and former citizens of Dawson 
continued to leave. The days of the Force were numbered, for the require- 
ment for the troops' presence had now passed. In his year-end Report, 
the General Officer Commanding the Militia noted that a decision on the 
Force would be required early in 1900. By May the period of service of 
the volunteers would have expired and it would be necessary either to 
replace the troops or to renew their terms of service if it were decided 
to retain the garrison. 
I 
In March, Sir Charles Tupper, the Leader of the Opposition, again 
brought up the issue of the troops in the Yukon. In view of the drasti- 
cally decreased population of the territory and the continued presence of 
the Mounted Police, he called for the withdrawal of the remainder of the 
Force, on the grounds that it represented a needless expenditure of public 
monies. He maintained that as events had turned out, there never was any 
need to dispatch the Force in the first place for, "the Yukon has been 
one of the most orderly places in the Dominion". 
2 The Prime Minister 
replied, repeating the argument that the reason for the tranquinity of the 
area even at the height of the gold rush was, "largely due to the care 
taken by the government to provide such a police and military force as to 
check the possibility of any demonstration He did agree, how- 
ever, that the reports of the Force at the end of the winter season would 
be carefully studied and that there was the possibility that the govern- 
3 
ment would decide on the withdrawal of the Force. 
'Militia Report, 1898, p. 19. 
2Debates, 1900, p. 1209.31bid., pp. 1210-1211. 
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The Cabinet considered the situation in May. A report submitted 
by the Minister of Militia and Defence noted that if a garrison were to be 
maintained in the Yukon, it would ýave to be kept at the present strength 
of about 88 to be efficient. He further noted that few, if any, of the 
members of the Permanent Force volunteers then serving in the Yukon in- 
tended to re-engage for a further period of service in the North and hence 
the government would be faced with the expense of dispatching replacements 
the coming summer. In any case, the minister admitted that there was no 
longer any justification for keeping the Force in the Yukon as the situ- 
ation had stabilized completely. The government resolved to withdraw the 
troops on the opening of navigation in the summer of 1900. The men were 
needed elsewhere to meet the Canadian commitment to South Africa and the 
new requirement to garrison the former imperial naval fortress at Halifax. 
Upon receipt of the withdrawal order, the Yukon Garrison quickly 
made the necessary preparations. Rifles and ammunition were left in 
Dawson under the care of the police, available for issue should any un- 
anticipated emergency arise. In July, 1900, the Yukon Field Force was no 
more. 
1 In recognition 
the Militia commented: 
duty characterized all 
in the Yukon. 112 
For a few year 
of their services, the General officer Commanding 
"A soldier-like spirit and zealous attention to 
ranks of this Force during its two years service 
s an Active Militia Company existed in the Klondike. 
The Dawson Rifle Company with an established strength of 45 all ranks was 
authorized on 1 July, 1900. The unit paraded regularly in mufti until the 
following year when uniforms, arms, and ammunition were received from 
PAC, RG 9,11 Al, folio 18637. 
2Militia Report, 1900, p. 43. 
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Ottawa. The organization existed for five years, during which time it 
acted much like any other Active Militia unit. 
I The continuing fall of 
Dawson's population resulted in the disbandment of the unit in November, 
1905.2 
In this manner, the Canadian military vanished from the North. 
The Yukon Field Force must be looked on as an aberration in the develop- 
ment of the Canadian military establishment. The military presence in 
the North was as ephemeral as the event which had prompted it. The town- 
site at Fort Selkirk was never built and the Field Force barracks slowly 
crumbled into decay eventually to vanish beneath encroaching vegetation. 
With the gold rush over, there was no military interest in the North and 
precious little governmental interest. In the realm of defence, interest 
continued to focus on the rb-for-Cn-of the Militia, in the developing concept 
of imperial defence and the role Canada was to play in the Empire of 
which she was a part. For many years, the only uniforms to be seen in 
the North were those of the Royal North West Mounted Police. A pattern 
of sporadic military involvement in the North had begun. None of the 
soldiers who had served in'the Yukon ever returned. What experience they 
had gained was quickly lost to the Militia. 
'Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History 
(henceforth: D Hist), folio 5001009(D7), "Lieut Col. H. D. Hulme Tells 
of Early Days of Rifle-Company", newspaper (unidentified) clipping. The 
author of the article was the first commanding officer of the Dawson 
Rifle Company. 
2Cited in Pye, p. 34. 
CHAPTER III 
HIATUS 
The Empty Years: 1900-1922 
There is an historic Canadian tendency to be concerned with the 
North only during times of crisis or periods of economic prosperity. At 
the turn of the century, the Klondike crisis had passed, but a booming 
economy allowed Laurier's Liberals to turn some of their attention to the 
North. In the few years that remained before the outbreak of war, Canada 
made some progress towards exerting national authority in the Arctic. A 
series of flag showing, proclamation issuing, cairn building expeditions 
was sent into the Eastern Arctic. These voyages also acted as bases for 
scientific study, customs collection, and fishery control. RNWMP detach- 
ments were established along the western shore of Hudson Bay and on the 
Beaufort Sea. A study was commissioned to investigate the strength and 
validity of Canadian claims to the territories and waters of the Arctic. 
Legislation was enacted organizing the arctic territories for adminis- 
trative purposes. In the Senate, Senator Pascal Poirier proposed that 
Canada declare sovereignty over all lands lying between her eastern and 
western borders from the mainland to the pole. The resolution, which came 
to be known as an expression of "The Sector Principle", was in time to 
become an important issue in northern sovereignty. 
1 
A number of factors precipitated this sudden--flurry of interest. 




eignty. It was appreciated by a few thoughtful politicians, civil ser- 
vants, and private citizens that unless Canada showed some interest in the 
Arctic, and took at least some symbolic actions to demonstrate her auth- 
ority, whatever legal claims the country had to the territory might slip 
away in the face of occupation and development of the region by citizens 
of other nations. 
It was clear that despite what Canada and Great Britain might 
claim, foreign nationals operating in the High Arctic around the turn of 
the century regarded the area as no man's land. They had little reason to 
think otherwise, for aside from a government-sponsored expedition in the 
mid-1880s to investigate shipping possibilities in the Hudson Straits 
area, agents of the Canadian government had never been into the Arctic. 
American whalers occupied semi-permanent base camps in the Eastern Arctic, 
where they carried out an increasingly profitable fur and ivory trade as 
a subsidiary activity. They also penetrated into the Beaufort Sea in the 
Western Arctic, established prosperous fishery, and (if one could believe 
contemporary Canadian newspaper accounts) debauched the local Eskimos. 
Robert Peary's polar expeditions of 1898,1905, and 1908 were carried out 
with. a cavalier disregard for the environment, the native peoples, and the 
sensibilities of Canada. Peary's expeditions were all supplied with a 
generous quantity of Stars and Stripes which he did not hesitate to plant 
along his routes. 
1 To'the west of Ellesmere Island, the Norwegian ex- 
plorer, Otto Sverdrup, and his partners were carrying out important geo- 
graphical and scientific work, discovering in the process some hitherto 
unknown islands. This particular expedition was in time to raise some 
delicate questions of Canadian sovereignty. While Bdtain had ceded to 
1 Philips, p. 101. 
40 
Canada all the islands between the mainland and the pole, the question 
arose over the international validity of the scope of the bequest: could 
one nation cede to another something that the donor did not even know it 
owned. 
Much of the government-sponsored activity in the 1897-1914 period 
was designed either to control the above mentioned ventures or to act as 
a Canadian counterpoise to the international implications of such foreign 
activity. There were, however, other reasons for the Canadian programs. 
As a sovereign state it was the right of Canada to levy customs duties on 
trade being conducted in her territory. Similarly, it was her right to 
demand that whalers operating in Canadian waters take out the appropriate 
licences. While this aspect had strong overtones of maintenance of sover- 
eignty, there was also the simple fact that the country was losing revenue 
because she had no means either of enforcing the regulations or even of 
collecting the money. Another not to be neglected factor was that several 
departments of the federal government had an interest in the North as a 
direct extension of their regular responsibilities. The Geological Survey 
Branch in particular wanted more basic data about all aspects of the North. 
Economically, there was increasing interest in a possible Hudson Bay 
shipping route for rapidly expanding wheat exports. Before regular ship- 
ping schedules could be established, however, it was realized that much 
basic data on ice conditions in the Bay and the Straits would have to be 
collected. In all, several departments of the federal government became 
involved in research and exploration activities in the Arctic during this 
period. The Department of Militia and Defence was conspicuous by its 
absence. 
By no stretch of the imagination was the North at the turn of the 
century and in the first two decades beyond, a potential battle area or 
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invasion route. Isolation, distance, and climate all combined to secure 
Canada's North. What little local shipping there was did not represent 
a worthwhile target for anti-shipping operations. There were no strategic 
targets in the North. Aviation, still in its infancy, had not developed 
the necessary technology to permit trans-polar flights. 
In 1903, in response to public pressure to dispatch an arctic 
patrol to reinforce Canadian sovereign claims, most other nations would 
have sent a gunboat--or a cruiser! The significance and utility of naval 
units "showing the flag" was well understood in the western world. The 
option was not even considered, for Canada still had no navy. In the same 
vein, there was a clear need to deploy agents of the federal government to 
occupy land and enforce the laws of Canada in the Arctic, the government 
turned instinctively to the Mounted Police. There was no consideration 
whatsoever of using troops, despite the fact that the Mounted Police were 
fully occupied with their responsibilities in the Yukon. Canada simply 
marked time in the Arctic, doing the absolute minimum required to reserve 
her claim to the far northern lands against the day when they might prove 
to have some utility to the nation. 
It was a two way street. Political leaders never thought of the 
Militia, and Militia leaders certainly never suggested military involve- 
ment in the North. A mere two hundred men dispatched to the Yukon had 
seriously disrupted the Permanent Force. Canada's General Officers 
Commanding the Militia and later, Chiefs of Staff were not about to 
suggest a further commitment for their tiny force. Internal reform, 
training, and imperial defence--these issues and these alone occupied the 
attention of military leaders. Not only was a potential not utilized, it 
was not even realized that it existed. The annual Reports of the Depart- 
ment of Militia and Defence from 1901 to 1922 make not one single reference 
42 
to the North. 
In the pre-war years, what Canada did, albeit slowly, and with no 
great sense of urgency, was build a Militia Army along the lines that 
General Hutton had envisioned. Beginnings were made on the establishment 
of the various support arms and services that a modern field army required. 
Militia staff courses and staff rides were undertaken with a view to in- 
creasing the technical competence of Canada's part-time soldiers. A mobil- 
ization plan was drafted. The size of the force continued to grow. In 
the summer of 1914, over 50,000 volunteers attended the annual training 
period; the Permanent Force approached 3,000 all ranks. 
1 
Canada also laid down the beginnings of a navy. The early history 
of the Royal Canadian Navy was by no means smooth. There was fundamental 
disagreement within the country as to the purpose, role, and, most import- 
antly, the relationship that Canada's maritime force should have with the 
Royal Navy. The eventual decision was that Canada should have her own 
navy which would come under the higher command of the Admiralty during 
time of war. In August, 1914 Canada's navy consisted of two aged ex-Royal 
Navy cruisers, one on each coast. 
There was no Air force, nor were there any military aircraft. 
In view of the eventual course of the First World War; it is mani- 
festly obvious that Canada was in no way even vaguely prepared for the 
scale of conflict that developed. In this respect she was not alone. No 
nation had even begun to appreciate the implications of total war or the 
vast technological superiority that the defence had over the offence. 
Canada's war effort can be seen as a national spasm. The Canadian 
See K. C. Eyre, "Staff and Command in the Canadian Corps" 
(Unpublished MA Thesis, Duke University, 1967). 
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contribution was out of proportion to the pre-war military capability, 
and in many ways, was out of proportion to the size of the Dominion. It 
is clear now that Canada went to war with a good deal of enthusiasm and 
patriotic fervour. Many of those who volunteered during the hot days of 
August did so with the nagging fear that the was would be over before 
they got to Europe. They need not have worried. Three years later, a 
reluctant government was forced to begin conscription to keep the deployed 
forces up to strength. 
The bulk of these forces were embodied in the Canadian Expedition- 
ary Force, the teeth of which was, by 1917, a large, powerful four-div- 
ision corps fighting on the Western Front. 
1 
The Royal Canadian Navy virtually withered on the vine during the 
war years. Canada ended the-do-n-f"l ict with a handful of trawlers and 
drifters engaged in coastal patrol work. The two old cruisers had long 
since been laid up. Those Canadians who wished to serve at sea joined 
the Royal Navy. 
Canada made no serious attempt to develop her own air force during 
the war. Those Canadians with a bent for aviation served in the Royal 
Flying Corps and later, in the Royal Air Force. Their numbers and their 
accomplishments were not insignificant. By the war's end, it has been 
estimated that fully 25 per cent of the air crews of the RAF were of 
Canadian origin. 
The war in Europe dominated Canada. For four years, the nation 
looked east. The North was forgotten--with one exception. In 1913, the 
Conservative administration of Robert Laird Borden sponsored an expedition 
of exploration and scientific research into the Western Arctic. Under 
lSee John Swettenham, To Seize the Victory The Canadian Corps in 
World War I (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1965). 
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Vilhalmir Steffanson, a portion of the Canadian Arctic Expedition remained 
in the field throughout the war. With the exception of this handful of 
men, the Arctic was devoid of federal government representation. 
With the Armistice, Canada quickly divested herself of the trap- 
pings of war. The mighty Canadian Expeditionary Force. vanished almost 
overnight. The country lapsed into its traditional defence posture, a 
voluntary militia supported by a small Permanent Force of professional 
soldiers. Miniscule naval and air forces were also retained. 
In the immediate post-war years, the federal government perceived 
an imperative to respond to the twin demands of sovereignty and national 
development in the North. With respect to the former, neither the govern- 
ment nor the defence establishment anticipated any role for the military, 
although inherent in the situation were certain possibilities that were 
ignored by both. In the field of national development, however, two of 
the war-inspired technologies, aviation and wireless communications, were 
seen to have tremendous importance for the future development of the 
North. The Canadian military establishment was uniquely qualified to make 
significant contributions in both areas. 
CHAPTER IV 
NATION BUILDING I: 
The Interwar Years 1922-1939 
Lhe 1922 Eastern Arctic Expedition 
Soon after the end of the Great War, Canadian attention again 
turned to the unresolved issue of sovereignty over the islands of the 
Eastern Arctic. There had been no official Canadian presence in the area 
since the visit in 1910 of Captain J. E. Bernier on the third of his pre- 
war patrols in the Coast Guard Ship Arctic. This was despite the fact 
that in 1904 the Dominion Astronomer, Dr. W. F. King, on completion of 
his commissioned study of the problem of sovereignty in the Arctic, had 
concluded that Canada's claim was in many ways imperfect. In addition 
there were strong rumours circulating in Ottawa that other nations were 
preparing to occupy sites in the "Canadian North". The Danes, long estab- 
lished in Greenland, were reportedly planning an expedition to Ellesmere 
island, an area they regarded as unclaimed. The Norwegians had an historic 
but undeveloped claim to the islands west of Ellesmere, thanks to the 
explorations and discoveries of Otto Sverdrup in 1903-1905. American 
sponsored explorations were apparently in the offing and it was reported 
that a recently published American atlas showed Ellesmere in the same 
colour as Alaska--an ominous sign to concerned Canadians. 
In response to these perceived threats, the. Department of the 
Interior formed the Advisory Technical Board, in 1919. It consisted of 
a small group of senior civil servants under the chairmanship of the 
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Surveyor General, Dr. Edouard Deville. The Board's mandate was twofold: 
to determine whether or not the Canadian title to the arctic islands was 
worth developing; and, if so, to recommend what steps should be taken to 
establish such a title. The focus of the study was on the islands of the 
Eastern Arctic, but in some respects it touched on factors affecting the 
entire archipelago. 
Neither the potential valu nor the importance of the islands was 
generally perceived in the Dominion. Still, the Board found many com- 
pelling reasons for Canada to perfect her claim to the region: 
Ellesmere and the other northern islands have always been regarded 
in Canada as Canadian, and there doubtless would be strong sentiment 
against their being taken possession of by any other flag. 1 
It is probable that the emotional and nationalistic nature of the issue 
would in itself have been strong enough to cause the Board to recommend 
development of the Canadian claim. 
In any case, the Board produced several other reasons that were 
both perceptive and far-sighted. They noted the role the islands might 
play in civil and military aviation. Dealing with national security, they 
broached a subject that was to beguile and haunt defence planners in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. As the Board saw it, "It would be undesirable 
and dangerous to allow another nation to get a foothold in the north now 
that aerial navigation has become so far advanced". Nor was the signifi- 
cance of the Alaska precedent lost on the Board members. They were well 
aware that the unknown land that had been dubbed "Seward's Folly" at the 
Canada, Department of the Interior, Report by the Sub-Committee 
nical Board (henceforth ATB Report), (n. d. -I 
There are apparently several drafts of this report extending well into 
1920. The one referred to here is probably the first-draft. It was 
submitted to the Commissioner of the RCMP in January 1920. The report is 
held in RCMP, Historical Section, File G-516-37 overeiqnýy over Islands 4ainland of Canada (henceforihSRCMP Northern over- rn 
eignty), Vol. Z. 
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time of purchase not only turned out to be a literal gold mine but also 
eventually yielded substantial other resources. It was anticipated that 
the Arctic Archipelago might well contain vast reserves of mineral wealth. 
There was even at that early date the suspicion voiced that oil might be 
discovered in the more westerly islands. Clearly, for a wide variety of 
reasons, the Board thought that it was in Canada's immediate interest to 
develop her sovereign claim. 
Of the various methods by which a state can acquire territory 
within the established conventions of international law, occupation was 
seen by the Board as most appropriate to the case of the islands of the 
Eastern Arctic. Occupation required more than just a symbolic act such as 
the hoisting of a flag. A real claim to sovereignty, through occupation, 
had to be based upon a physical presence and the establishment of govern- 
ment administration in the area. 
' Obviously, some agents of the Canadian 
government were going to have to go north. 
The Board was quite definite as to who these agents ought to be: 
sovereignty in the Eastern Arctic was to be established by the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police. The men of the Force had already established a 
presence in the Yukon, the Mackenzie, and along the fringes of Hudson Bay. 
It seemed natural that now they should be sent farther afield. The Board 
does not appear even to have considered such alternatives as a military 
garrison or a civil Ogency of the Department of the Interior. 
The Report produced by the Advisory Technical Board became the key 
planning document for subsequent Canadian occupation of the Eastern Arctic. 
Virtually all its recommended; 'programs and approaches were eventually 
implemented. The one area where the opinion of the. Board differed from 
'Ibid. 
48 
that of the Cabinet was the need for haste. The bureaucrats thought 
that immediate action was imperative; the politicians perceived no such 
pressure. 
The members of the Board were concerned with the need "to get 
there first", but by the time the Report had been fully considered in the 
Department and the Cabinet, it was mid-1920 and the summer shipping season 
was too far advanced for Canada to do anything concrete that year. It was 
the potential Danish "threat" to Ellesmere Island that most concerned the 
Department of the Interior. The Board went so far as to outline a tenta- 
tive plan to be used if definite evidence became available that the Danish 
government was going to support an expedition in 1920. They recommended 
that Canada should attempt to borrow an airship from the imperial govern- 
ment. This airship was to be loaded with a group of RCMP constables and 
a winter's worth of supplies, and launched from Scotland towards the Pole. 
over Ellesmere, the police were to parachute onto the island in time to 
greet the Danes. 
1 Given the state of the art of arctic aerial navigation 
and parachuting technology, it is fortunate for the police that there 
never was a need to implement this hare-brained preemptive scheme. 
At first glance, it would seem that it would have been reasonable 
to turn to the Department of Militia and Defence for the men for this con- 
tingency plan. "Airborne operations", as the mass parachuting of troops 
was to become known in-the next war, were still a phenomenon of the future. 
Parachuting in the early 1920s was still very much a fairground display 
stunt or, increasingly, a lifesaving means for aviators. The link between 
I In point of fact the Danish government was quite helpful to 
Canada when the expedition was actually launched, and continued to provide 
assistance during the period 1922-25. See RCMP NortlTern SovereigntY, 
Vols. 2,3. 
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parachuting and the military had yet to be formed. 
' 
In another sense, this minor plan is illustrative of the manner 
in which the defence establishment was regarded in Canada. There is no 
evidence that the Department of the Interior ever even considered consul- 
tation with the Department of Militia and Defence on any aspect of the 
problem. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the military would have 
had the slightest interest in the_project had they been approached. 
Canadian attitudes were very fixed. The business of the military estab- 
lishment was the defence of the country and the support of the forces of 
law and order. The protection of sovereignty was the responsibility of 
the RCMP. There is no evidence whatsoever that anybody--politician, 
civil servant, professional soldier, or private citizen--at the time 
considered that the militark--h-ad or could have a role to play in the es- 
tablishment and protection of sovereignty. 
The Danes did nothing in 1920, and Canada was able to proceed at 
a leisurely pace with the planning and the preparations for an expedition 
in 1921. A wooden hulled sailing ship, the Arctic, was procured for the 
expedition, and a massive refit was begun. Her former Master, Captain 
Joseph E. Bernier, Canada's most experienced arctic mariner, was called 
out of retirement. J. D. Craig of the Department of the Interior was 
appointed commander of the expedition, and at RCMP headquarters, staff 
officers began to examine the nominal roll of the Force in search of 
likely candidates for the northern deployment. 
Then, all activity ceased; the expedition was cancelled. 
'Brigadier-General William Mitchell's plan to drop the Ist Divi- 
sion of the American Expeditionary Force behind German lines at Metz in 
support of the 1919 offensive had naturally not come to fruition, for- 
tunately for the American troops as the concept was ahead of the tech- 
nology required to support it. 
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Mackenzie King, the Leader of the Opposition, wanted to know. why. Prime 
Minister Arthur Meighen claimed that the expedition had not actually been 
cancelled, but had merely been put off until the following year because 
of the high costs involved. The issue was pursued with the suggestion 
that Canada should accept the additional expense in view of the rumour 
that, "another power just might be contemplating the same action". The 
Prime Minister's disagreement with the time assessment of his civil ser- 
vants was most apparent when he stated that there was really no pressing 
need for action, and that Canada's claims would not be harmed by waiting 
a year. He did assure the House, however, that if any other power made 
a move in the Canadian Arctic, "the Government will not hesitate to take 
action to protect the interests of Canada". 
' Just what that action would 
be and how the government would take it, the Prime Minister did not say. 
The plan for the occupation of the Eastern Arctic continued to be 
developed and refined during the year-long lapse in activity. Government 
officials paid considerable attention to the notion that a claim to sover- 
eignty based upon the fact of occupation required both physical presence 
and the provision of government administration. In the Canadian case, 
however, the occupiers and the administrators were to be one in the same: 
the RCMP. As W. W. Cory, the Commissioner of the North West Territories 
saw it, 
in order to establish occupation it is necessary to perform ýeýtýin administýative acts and that the Police Force should be 
empowered to act as Customs Officers, Immigration Officers, Post- 
masters, etc. 2 
It is often popularly assumed that the men of the RCMP who performed 
IDebates. 30 May 1921, p. 4106. 
2RCMP Northern Sovereignty, Vol. 1, Cory to Perry (Commissioner, 
RCMP) 12 March 1921. 
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basic tasks of government administration in the early years in the High 
Arctic did so on an unofficial basis as and when the need arose in the 
areas they patrolled. In reality, it was always intended, because of the 
legal needs of the sovereignty claim, that such services should be pro- 
vided on an official basi s. The RCMP had approached all the departments 
concerned to have the Force's detachment commanders in the North formally 
appointed (without salary) to the-posts of Immigration Officer, Customs- 
Excise Officer, Justice of the Peace, Coroner, and Postmaster. 
I 
The year 1922 marked a turning point in the history of the Canadian 
North. The Canadian Arctic Expedition finally departed from Quebec City 
on 18 July. Aboard Arctic was a force of nine members of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, commanded by Inspector C. E. Wilcox. Cargo 
included a two year supply of food and fuel, along with the necessary 
materiel to build quarters for the men who would occupy and administer the 
Eastern Arctic. By the end of summer, Wilcox and his men were established 
in the forlorn camps that were to be their homes for the next two years. 
The RCMP posts established at Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island, and Pond 
Inlet on Baffin were the beginnings of what was to become a far flung net 
of police posts. The subsequent story of the RCMP presence in the High 
Arctic has been woven into the basic fabric of the history of the area. 
The summer cruise of the Arctic, and those of her successors, to resupply 
the police posts and., -to provide an ever increasing range of government 
services was to become an annual feature in the North. Today, in modified 
but recognizable form, the Eastern Arctic Patrols are still carried Out. 
2 
I RCMP Northern Sovereignty, Vol. 1, Cory to Perry (Commissioner, 
RCMP) 12 March 1921. 
2For 
a more detailed study and analysis of the sovereignty estab- 
lishing aspects of the 1922 Expedition, see K. C. Eyre, "Policemen and 
post Offices: Canadian Sovereignty 1922 Style", north nord, Vol. 23, 
No. 3, May/June 1976. 
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Symbolic acts such as the building of a cairn, the reading of a 
proclamation, or the hoisting of a flag were deemed by international con- 
vention to be inadequate to support a claim to sovereignty. Canada's 
response was to provide a symbolic presence and a symbolic administration. 
It mattered not that it was extremely unlikely that anybody would actually 
require the services provided by the police detachments. The presence of 
the police detachments in the North was seen from Ottawa to "close up 
what might be called the front door of the Arctic Archipelago"' 
1 
In addition to the members of the RCMP and several representatives 
of the Department of the Interior, Squadron Leader Robert A. Logan of the 
Canadian Air Force sailed with the 1922 Eastern Arctic Expedition. In 
doing so he became the first member of the Canadian military establishment 
ever to serve in the Arctic. The Advisory Technical Board had sensed that 
the war-inspired technology of aviation, and the promise of extensive 
further development, would have an important significance to the Canadian 
North. Logan was ordered, at the last minute, to join the expedition, the 
Department of the Interior having approached the Air Board to supply such 
a specialist. His task was 
to endeavour to obtain as much information as possible regarding 
flying conditions (in the Arctic Archipelago), and from investigations 
made actually in the country concerned to submit suggestions which 
might be of assistance in determining the types of aircraft suitable 
for use and methods for their employment in various ways in the 
northern Archipelago. 2 
Loganis report naturally reflects his personal background and the 
organizational environment of which he was a part. As a member of the 
establishment, he looked at the Arctic Archipelago from the point 
ATB Reeort. 
2 R. A. Logan, Report of nvestigat ions on Aviation in the Arctic 
hý nal eC 
A Arcýipbella o carrLiedd out during the summer 0 22 (henceforth: Logan 
- ___ 
L --I Ca 
" 'U Lf 19' 
ýReport held inn CannaNa, Department of National Difence, Directorate of 
HistOrY (henceforth D Hist), (74/414). 
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of view of a defence strategist. He also assumed that pioneering aviation 
enterprises in the North would, of necessity, be carried out under govern- 
ment sponsorship and that the Canadian Air Force would be the agency that 
carried out the actual work involved. In reality, this latter aspect does 
not mean, as it appears to, that Logan saw the Air Force specifically as 
having an important role to play in the opening up of the North. Rather it 
reflects the primitive state of the organization of aviation in Canada at 
the time. In 1922, the Mackenzie King administration was in the process of 
merging civil and military aviation under a single Director of the Canadian 
Air Force within the Department of National Defence. While it was possible 
to distinguish between flying done as purely military training and flying 
done "in support of other government departments", all the actual work was 
done by the same group of people using the same group of aircraft. Logan 
was selected by the Air Board in his capacity as an expert on aviation, 
not in his capacity as an officer of one of the three fighting services. 
The Logan Report is an important historic document for it contains 
the first suggestion that the Far North had an important strategic role to 
play in the defence of Canada. In many respects, Logan's thoughts were a 
generation ahead of their time. Given what are now understood to be re- 
alities, his thoughts on the strategic importance of the North would have 
been much more appropriate to 1952 rather than 1922, for Logan correctly 
anticipated the developing technology of aviation and even the potential 
enemy. 
Logan built an analytic model which depicted four classes of glo- 
bal aviation. The last two classes, which included sub Arctic and Arctic 
flying, he maintained, would require special equipmerft, skills, and support 
facilities. On the grounds of defence alone, he urged that Canada should 
take the necessary steps to master northern flying. The opinion that it 
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would be necessary to develop such an obviously costly capability reflected 
Logan's adherence to the then current western democracies' concern with 
international communism in general, and the success of the Bolsheviks in 
Russia in particular: 
Much has been said of the possibilities of future hordes of Slavs 
overrunning Europe ... Afrcraft operated from Arctic or sub-Arctic bases which would swoop down and leave trails of destruction through- 
out the rest of the world, but from the very nature of their bases 
of operation they would be almost inaccessible to aircraft of 
countries to which "cold weat[Ter" flying was unfamiliar. 1 
Logan clearly saw it as a Canadian responsibility to develop the ability 
to deal with any northern threat. He wrote: 
Whether war with such a country as Russia would ever come or not, 
should not affect the determination to develop flying in the Canadian 
Arctic and sub-Arctic regions because Canada, if it considers itself 
worthy to be called a Nation, should have enough pride and spirit to 
take at least ordinary precautions and be prepared to defend itself 
in any emergency. 
... It now remains 
for (Canada) to show the rest of the world 
that she can defend herself, and the whole British Empire if necess- 
ary, from all comers from the cold countries in the north of Asia--or 
Europe--by having men trained and proper materiel and information 
available through actual practice within her own boundaries. 2 
This particular notion was strikingly out of accord with the then- 
current Canadian political and public mood. Canadians as a whole were 
war-weary, anti-military, and certainly not about to spend a single cent 
for defence from some prospective enemy in the far distant future. In 
point of fact, Canada, led by Mackenzie King, was disinclined to spend 
3 
much money on defending Canada, let alone the entire British Empire. 
Logan was shrewd enough to realize this and he showed a fine grasp of 
Canadian political and economic reality when he wrote: 
'Ibid., 
p. 2.2 Ibid., p. 3. 
3 See the chapter entitled "Views from a Fire-Proof House" in 
James Eayrss In Defence of Canada, Vol. 1, From the Great War to the Great 
Depression. onto: University of Toronto Press, 196b), pp. 4-25 for 
a comprehensive discussion of Canadian defence policy during the 1919-1935 
period. 
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Canada cannot afford at the present time to carry on expensive inves- 
tigation and research work unless some immediate benefit is to be 
obtained, and it is probable that the best policy will be to encour- 
age flying which will materially assist many civil operations, and 
at the same time a knowledge of aircraft operation in cold climates 
for defence purposes will automatically be gained. 
1 
This passage expresses a philosophy essentially the same as that put forth 
by J. A. Wilson, the Naval Director of Stores, who in April 1919 proposed 
the establishment of a Canadian Air Board: 
The upkeep of large Air Force -establishments for purely Naval and 
Military duties in time of Peace will be expensive and a constant 
object of criticism. It should therefore be advantageous to the 
country generally to encourage and assist the Civil development of 
aeronautics in every way, and to so guide and regulate its organis- 
ation and any aircraft industry which may develop in Canada, so that 
it may form a reservoir on which to draw in any emergency. 
2 
It was perceived in Canada that unlike the other armed services, 
military aviation could be adapted to fulfill a wide range of civil sup- 
port functions in peacetime. Logan experienced no apparent difficulty in 
identifying several useful tasks to which aircraft could be put in the 
developing North. He realized that airplanes were the ideal means for 
"the exploration and investigation of the extent of the natural resources 
of the territory". He noted that the work of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, both in respect of their civil tasks in support of sovereignty 
and in the more fundamental task (for them) of the administration of law 
and order, would be greatly facilitated by the use of aircraft. In antici- 
pation of the development of a major caribou and musk-ox herding industry, 
he pointed out that-aircraft would be the ideal means to identify existing 
and potential breeding and feeding grounds. It is evident from the tenor 
of his writings that Logan was anticipating a tremendous boom of develop- 
ment and exploitation throughout the North. The domesticated caribou and 
'Logan Report, p. 37. 
2 Cited in Eayrs, Vol. 1. p. 188. 
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and musk-ox herds, as he saw it, would provide a ready and economical 
source of food for workers "if a mineral or oil strike were ever made in 
a 
the Arctic Islands, or even in the sub-Arctic. 
' 
Logan was generally correct in his assessment of the direction of 
northern development; he was wrong in his sense of the tempo of that 
development. What he saw as taking place in the immediate fut-ure has 
taken, in fact, over five decades and the process is still far from com- 
plete. But who, in 1922, could have forecast the Great Depression and 
another world war? What is important about Logan's work, however, is his 
realization that before development could take place, a considerable amount 
of ground-work--experimentation and investigation--had to be done. He 
realized that development would be greatly facilitated if there were a 
modern communications and air transportation infrastructure established. 
He saw the Canadian Air Force as being the agent of the establishment of 
the Arctic air routes. Canada, on the whole, was not ready to get into 
the business of Arctic flying. The Arctic air exploration role that Logan 
envisioned for the Canadian Air Force did not even begin to develop serious- 
ly until after the end of the Second World War. 
The 1927-1928 Hudson Strait Expedition 
The vision of a seaport on the south of Hudson Bay, linking the 
Canadian West to the grain markets of Britain, was as old as the Dominion. 
The vision of a Hudson Bay port had endured since the early seventeenth 
century. It was a vision that was to take considerable time to be re- 
alized. As has been repeatedly noted already in this study, Canadians are 
not wont to look northward. To suggest that Canada should build a rail- 
road to the margin of Hudson Bay and then, at the end-of steel, to construct 
I Loqan Report, p. 15. 
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a port facility was an idea bound to cause incredulity in most Canadians. 
Sir John A. Macdonald was confronted with the proposition, as was 
Sir Wilfrid Laurier a generation later. There appears to have been an al- 
most unending series of studies undertaken in respect of the shipping 
season in Hudson Bay and 'Hudson Strait. 
' However, in the absence of a 
decision to open up the Hudson Bay route, the studies continued. One should 
not be surprised, therefore, to learn that in 1927, the Canadian government 
once more undertook a survey of the shipping conditions in Hudson-Strait. 
This particular expedition is of interest to this study because it marks 
the first use of Canadian military aircraft in the Arctic. 
In the spring of 1927, Charles A. Dunning, the Minister of Rail- 
ways and Canals, announced in the House of Commons that it was the govern- 
ment's intention to complete the railroad "known as the Hudson Bay route". 
He stated that the government had considered the problem of navigation in 
Hudson Strait, and to this end it was proposed to send an expedition north 
to study the situation over a period of a year. 
2 This latest survey had 
the same aims as all of the previous expeditions: to acquire more data 
1 As early as 1878-1880, Dr. Robert Bell, a physician by profession 
and a geologist by inclination, spent two years as an agent of the 
Canadian Geological Survey on Hudson Bay in order to determine the length 
of the season of navigation and the general feasibility of the route. A 
perusal of two centuries' worth of Hudson's Bay Company shipping records 
should, one would think, have provided all the necessary data on shipping 
seasons and ice conditions. In 1884, the government sponsored a three 
year study of the meteorological conditions, tides, geology, wildlife, 
and native inhabitants of the Hudson Strait area. This particular ex- 
pedition was led by Lt. A. R. Gordon, RN, the deputy director of the 
Canadian Meteorological Service. In the summer of 1897, William Wakeham, 
a veteran of the Gulf Fisheries Patrol, was dispatched to Hudson Bay to 
report on the duration of the shipping season and navigation conditions 
in Hudson Bay. Captain Irving B. Miles of the Department of Naval 
Service, while carrying out a hydrographic survey of potential port 
sites in 1910 also reported on the shipping conditions in the Strait and 
Bay. See Zaslow, pp. 255-259 and Howard A. Fleming', -Canada's Arctic 
f- the Hudson Bay Railway (Berkeley: UniVTrsity of 
-California Press, 19571-, Pp. 9,69. 
2 Debates, 8 April 1927, p. 2146. 
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on the shipping season and information on required aids to navigation. 
An interdepartmental committee, consisting of representatives of the 
Departments of Railroads and Canals, Marine and Fisheries, and National 
Defence, was formed to work out the details of the expedition. 
' It was 
directed that the means of acquiring the necessary data was to be a year- 
long aerial survey of the area. 
2 The committee proposed to establish 
three bases: one at either end of the Strait with a third in a central 
location. The government accepted this plan, and on 17 July, the 44 men 
of the 1927 Hudson Strait Expedition sailed from Halifax, northbound. 
The Department of Marine and Fisheries, the sponsoring agency, 
provided general support personnel such as doctors, wireless engineers, 
ground radio operators, storekeepers, and cooks. The Royal Canadian Air 
Force provided six officers and twelve airmen to operate and maintain six 
Fokker Universal aircraft. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals provided 
an officer and three other ranks and the necessary equipment to establish 
air-to-ground communications; the RCMP detailed three members for duty 
with the expedition. 
3 
During the summer the base camp sites were selected and the 
necessary support facilities were installed: Wakeham Bay in the center 
was designated expedition headquarters; Nottingham Island in the west and 
port Burwell in the east completed the line. Each base was assigned two 
aircraft and by mid-autumn all three sites were conducting flying oper- 
ations. The open cockpit Fokkers were hardly the ideal vehicle to conduct 
an arctic survey despite the fact that they had been modified to permit 
'Canada,. Privy Council Order 85,22 January 1927. 
2 N. B. McLean Report of the Hudson Strait Expedition 1927-28 
(Ottawa: King's Prinier, 1929), p. 5. 
3Ibid., p. 7. 
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ski, float, or wheel operation, depending upon the prevailing climatic 
condition. Flights were carried out "whenever the weather was favour- 
2 
able and it was considered advisable" . The work of the expedition ended 
in mid-August 1928. By that time one aircraft had been lost in an acci- 
dent, another crashed on an administrative flight soon after and the 
remaining four were considered to be in no condition to fly back to 
southern Canada. They were dismantled and shipped home with the rest of 
the expedition arriving in Halifax in October 1928.3 
The data accumulated during the flights was compiled and tabu- 
lated by the Department of National Defence and then turned over to the 
Department of Marine. The results of the reconnaissance patrols are 
interesting in many ways. Despite the fact that explorers, traders, 
whalers, the Royal Navy, and various other private and government spon- 
sored expeditions had been poking around the area for nigh onto three 
centuries, it was found that the existing maps and charts were very inac- 
curate. From the bird's eye view provided by aircraft, it was soon dis- 
covered that it was impossible to identify many parts of the coastline 
from the maps. In addition, numerous islands were found which had not 
been previously charted; others, although charted, turned out to be in- 
correctly located. 
The flights proved what many of the proponents of the Hudson Bay 
route had been claiming for years: even during the heart of winter, I 
Hudson Strait never froze over completely. From ten to twenty per cent 
FIt Lt E. P. 
I 
Wood, Northern Skyytra 1s: 
- 
The StoU of the Work 
as Arcfic and Sub-Arctic (serialized in RoundeT-, 
the Journal OT -the oyal Canadian Air Force), Part 8, pp. 20-T1-. Ajjo 
Pp ReELort 1929, P. 72. 
2McLean, p. 9. 
3Wood, Part 8, P. 22. 
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of the area remained open. There was no practical utility in this know- 
ledge, however, for the open lanes constantly shifted due to the action of 
tides, wind, and current. It was felt that any attempt to force the Strait 
in late winter or early spring would be exceedingly dangerous. 
2 
The flight data is also interesting for it underlined the extreme 
difficulty of operating aircraft in the Arctic. Each base was assigned 
three or four routine patrols, two of which were to be carried out daily, 
weather permitting. The program included actually photographing the ice 
conditions on each patrol; those situations that permitted flying but no 
photography were to be covered by detailed patrol reports. In addition 
to the routine patrols around each base, four special patrols were laid 
out: aircraft from adjacent bases would fly out to a central rendezvous 
point and then return to their home bases. Since these special patrols 
took the aircraft considerably farther from their bases than did the rou- 
tine patrols, they were not attempted until all six aircraft were oper- 
ational and the air-to-ground radio communication system was installed 
and tested. 
3 The aircraft flew when they could, but on numerous occasions 
they were "weathered in" for days on end. For example, from the start of 
the expedition until the end of 1927, Port Burwell was able to launch only 
four flights, of which only two were actual ice patrols. At Waýeham Bay 
eighteen flights were carried out over the same three month period, while 
at Nottingham Island* twenty-two flights were made. It was noted that 
"it has been impossible, owing to weather conditions, to carry out flying 
operations as freely as was expected". The problem presented by freeze-up 
was insurmountable for the forming ice denied the use of both floats and 
1 McLean, pp. 12,13. 
2 Fleming, p. 80. 
3 McLean, Appendices 3-6. 
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skis. Fog accounted for most of the other lost days. The flying oper- 
ation was a success in the sense that no lives were lost, but on four oc- 
casions, aircraft were forced down because of inclement weather; on two of 
these occasions the aircraft had to be abandoned and was lost. Upon super- 
ficial examination, four -forced landings over a ten-month period may 
appear to be a reasonable level. When one considers the actual number of 
hours flown, however, a different picture emerges. A total of 227 patrols 
were flown for a total flying time of 370 hours. 
' Using rough averaging, 
one out of every fifty-five patrols was forced down, or, more ominously 
still, there was one forced landing for every ninety hours of flying. The 
lack of aids to navigation, coupled with compass unreliability in the area, 
made Arctic flying in 1928 a hazardous occupation. 
2 
Miscellaneous Air Operations-- 
RCAF operations between 1923 and 1932 were dominated by the re- 
quirements of "civil government air operations". These air operations 
included forest fire patrols, reconnaissance, fisheries patrols, rust 
control dusting, photography, customs preventive service, treaty payment 
0 
flights, air mail route finding, experimental work, aircraft testing, and 
1 DND Report, 1929, p. 74. 
2 Norman B. McLean of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, the 
expedition commander, recommended in his report that safe ship navigation 
of the route would require stationary lights, accurate charts. reliable 
tidal information, and a series of radio direction finding stations. He 
also recommended that Canada acquire two icebreakers, one to be used in 
the Strait, the other to operate out of Churchill in support of commer- 
cial navigation. Radio stations were built at Cape Hopes Advance and on 
Nottingham Island in 1928, and on Resolution Island and at Churchill in 
1929. In 1930, the icebreaker N. B. McLean began her patrol duties in 
Hudson Strait. For a generation, the route failed to live up to its prom- 
ise. While the northerly route offered a saving of approximately a 
thousand miles for prairie grain over the conventional Great Lakes- 
St. Lawrence route to British markets, the high Lloya, s insurance rates for the Bay route, coupled with the short shipping season, virtually 
eliminated any cost saving. See McLean, pp. 18-22 and Fleming, pp. 89-92. 
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transporting government personnel. Such a huge and diverse set of re- 
sponsibilities occupied a good percentage of the personnel of the RCAF. 
It was tasks falling under one or more of the above categories that 
brought the RCAF into the North between 1927 and 1932. In the latter 
year the effects of the depression made themselves felt. The RCAF was 
reduced by a third of its strength and was simply unable to meet many of 
these extraneous commitments. In-addition, commercial firms and provin- 
cial government aviation agencies developed during the 1920s to the point 
where many of the former RCAF tasks could be taken over by the new organ- 
isations. After 1932, with the exception of some continued topographical 
work and the occasional special flight, the RCAF concentrated on training 
for war--and stayed in the South. In the interval, however, aircrew and 
ground support personnel of the RCAF gained a considerable amount of ex- 
perience in operating aircraft under the varied and difficult conditions 
of the continental North. 
1 The irony was that this experience would prove 
to be completely irrelevant during the war. 
Most of the "civil" flying done by the RCAF in the 1920s and early 
1930s was carried out in the northern reaches of the central provinces. 
In terms of isolation and terrain, there was little to distinguish between 
the boreal forest north or south of the 60th Parallel of Latitude. Aerial 
photography and geodetic survey work was done by No. 2 General Purpose 
Detachment mainly injhe area between Great Slave and Great Bear Lakes, 
for it was in this region that mining activity centered during the 1930s. 
In 1934 the aerial survey was shifted to the headwaters on the South 
Nahanni River, the "headless valley" of northern legend. In 1935 photo- 
graphic flights were launched out of Aklavik north oVe'r the Reindeer 
Reserve and west across the Richardson and Mackenzie mountain ranges to 
lWood, Part 1, pp. 29-31. 
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the Porcupine River. The RCAF provided a pair of Bellanca seaplanes in 
1930 for a "treaty flight" to the native bands along the western shore of 
Hudson Bay, and later provided lift for officers of the Royal Canadian 
Corps of Signals and the Department of Indian Affairs on inspection trips 
of government facilities in the Mackenzie Valley. Another major flight 
made in 1930 was the 12,000 mile operation across the barren lands made by 
a Vedette flying boat. The project included photographic work, inspection 
of northern fuel caches, and the opening up of air routes in areas that 
had never been visited by aircraft before. In 1936, the Department of 
National Defence provided a Fairchild 51 and aircrew to the RCMP for the 
purpose of transporting Sir James MacBrien, the Commissioner, on an in- 
spection of prairie and northern detachments. This trip covered 11,000 
miles in just under one month, one of the longest single journeys made in 
Canada by air at the time. In a route that described a colossal figure 
11811, the Fairchild ventured into the Yukon, along the Mackenzie, to the 
Arctic coast, into the barrens of Keewatin, and along the western shore of 
Hudson Bay. The entire trip was carried out without mishap. 
' 
In summary, practical aviation in the Arctic Archipelago remained 
an unrealized dream. Flights were made all over the northern continental 
land mass, but the emphasis on aviation, private, commercial, and govern- 
mental, was in the Yukon and Mackenzie where economic activity in the form 
of mineral exploration'and mining operations was concentrated. It was in 
these two regions that the great reputations of the "bush pilots" were made. 
The Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System (NWT & YRS) 
While Canada staked her claim in the Eastern Arctic with the estab- 
lishment of the remote police posts and the institution of an annual re- 
supply cruise in northern waters, no major attempt was made to exploit the 
1 Ibid., Part 5, pp. 22-26. 
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commercial potential of the area. Resource development in the interwar 
period was concentrated far to the west in the Yukon and Mackenzie Dis- 
tricts. In 1922, the communications facilities in these areas were either 
non-existent or else unreliable and costly. In the Mackenzie region there 
were no radio or telegraph facilities north of Fort McMurray, Alberta. 
From McMurray to Aklavik at the mouth of the Mackenzie River, a direct 
line distance of 1,200 miles, messages had to be carried by hand. In the 
Yukon there was a commercial telegraph line linking the government centre 
at Dawson to the national telegraph grid via a terminal at Hazleton, 
British Columbia. Because of the vast distances involved and the diffi- 
culty of access to the line, maintenance costs were extremely high and 
reliability was poor. 
Some thoughtful government officials began to consider the use of 
wireless to bridge the North. Again the name of Robert Logan appears as 
one of the northern innovators. Logan had been at the Canadian Air Force's 
flying school at Camp Borden, Ontario and had been involved with a Royal 
Canadian Corps of Signals (RCCS) project of providing a wireless link 
between the base and headquarters in Ottawa. 
1 Logan was aware of the 
signallers' capabilities and also knew that the senior officers of the 
Corps were looking for opportunities to train a cadre of experienced op- 
erators through the medium of providing wireless services to other depart- 
ments of government.. Following the return of the Eastern Arctic Expedition, 
Logan met with 0. S. Finnie, the Director of the Northwest Territories 
Branch of the Department of the Interior to discuss the possibility of 
establishing a radio net in the Northwest. Logan undertook a study of the 
existing files on northern communications and unoffipially contacted the 
'Letter, R. A. Logan to author, 9 July 1976 (Copy in D Hist 
%. ogan Me"). 
65 
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals to determine their views on the project. 
I 
By the autumn of 1922 the issue had become the subject of official inter- 
departmental correspondence. Finnie was primarily concerned with communi- 
cations in the Mackenzie Valley, but he saw the utility of an east-west 
link between stations to be established there and stations that could be 
2 
set up in the mining district of the Yukon. 
G. J. Desbarrats, the Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence, 
replied a few weeks later outlining his department's attitude to the 
Department of the Interior proposal. DND was prepared to undertake the 
works but insisted that the Department of the Interior provide the funding 
for the project, including the salaries of the soldiers who would man the 
stations. 
3 In his view, 
Such an arrangement makes-1-t-possible to send men into these Northern 
areas for a certain tour of duty, and to replace them at the end of 
this period by other members of the Corps, thus avoiding the trouble 
which all commercial companies have experienced in getting operators 
to go to out-of-the-way places without having to pay excessive 
bonuses. 4 
As the Department of National Defence saw it, the main purpose of the 
proposed radio system was to permit various departments of the federal 
government to control their northern operations with a greater degree of 
efficiency than had hitherto been possible. The system would also handle 
1 Letter, R. A. Logan to author, 10 July 1976 (Copy in D Hist 
"Logan File"). 
2 Interdepartmental memorandum, 0. S. Finnie to Deputy Minister of 
National Defence, 23 October 1922. Document held (uncatalogued) in NWT & 
YRS exhibit collection, RC Sigs Museum, Vimy Barrackss Kingston, Ontario. 
3 The final arrangement, however, resulted in the operating costs 
of the System remaining within the defence budget but as subject of a 
spectal vote. Thus the Department of National Defence differentiated 
between those costs incurred to train signallers for, -purely military pur- 
poses and those costs associated with national development tasks. 
4 Letter, Desbarrats to Finnie, 9 November 1922. RC Sigs Museum 
collection. 
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paid commercial traffic and it was thought that as northern development 
proceeded, the revenues thus realized might actually pay the full oper- 
ating costs. 
' 
With the interdepartmental agreement worked out, the matter went 
to the Cabinet for approval. In December, a Privy Council ruling was made 
to the effect that the Department of National Defence could undertake work 
for other departments of government in cases where commercial contract 
costs would be excessively high. 
The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals had been organized as a 
distinct and separate corps of the Canadian Militia in late 1918 as a 
result of war needs and experiences. At war's end, both the Permanent 
Force and the Active Militia faced a major reorganization. The require- 
ments of the war effort and the expedients and organization adopted to 
meet these requirements had completely disrupted the old pre-war system. 
A Reorganization Committee was appointed to deal with this complex pro- 
blem. Not much training or organization could take place until the plan 
was complete and it was not until 1923 that lines of development could be 
seen clearly. 
Militia General Order 27 of April 1919 decreed that the RCCS slice 
of the planned 4,000 man Permanent Force was to be five officers and four- 
teen non-commissioned officers. The Militia Report for 1920 observed that 
the Corps was "only partially organized, and requires considerable 
1 Ibid. 
2 John S. Moir (ed), History of the Royal Canadian Corps of Siqnals 
1903-1961 (Ottawa: RC Sigs Corps Committee, 1962), p. 276. This condi- 
tion of ploying the military on national development tasks was not 
discussed in Parliament. The decision was probably. recorded as a Cabinet 
Minute. The secretariat of the Privy Council was unable to locate the 
original note when they searched, at the author's request, in 1975. 
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attention if it is to be developed to the necessary degree of efficiency". 
' 
The following year, the deficiencies of the establishment were spelled out 
in some detail: 
this establishment does not provide for even sufficient officers and 
instructors to supply the requirements of one quarter of the Military 
Districts in Canada, . and does not provide for a Central Training 
Depot, or Permanent Army Signal School. 2 
The limited establishment was increased to ten officers and 26 other ranks 
later in 1921, not to meet the ins'tructional and training requirements 
identified above, but to permit the provision of wireless communication 
for the Canadian Air Force based at Camp Borden, Ontario. The Corps was 
further committed to support air force forestry patrols in northern Mani- 
toba the following summer. 
The precedent established by the provision of RCCS support to the 
Canadian Air Force led to the realization in the Department of Militia 
and Defence that the potential inherent in this role had barely been 
tapped. The Militia Report for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1922 
noted: 
A very large field exists for the employment of Signal Service person- 
nel in connection with Federal and Provincial Government Departments 
requiring communication by wireless telegraphy and telephony .... 
3 
It seems clear that the nucleus of officers who formed the RCCS in the 
early 1920s saw the potential national development role as an excellent 
training vehicle for military signallers, and a means of building up the 
Corps to a more realistic size. It should be noted, however, that the 
Department of National Defence did not got out and actively seek these 
training opportunities. It was the Department of the Interior, encouraged 
by Logan, that actually took the initiative in the case of the NWT & YRS. 
Militia Report, 1920, p. 7. 
ýIbid., 1921, p. 27. 3 Ibid., 1922, p. 32. 
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At the time DND agreed to take the project, the ability of the 
RCCS to run the system was purely theoretical. They had neither the men 
nor the equipment to do the job. The Deputy Minister warned the Depart- 
ment of the Interior that if the stations were to be opened in 1923, a 
final decision to go ahead had to be made by the end of November 1922: 
of the personnel required. two officers and seven other ranks must 
be enlisted and trained .... In addition, the greater part of the equipment must be obtained from England ...; further, work 
must be commenced in our own s7hops on the receivers and amplifiers 
which cannot be bought outside. 1 
The creation of the NWT & YRS provided the RCCS with a heaven-sent oppor- 
tunity to increase its authorized establishment, and to acquire modern 
long range equipment and an excellent training environment for its per- 
sonnel--all at no additional cost to the Department of National Defence. 
A decision was made to defer the installation of the Mackenzie 
stations until the following year because of a specific problem that de- 
manded immediate solution in the Yukon. While the gold rush had run its 
course by 1901, prospecting continued on a fairly heavy scale throughout 
the territory. A silver strike in the area of Mayo had developed into a 
modern mining operation that had grown in importance during the war and 
in the years immediately following. In the early 1920s the problem of 
communications between the mine area and the government centre at Dawson 
became acute. Radio stations would provide a means of linking the Gold 
Commissioner, the Mining Recorder, and the District Superintendent of the 
RCMP, all at Dawson, with their branch offices at Mayo. 
What was in time to become an extensive northern communications 
network had its modest beginnings in August 1923. An eight-man party 
(commanded by Major W. A. Steele) departed for the Yukon with two 120 watt 
1 Letter, Desbarrats to Finnie, 4 November 1922. RC Sigs Museum 
collection. 
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radio transmitters. The Yukon Field Force would have envied them their 
journey: steamship from Vancouver to Skagway, rail to Whitehorse, river- 
boat to their bases at Dawson and Mayo Landing. On 20 October, 1923 the 
first message was transmitted between the two stations. 
1 The stations 
proved to be an immediat6 success and a popular innovation. Commercial 
firms also were quick to use the facility: banks, mining interests, and 
shipping companies transacted business by wireless with the "outside". 
Nor did the general public hesitate to avail itself of the service. 
For the 1924 season, the Department of the Interior requested the 
establishment of the additional stations down the Mackenzie Valley. Fort 
Smith was the government administrative centre for the Mackenzie District; 
Fort Simpson was the site of a busy trading post at the junction of the 
Liaird and Mackenzie Rivers; and Herschel Island in the Beaufort Sea was 
an important summer post for fur trading and the transshipment of goods 
destined for settlements up the Mackenzie. At the same time, the Depart- 
ment of National Defence came to realize that reliance upon the Dawson- 
Hazelton telegraph line was unacceptable for the expanded operations. 
Accordingly, it was decided to construct a terminal wireless station at 
Edmonton, Alberta, from whence traffic could be switched directly to the 
nation-wide Canadian National and Canadian Pacific telegraph systems. 
The 1924 program was only partially completed during the year. 
The Edmonton and Fort Simpson stations were finished as planned; and by 
October, all the traffic from the system, including the Dawson-Mayo link, 
was passing through to Edmonton. The equipment destined for Forth Smith 
was temporarily put to a novel use in that it was installed on th. e 
A Short Histony of the Northwest Territorie-s and Yukon Radio 
System RC Sigs (henceforth Radio System Short History), (Edmonton: ms 
unpublished, 1960), (prepared under the direction of the Commanding 
Officer NWT &Y Radio System RC Sigs), p. 1. 
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Hudson's Bay Company steamship Distributor in order to provide a means of 
communication for the Governor-General, Lord Byng, on his 1925 tour of 
the Mackenzie River area. This innovation underlined the utility of a 
communications infrastructure and the inherent flexibility of the system. 
The equipment was finally installed in Forth Smith in late 1925. The 
Herschel Island station did not open on schedule for the simple reason 
that the ship carrying the equipment (and the supplies for the detachment) 
sank in the Bering Sea. The detachment personnel had gone to Herschel via 
the Mackenzie route, so a relief craft bearing winter clothing, food, and 
supplies for them was dispatched down the Mackenzie. It also sank. 
1 
The idea held by the senior officers of the RCCS that service on 
the NWT & YRS would-not only provide valuable communications training, but 
also would bring out such admirable qualities as self-reliance and a flair 
for improvisation, was well borne out by the performance of the stranded 
Herschel detachment. Under the command of Lt. H. A. Young, the detachment 
members built a radio out of bits and pieces from their personal luggage 
and were able to establish communications briefly with the Dawson station 
to inform their confr6res that all was well. Occupying an abandoned hut, 
they survived quite nicely, having been able to buy a small store of food 
and supplies from a passing whaler. The four-man detachment supplemented 
their food supply by hunting, acquired a dog team, traded for native fur 
clothing, and, it is. claimed, even learned how to speak Eskimo. 
2 Because 
of what they learned of developing trade and commerce patterns in the area, 
the replacement station, when it finally arrived in 1925, was installed at 
the comunity of Aklavik in the Mackenzie Delta rather than at Herschel. 
'Moir, 
p. 279. 
2Edward Romaine, "Unsung Heroes Who Broke the Silence of the North", 
Weekend Magazine, Vol. 10, No. 14,1960, P. 19. 
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In 1926, Herschel was occupied as a summer substation of Aklavik during 
the trading season. By then, the NWT & YRS was fi rmly established in the 
North. As the DND Report for fiscal 1924-25 noted: 
The amount of paid traffic (i. e. messages sent by commercial concerns 
or private individuals) shows a steady increase month by month and 
reports from the Yukon and 
- 
Northwest Territories emphasize the im- 
portance that this radio system bears in the every day life of the 
inhabitants of that northern country. 1 
It was generally realized that the_potential of the system had barely been 
tapped in terms of size or ability to perform ancillary functions. For 
these first few years, it must be noted that the System did not contribute 
to any developmental expansion. What it did do was permit previously es- 
tablished northern activities to be carried out with greater efficiency. 
The establishment of the NWT & YRS had not been an entirely simple 
matter for the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. Having jumped at the 
chance to run the system because of the training advantages it offered, 
the Corps was faced with the continuing problem of manning it. In early 
1924 it was observed: 
The limited establishment (6 officers/57 other ranks) of the Royal 
Canadian Corps of Signals is not sufficient at present to enable 
the Unit to supply the Administrative and Training Staffs for the 
Militia and the special Communications Services that are now being 
carried out by the Department of National Defence for other depart- 
ments and branches of the Dominion Government. 
The Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System ... is being 
conducted without a sufficient margin of safety as regards staff 
and personnel training, engineering, supervision, etc. 2 
As argumentS*'for increases of the defence establishment went in 
the 1920s, the Signals Corps was in a powerful position. The navy could 
cry out for destroyers, the air force could call for modern combat air- 
craft, and the Militia could lament the lack of funds to support training 
or to purchase tanks. The simple fact of the matter was that the various 
lDND Report$ 1925, p. 39.21bid., 1924, p. 31. 
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Canadian administrations of those years were going to pare defence expen- 
diture to the bone. Canadians lived in "a fire-proof house", and no 
government was going to "waste" money raising forces or purchasing equip- 
ment to defend against a non-existent enemy. The RCCS was different. The 
NWT & YRS was already proving to be a valuable asset to the civil life of 
northern Canada; at the same time it was obviously a secondary function 
of the Corps. Given financial restraints, a secondary function would be 
the first to be dropped over purely defence-related manpower commitments 
of the Corps. The fact that the NWT & YRS responsibility remained a sep- 
arate and distinct part of the Militia role guaranteed the continued 
growth of the System. The RCCS was able to keep its unique training 
ground and develop an ever growing pool of highly trained communicators. 
From 1920 to the beginning of rearmament in 1936, the RCCS was the only 
component of the Permanent Force which actually increased in size. 
In addition to the more lofty aspects of manning as related to 
departmental policy and funding, the RCCS met the problem which is faced 
by any military branch whose tradesmen have skills that were directly ap- 
plicable to the civilian economy. When military pay rates were lowered 
in August 1924, thirty other ranks, or twenty-five per cent of the actual 
strength of the Corps, took their discharges. The DND Report for 1924-25 
noted: 
It requires a minimum of sixteen months intensive training before a 
man is fit for qmployment on a radio station. The majority of the 
personnel who left the service had arrived at a degree of efficiency 
which rendered them valuable to the corps and by their loss the RCCS 
was faced with a very difficult task in finding the requisite number 
of trained personnel required for employ T ent on the Northwest 
Territories ... Radio Stations .... 
Despite these internal and domestic problems the NWT & YRS continued to 
thrive. 
'Ibid., 1925, P. 33. 
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A new station was added in 1927 at Fort Resolution on the south 
side of Great Slave Lake at the point where the Slave River enters the 
lake. Since any river traffic destined for the Mackenzie or Beaufort Sea 
ports from Fort Smith had to descend the Slave and cross the southern 
portion of Great Slave La ke itself, the radio station at Fort Resolution, 
which initially operated only during the July-October shipping season, was 
ideally sited to serve the varied needs of lake and river shipping. 
The next year, the System expanded in scope if not in the number 
of permanent stations. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police schooner St. Roch, 
which usually operated in the Western Arctic, and the Hudson's Bay Company 
schooner Baymaud became low-powered out-stations on the net, transmitting 
through the relay facility provided by the Aklavik station. The first re- 
ported regular use of the NWT & YRS in meteorological work occurred in 
1928. Special arrangements had been made with the Director of the Meteoro- 
logical Service to have military signallers selected for duty on the NWT 
& YRS trained as Meteorological Observers. It was claimed that all per- 
sonnel working on the system were so trained. Each station produced a 
twice daily reading which was transmitted to the Dominion Weather Office 
in Toronto. -' By 1929, the System was beginning to realize its full po- 
tential in terms of service. In addition to providing a communications 
link from the Northwest to the rest of Canada, stations began to repeat 
daily news bulletins. that were transmitted from the main terminal at 
Edmonton. Weather reports for aircraft flying in the North, and even 
stock quotations, were available on an "as required" basis. 
1929 marks the beginning of NWT & YRS's direct support of the 
increasing mineral exploration activity that was taktng place in the 
1 Ibid., 1929, P. 32. 
74 
Northwest. The search for precious metals dominated the expansion of the 
System from the beginning of the Great Depression to the outbreak of war. 
As mines were opened, the NWT & YRS responded by building a radio station 
near by. When mines were worked out or, as was often the case, went into 
bankruptcy, the supportin'g stations were closed. 
1 All of these stations, 
in addition to providing communications for the associated mining ac- 
tivity, joined the national weathp-r reporting grid and supported flying 
operations in the local area. 
It was the development of commercial aviation--bush flying--that 
in a large way permitted mineral exploration and development to be carried 
out in an efficient manner. Bush flying in the North was a hazardous oc- 
cupation at the best of times. Meteorological data from military radio 
stations provided a much needed margin of safety for the new breed of 
pilots who routinely operated beyond the frontier. Initially, aviators 
obtained weather reports through the rather crude means of landing at a 
radio site and walking over to the station. In the mid 1930s, however, 
commercial companies installed modern high-powered radios, allowing pilots 
to transmit and receive messages while in flight. Eventually, the avi- 
ation support role became one of the most important services provided by 
the System. Some radio stations were established for the specific pur- 
pose of supporting flying operations in the Northwest. 
In September. -1939, the NWT & YRS had been in operation for six- 
teen years, and had become an important northern institution. By estab- 
lishing the only communications grid in the Yukon and Mackenzie District, 
'During the period a total of nine new stations were opened of 
which three closed after only a few years' operation-7 The expansions and 
contractions of the System during the 1930sq in resp; nse to the vagaries 
of the mining industry is well chronicled in Moir in a chapter devoted to the NWT & YRS. 
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the System provided an absolutely key element for northern development. 
It has been noted that its original purpose--to support other departments 
of government by transmitting administrative messages--was eclipsed by 
other roles. The dominating reasons for the location of the majority of 
sites added after the first few years were the requirements of the mineral 
exploration industry, and, as a corollary, the needs of developing north- 
ern aviation. By accepting small commercial stations as system out- 
station subscribers, the full potential of the system was realized. The 
weather reporting functions of the various stations grew throughout the 
interwar years. As it was noted in the DND Report for 1939, "The NWT & 
YRS Yukon Radio System has become of increasing importance in the develop- 
ment of the vast Hinterland of Canada lying to the north of the Peace 
River District. "' 
While the Department of National Defence was prepared to admit 
that the work of the System was important to the area, this contribution 
to the creation of a frontier infrastructure was not seen by Canada's 
military leaders as a role of the national military establishment. The 
running of the System was seen as an ancillary task to the "proper" work 
of the Department--of defending the country and insuring internal order 
and stability. Similarily, the national development role taken on by the 
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals was never a political issue. The System 
was created by senior civil servants as an expedient solution to what was 
in the national scope of things, a minor problem. 
It was not until 1936, fourteen years after its establishment, 
that a member of parliament even bothered to ask a question about Canada's 
soldiers in the North. Ian Mackenzie, the Minister qf National Defence, 
1 DND Report$ 1939, p. 62. 
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spoke briefly to the subject. He described the many roles the System 
filled in support of other departments of the government, in particular 
the meteorological service. He admitted, however, that "it is largely a 
service for the civilian population". Miss Agnes Macphail, probably the 
most vehement anti-militaýist who sat in the House during the interwar 
years, suggested that the vote should be taken out of the National Defence 
supply bill. (Miss Macphail was in somewhat of a quandary here because 
she favoured the complete elimination of the defence establishment, but 
here was a component of the Militia providing a demonstrably useful and 
important function to Canadian society. ) Mackenzie replied: 
If any other department of government in Canada can get the same 
efficiency in service I have no objection to having it transferred. 
This is significant evidence that the government's decision to use 
troops to man the northern radio system was a matter of expediency rather 
than deliberate policy. The Minister's rather offhand reply also indi- 
cates that he had forgotten, for the moment, the original reason why the 
Department had taken on the running of the system in the first place. 
When the issue came up again in the House two years later, the Minister 
did recall the System's original purpose. A question had been asked of 
him concerning the relationship between the NWT & YRS and the Department 
of Transport radio system. The Minister revealed that an interdepart- 
mental committee had studied this very question the previous year. "The 
actual finding was that there was very little duplication as between the 
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals and the Department of Transport". 
Mackenzie supported the findings of the committee in that "operation of 
the system by military personnel had distinct: advantages from a defence 
standpoint", because the necessary training could n6ý be gained in any 
Debates, 19 May 1936, p. 2980 
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other way. Mackenzie argued that in this sense, the existing organis- 
ations were the most economical, for to remove the RCCS from the System 
would necessitate an increase in the Permanent Force vote in order to 
provide necessary communications training. In depression-burdened 
Canada, as likely as not, the ultimate result would not have been an in- 
crease in the Permanent Force vote, but rather a curtailment or elimin- 
ation of the training. 
The Eve of War 
Between the two world wars, northern development in Canada was 
never an important national priority. Until the southern, more hospit- 
able reaches of the country were fully developed, the North would have to 
continue to wait. As in the past, a small population and limited capital 
made the taming of the distant, unknown North a "someday" proposition. 
The frontier advanced but little. The Eastern Arctic saw vir- 
tually no development at all, although the RCMP and the annual Eastern 
Arctic Patrol protected the nation's sovereign claims against the day 
when development would come. In Mackenzie District and in the Yukon a 
nascent mining industry was established. Aviators tentatively probed 
the far distant places. Perhaps the most significant example of the re- 
stricted nature of northern development is the fact that, on the eve of 
war, there were no roads connecting either of the northern territories 
with southern Canadai 
The defence concepts and strategic considerations relative to the 
North that had held in 1914 were still valid in 1939. The northern flank 
of Canada remained secure. Geography required no assistance from Canadian 
sailors, soldiers, and airmen. Northern defence was-Inever a political, 
1 Ibid., 13 May 1938, pp. 2884-2885. 
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military, or popular issue during the interwar period, although some 
visionaries anticipated the future capabilities of long-range aircraft 
and the resultant military significance of such a development. What 
military involvement there was in the North during this period was car- 
ried out for the purposes'of national development. The typical employ- 
ment pattern saw elements of the military establishment operating in 
support of other federal government department. In some cases the mili- 
tary actively sought out these roles for reasons of internal departmental 
objectives. In other cases the forces were directed to provide the necess- 
ary support, either because they held a monopoly on the necessary skills 
and equipment, or, more commonly, because using the resources of the 
Department of National Defence in this way represented a means of saving 
public money. 
The total military involvement in the North during the period was 
quite limited. The Royal Canadian Air Force undertook a number of specific 
projects, but there was no continuity in these. Southern based aircraft, 
crews, and support facilities were deployed into the North, completed 
their mission, and returned to the South to await another call for their 
services. No RCAF northern operations were undertaken for military 
purposes. 
The Militia's contribution to the North consisted solely of the 
men of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals who over the years established 
a wireless communications grid over much of the Northwest. This particu- 
lar program differed from the RCAF's northern approach in the sense that 
the radio stations run by army signallers were permanent installations. 
The Royal Canadian Navy never ventured into. "rthern waters during 
these years. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be 
assumed that a northern cruise by any of His Majesty's Canadian Ships was 
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never even considered. 
It is interesting to note that neither the political nor military 
leaders of the day generalized from the particular precedent of the North- 
west Territories and Yukon Radio System: If signallers could run a 
communications grid, military engineers could build bridges, airfields and 
roads. Military flyers could survey, map, carry out resource exploration 
and establish a sovereign presence. Sailors could gain valuable sea time 
and operating experience by taking over the northern resupply role. or 
cruising in support of scientific expeditions. Without a strong national 
imperative for northern development, however, it is not surprising that 
the interdepartmental structures necessary to create such integrated 
programs were neither attempted nor considered. 
CHAPTER V 
OPENING THE NORTH 
Northern Military Projects Durinq the Second World War 
The most important factor affecting development of the North 
during the war years was the relationship between Canada and the 
United States--with the United States dominating the partnership. A 
familiarity with United States-Canadian defence relations is essential 
to an understanding of the great northern military expansion of the 
Second World War. The strategic outlook of both the United States and 
Canada differed in many ways, but a great commonality of interest lay 
in the area of the defence of North America as a whole. 
The first step towards establishing an understanding about 
mutual defence problems was made by Franklin Roosevelt in the mid 1930s. 
The "good neighbour" policy he had articulated in 1935 was sharpened in 
the summer of 1936, when, during a speech at Chataugua, N. Y., he said: 
Our closest neighbours are good neighbours. If there are remote 
nations that wish us not good but ill, they know that we are 
strong; they know fhat we can and will defend ourselves and defend 
our neighbourhood. - 
This was, of course, -only a generalized statement of intent, but it did 
indicate the direction in which the President wished to take his countrY 
in defence matters. 
'Cited in Eayrs,, In Defence of Canada, Vol. 2-, p. 177. In the 
chapter entitled "The Road to Ogdensburg", Eayrs discusses the genesis 
of the Canadian-American defence relationship during the 1930s. 
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As American concern over the Japanese threat grew, so did their 
apprehension over the exposed and relatively isolated position of the 
Alaska territory. Following a visit to British Columbia in the autumn 
of 1937 where he discussed aspects of Pacific coast defence with the 
Premier of that province, the President directed the American ambassador 
to Canada to raise the issue of military conversations between the 
general staffs of the two nations. 
- 
This contact led to occasional mili- 
tary liaison visits during 1937 and early 1938, but the nature of the 
discussions remained general and no commitments were made by either side. 
At a higher political level, the leaders of both countries discussed 
defence matters upon those occasions when they met. In August 1938 at 
a ceremony marking the opening of an international bridge near Kingston, 
Ontario, both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
made public statements to the effect that neither nation would stand by 
idly if the other were attacked. 
There was a hiatus in military liaison between the two countries 
from January 1938 until July 1940. In the interval Canada went to war; 
the United States remained neutral. Successive waves of allied disaster 
in the spring and summer of 1940 made Canadians apprehensive over their 
future security, and in June 1940 Canada took the initiative in attempting 
to re-establish defence liaison. A military relationship between a 
belligerent and a neutral raised serious, if subtle, political issues in 
the United States, and the American administration approached the Canadian 
proposals with some trepidation. However, during July, high level staff 
talks were held, their prime focus being defence in the event that 
Britain should fall to the German offensive. 
The following month, a major step forward in defence coordination 
was made with the establishment of the Canada-United States Permanent 
...... . 
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Joint Board of Defence (PJBD). Suggested by Roosevelt and warmly accepted 
by Mackenzie King, the PJBD provided the machinery for joint defence 
planning. In the words of the press release issued by the two leaders at 
Ogdensburg, N. Y. on Augus t 18,1940: 
The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual 
problems of defence in rel; tion to the safety of Canada and the 
United States. 
It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board of Defence shall 
be set up at once by the two countries. 
This Permanent Joint Board of Defence shall commence immediate 
studies relating to sea, land and_ai_r problems including personnel 
and materiel. 
The structure, operation, and work of the PJBD has been examined 
in detail by the official military historians of both countries. 
2 The 
Board did not have executive authority; rather it was a coordinating 
agency. It produced recommendations that required executive approval by 
the President in the United States and the Cabinet War Committee in 
Canada. What is important to this study is that it was the means by 
which most, but surpriý singly, not all, of the joint Canadian-American 
defence projects in the Canadian North were initiated. 
The North West Staging Route 
The tripartite agreement befwsts Germany, Italy and Japan was an- 
nounced in September 1940. Suddenly a secure air route between the 
continental United States and the Alaska Territory became strategically 




2 For Canada, see C. P. Stacey, Arms Men and Governments: The War 
Policies of Canada 1939 - 1945 (Ottawa, Queen' Printer, 1970). Fo--rthe 
United States, see Col Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between 
the United States and Canada 1939 - 1945 (Washington: Office of the 
Chief of Military History, DepartmeFt of the Army, 1959), in the sub- 
series "Special Studies" of K. R. Greenfield (ed), United States Amy in 
World War II. The PJBD documents were not an open source at the time 
this thesis was written. 
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issued on 4 October 1940, recommended that "Canada develops air staging 
facilities for aircraft en route ... ." The report, in addition, 
recommended extensive defence works in Alaska and suggested arrangements 
that would permit the free passage of American military aircraft over 
Canadian territory in trahsit to Alaska. 
The precise nature of the Canadian requirement to develop what 
was to become the *Northwest Staging Route was spelled out in the 10th 
Recommendation of the Board, issued on 14 November 1940: 
Air Staging Facilities--Western Canada 
The Board recommends that, to implement the recommendation contained 
in its First Report to the respective governments regarding the 
development of air staging facilities across Western Canada between 
the United States and Alaska, suitable landing fields, complete 
with emergency lighting, radio aids, meteorological equipment and 
limited housing for weather, communication, and transient personnel 
be provided at the earliest possible date by Canada at Grande 
Prairie, Fort St. John, -Fo'Ff-Nelson, Watson Lake, Whitehorse .... 
This development will provide means for rapid movement of light 
bombers and fighter aircraft into Canada, into Central Alaska via 
Whitehorse ... and is considered essential to the defence of Western Canada, Alaska and the United States. Such means are 
vital to the effective use in joint continental defence of both 
the rapidly expanding air forces of the United States and the 
extension of air operating facilities in Alaska. 2 
The Board recommended this particular route following a meeting held 
at Victoria, British Columbia on 13 November. The Canadian Chairman 
of the Board, Colonel 0. M. Biggar, was aware of existing Canadian 
Department of Transport plans for the development of a Northwest Air- 
way and arranged for two former officials of the department to brief 
3 the Board. A recommendation by the PJBD was one thing; governmental 
'Published in Dziuban, Appendix B. 
2 Published in Dziuban, Appendix A. 
3A 
pioneer Northwest Airway east of the mounfains had been 
developed by commercial firms using float and ski-equipped aircraft 
during the 1930s. In 1939 the Department of Transport began work to 
establtsh a modern airway complete with the necessary aerodromes and 
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approval of a recommendation was another. While President Roosevelt 
approved the recommendation within a week, the Canadian Cabinet War 
Committee did not do so until 15 December. In granting its approval, 
the Cabinet War Committee noted that in future, Canadian acceptance of 
PJBD recommendations would be withheld until the Treasury Board had the 
opportunity to consider the expenditures involved. 
Despite the sense of urgency conveyed by the PJBD recommen- 
dations, it was not until early February 1941 that the Ottawa bureau- 
cracy finally authorized and funded construction for the airway. 
It is of interest to examine the actual construction of these 
various aerodromes as it clearly underlines the requirement for any 
northern development project to take into account the formidable ob- 
stacles created by climate, great distances, and wilderness terrain. 
Grand Prairie and Fort St. John presented no particular problems as they 
were located in "settled" areas of the country. Grand Prairie was on a 
rail line, and Fort St. John was located only 60 miles north of the rail- 
head at Dawson Creek. A road that was usable in all but wet weather 
joined Dawson Creek and Fort St. John. Both locations already boasted 
modest aerodromes. The shipment of men and materials over rail and well- 
established roads was carried out easily. The construction of the 
Whitehorse facility was only moderately more difficult, and then, only 
because of the distances involved. Equipment was shipped north from the 
port of Vancouver to the Alaskan community of Skagway. From there it 
aids to navigation. The plan called for 3000 foot landing strips to be 
located at Grand Prairie, Fort St. John, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, and 
Whitehorse, with emergency landing sites located approximately half way 
between each major field. The surveys for these fields were completed 
in January 1940, but no immediate work on the sites was undertaken. See 
Canada, DND, Directorate of Information Services morgue (DIS morgue) for 
"The Northwest Staging Route: A Summary of its History and Development 
During the Peace-Time Years and in War Time", Staff monograph, ms un- 
published, March 1945. 
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was transported by the narrow gauge White Pass and Yukon Railway to the 
railhead at Whitehorse. Whitehorse, too, had an airstrip which had been 
improved over the years by the Yukon Territorial government, the British 
Yukon Navigation Company, and Pan-American Airways. All that was required 
by the Northwest Airway p-roject was to regrade, lengthen, widen and pave 
the strip to meet national standards. Again, established transportation 
routes made all the difference. 
The isolated sites at Fort Nelson and Watson Lake, however, 
presented major problems. Fort Nelson was 300 miles beyond the railhead 
and 240 miles from the closest road; Watson Lake was 200 miles beyond 
Fort Nelson. The main difficulty was not the actual construction of the 
airfields but the tremendous transportation problem of concentrating the 
required men, equipment, and materials at the work site. Virtually 
every mode of transportation was used to open up routes and move supplies. 
Some parties used horses and dog teams; bulldozers hacked out trails and 
opened up winter roads over the ice of frozen rivers and lakes. Ottawa's 
delay in approving construction contracts until the winter transportation 
season was almost half over resulted in a serious interruption in the 
flow of materials to the isolated sites. The spring thaw and ice break- 
up effectively brought all movement to a halt. As a result, during the 
summer every available water route had to be pressed into service, 
despite the need for frequent trans-shipment of goods and the require- 
ment to move more boats onto the routes. Seaplanes were used to fly in 
key workers and portable sawmills. There was no limit to the ingenuity 
used to complete the project. 
By September 1941, all five airfields were open for daylight 
operations during good flying weather. Three months later basic radio 
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ranges had been installed at all sites. 
I From the date of the issue of 
authority to attempt the project to the actual completion of the austere 
facility had taken seven months--a major feat of engineering by the 
standards of the Canadian North. 
As 1941 progressed, the strategic importance of the Northwest 
Airway became increasingly evident in view of the deteriorating situation 
in the Far East. Defence planners monitored progress carefully; the PJBD 
urged on the project in its 19th Recommendation: 
Canadian-Alaskan Staging Fields 
On the consideration of the report as to the progress being made 
with the construction of the Canadian Airway between Edmonton and 
Whitehorse, attention was directed to the recent change in the far 
eastern situation the effect of which is to make the completion of 
the airway to Alaska of extreme urgency. It was pointed out that 
the urgent needs for air strength in Alaska may suddenly increase 
beyond those heretofore anticipated; that the preparation of air- 
dromes in Alaska is being expedited by the United States as much 
as possible, but that large numbers of aircraft if sent there 
would at present be relatively isolated. 
In view of this, the Board decided to invite attention to the 
fact that the completion of both the Canadian and the United States 
sections of the airway to a point which would permit its use at the 
earliest possible moment had become of extreme importance and to 
recommend that other considerations should give way to that of 
completing as quickly as possible the air route which ýill permit 
the rapid reinforcement of the air strength in Alaska. 
At the same time as Canadians were struggling with their wilder- 
ness to build the Airway, the Americans in Alaska were attempting to 
accomplish a feat of the same magnitude in their territory. The Americans, 
like the Canadians, found that the great difficulties were caused by 
transportation problems. The presence of permafrost at many locations 
did nothing to make their job easier. Whereas in 1940 there were only 
four airfields in all of Alaska capable of supporting military aviation, 
Ibid. 
2Published in Dziuban, Appendix A. 
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by the end of 1941 there were ten strips completed and another six in 
the final stages of construction. 
After Pearl Harbour, it was evident that they would have to be 
used. American defence plans for the Pacific coast were in disarray. The 
United States Navy reported on 8 December 1941 that it would be unable to 
carry out tasks assigned to it under the war plan. The British loss of 
Repulse and Prince of Wales. on 10 December served to heighten the mood of 
pessimism that gripped North America. In what, in retrospect, was a 
wildly inaccurate assessment, the United States estimated on 12 December 
that Axis forces might succeed in an attempt to capture Alaska. Were an 
attack to be launched on Alaska, the United States was admittedly not in 
a position to do much about it. While the United States Navy had the 
responsibility for the strategic defence of the area, the protection of 
military bases was an Army responsibility. The Army plan to rest this 
defence primarily upon air power was immediately negated by the fact that 
the 2,200 man Alaskan Air Force possessed only six old medium bombers and 
a dozen obsolete pursuit planes. The lack of air resources was compounded 
by the austere state of what fields there were. There were no bases at 
all in the Aleutian Islands, the most vulnerable portion of the Territory. 
The first attempt to build up the air resources of Alaska was a 
disaster. The llth Pursuit Squadron, equipped with twenty-five P40 air- 
craft, and the 77th Bombardment Squadron, operating thirteen B25s, were 
ordered to Alaska on 10 December, but lack of specialized winter equip- 
ment and maintenance delays in preparing the aircraft for northern oper- 
ations resulted in their not being able to depart from Spokane, Washington 
until 2 January 1942. Twenty-five days later, all was a shambles. Six 
of the pursuit planes had crashed, another six were strung out somewhere 
along the Northwest Airway; only thirteen had arrived at their destination. 
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The bombers fared as poorly with five of the thirteen crashing en route. 
This minor disaster was attributed to "the inexperience of the pilots, 
together with poor communications and inadequate landing fields along the 
route". 
' It was obvious that the Canadian facilities would have to be 
considerably improved. The manner, method, and rate by which this im- 
provement took place was to cause no small amount of difficulty between 
Canada and the United States. 
The need to develop the control-and airdrome facilities along 
the route presented Canada with something of a dilemma. The original 
airway had been developed in peacetime for the purposed of civil aviation, 
although the strategic importance of the route for the defence of Alaska 
had been acknowledged obliquely by Department of Transport officials. 
Canadian politicians and government officials were wary of ceding con- 
struction and operating rights to the United States for fear of the 
commercial and sovereign precedents such an abdication of responsibility 
would create. 
2 On the other hand, Canadian resources to undertake the 
required improvements were extremely limited as the tremendous expansion 
of the navy, army and air force had, by 1942, placed a severe strain on 
available manpower. Construction industry resources to meet existing 
defence related commitments were already in short supply. 
3 The ultimate 
solution to the problem was in the best Canadian tradition: a compromise. 
The nature of the required improvements was discussed in Ottawa 
on 11 March 1942 at a meeting attended by representatives of the Air 
Services Branch of the Department of Transport, the RCAF, and the USAAF. 
Dziubans p. 203. 
2Stacey, Arms Men and Governments, pp. 280-381. 
3Wood, Part X, p. 6. 
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At the request of J. A. Wilson, the Canadian Director of Air Services, 
the Americans submitted a paper entitled "Details of Improvements Desired 
in Canada to Facilitate Operation of a United States-Canadian-Alaskan 
Military Air Route". This paper became the basis for discussion at an- 
other meeting held on 10 April 1942. Agreement was reached to improve 
the radio range installations on the airway by installing intermediate 
stations between Fort St. John and Fort Nelson, between Fort Nelson and 
Watson Lake and between Watson Lake and Whitehorse. Two new stations 
were to be built between Whitehorse and Northway on the Alaska-Yukon 
border. In order to standardize the equipment and operation of the air- 
way, the Department of Transport agreed to select and develop the sites, 
purchase and install the necessary equipment, and operate the stations. 
It was further agreed that tfi-e-U-SAAF could install ground to air radio 
equipment at each of the main fields along the airway. With respect to 
needed support facilities at each aerodrome, the American representatives 
presented a long list including such items as hangars, barracks, mess- 
halls, and office buildings. The Canadian authorities agreed to carry 
out the requested construction. 
The issue of who was to pay for all this work arose early in the 
discussions, but Wilson stated that such matters were beyond his com- 
petence to discuss. He suggested that the Americans should have their 
State Department approach the Canadian Department of External Affairs 
to negotiate a financial settlement. In the interval, Wilson undertook 
to "obtain authorization to get the various programmes of work upon which 
an agreement was reached put in hand immediately utilizing Canadian 
funds. "1 
ID Hist, 181.009 (D6244) "Northwest Airway Facilities" (Minutes 
of Conference 10 April, 1942). 
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Having said that Canada would handle the initial financing, the 
Department of Transport was faced with two problems: obtaining the 
necessary funds to undertake the work pending a political decision on 
the final financial arrangements, and calling to the attention of the 
government the requirement for such a political decision. Short term 
funding presented no major problem: Department of Transport applied to 
Department of National Defence for the funds, which were quickly forth- 
coming. 
1 The political issue, however, proved to be somewhat more com- 
plex. The senior American representative at the conference had indicated 
that the United States was willing to pay for any or all of the expenses 
associated with the requested improvements. The United States, concerned 
over the security of Alaska, wanted quick action and was willing to use 
U. S. Army engineer units to undertake the required work. Canada was 
reluctant to agree to extensive American participation in the construc- 
tion or funding of the project for fear of post-war repercussions that 
might not be in the sovereign or commercial interest of Canada. Colonel 
Biggar called these matters to the attention of the government, and on 
22 April the Cabinet War Committee decided that the United States could 
pay for additional work beyond Canadian standards, but that Canada would 
retain full title and control. Canada also retained responsibility for 
the construction of intermediate emergency landing fields. 
2 
Before much of the required work could even be started, the 
Japanese carrier-borne attack and occupation of the Aleutian islands of 
Kiska and Attu provoked the major crisis of the war for the Northwest. 
1D Hist, 181-009 (D6244) I'Aerodrome Development Committee Sub- 
mission No. 591, Edmonton to Whitehorse Route" April, 4? ), 1942. 
2D Hist, 348.013 (D2) "Summary of Cabinet War Committee Decisions 
on Canada - United States Joint Defence Construction Projects in the 
Northwest. " n. d. See also Stacey, p. 380; Dziubans pp. 203-204. 
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Eleven American commercial airlines provided some fifty aircraft to 
operate on a round-the-clock shuttle to fly reinforcements and war sup- 
plies to Alaska. In the early summer of 1942, with the reinforcement 
crisis stabilized, the United States made the decision to use the North- 
west Staging Route to ferry war planes to their Russian ally, placing 
even more pressure on the route-. To complicate matters further, the 
internal administration of the Airway underwent a reorganization in June. 
What had started before the war as a modest civilian project became, by 
1942, a major military ferry route. As a result of this development, 
responsibility for the operation of the route was transferred from DOT to 
the RCAF. DOT however, retained responsibility for construction projects 
along the airway. From 1942 until the spring of 1943, DOT contractors 
worked towards completion of the project. American military engineers 
were deployed to assist in the work in August and again in September, but 
were quickly withdrawn on both occasions when Canadian labour groups 
protested. 
1 
New construction and improvement of existing facilities was under- 
taken as American requirements increased steadily. In February 1943 the 
PJBD in its 29th Recommendation suggested that United States military 
engineers be permitted to undertake the next phase of construction work. 
The Cabinet War Committee refused approval. (The 29th Recommendation is 
unique in that of the 33 wartime resolutions of the PJBD, the 29th is the 
only one that was nýt approved by both governments. ) In any case, the 
Canadian government later gave assent to what amounted to the intent of 
the 29th Recommendation, and there followed an intense period of American- 
sponsored development that greatly enlarged and improved the facilities 
of the Northwest Staging Route. Canada reverted to the former pattern 
1 Dziuban, p. 206. 
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of insisting that future work be undertaken by Canadian contractors and 
Canadian labour on 15 March 1944. This system continued until the war's 
end. 
1 
On 20 February 1944, C. D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and 
Supply made a long statement in the House of Commons about the North West 
Staging Route. He summarized the pre-war history of the development of 
the route and the work that was done during the 1939-41 period before the 
United States entered the war. He then reviewed the earlier government 
decision that Canada would only pay for those permanent construction works 
that were required by Canadian standards and that the United States would 
bear the cost of those works over and above Canadian standard. He noted, 
however: 
the northwest staging route is Canadian property, owned and ; 
pýrýted by the Canadian government. It was built and developed by 
Canada, with the cooperation of the United States army engineers and 
workmen. The cost of the project is to be borne wholly by Canada. 2 
The Canadian government fully anticipated that the airway would play a 
major role in post-war international aviation. Canada was taking what 
were seen as necessary steps to ensure that control of the airway would 
remain firmly in Canadian hands. 
The operation of the airway was also a source of continuous 
friction between the United States and Canada. As was noted above, the 
Northwest Airway was militarized in September 1942 when the RCAF took over 
responsibility for what became known as the North West Staging Route. Six 
officers were dispatched to each of the stations on the route in mid-July 
to begin preparations for the eventual takeover of the system by the 
I Dziuban discusses in some detail (pp. 205-213) the problems of 
U. S. -Canadian co-operation in the construction of thiý NWSR. 
2Debatess 1944, pp. 1011-1013. Dziuban, in discussing costs of 
the route does not mention that Canada paid the United States for the 
work done during the American construction phase. 
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Canadian military. The instructions given to these officers are of 
interest inasmuch as they indicate how sensitive Canada was to the con- 
trol aspect of the international project. The officers were informed 
that they "were to act as 'ambassadors' of the Canadian Government for 
the present", an interesting notion, and perhaps an unfortunate word 
choice when one considers that these RCAF officers were, after all, 
serving in their own country. The intent of the instruction is clear. 
It went on to say that while initially the officers were there in an 
unofficial capacity, and were to "help out" in any way they could, they 
were to allow 
the impression to grow that at some future date, not far hence, 
that the RCAF would eventually take over the official operation 
of this route without disturbance to any of the parties now using 
the present services. 1 
In the actual operation of the Staging Route, the RCAF encountered two 
main problem areas: those arising out of continuing DOT activity and 
some USAAF activities. While the RCAF was responsible for the control, 
maintenance, and defence of the route, DOT continued to supply meteo- 
rological reports and some communications services. Cooperation between 
these two federal agencies was dependent upon local liaison as there was 
no central overall Canadian airway authority. An RCAF proposal made in 
early 1944 to bring DOT personnel under military control was resisted by 
the Department of Transport and came to nought. 
2 The system "muddled 
through" for the dur: ation of the war. 
With respect to the USAAF activities, it would appear that the 
Americans were rarely satisfied with the level or quality of services 
1D Hist, 181-009 (D6244) No. 4 Training Command Organization and 
Policy, March to September 1942, -r'Northwest Staging Route", 15 July., 1942. 
2D Hist, 181-009 (D6574) "Centralized Local Canadian Authority 
on the NWSR", 16 February, 1944. 
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provided by the RCAF on the route. American attempts to share the air 
traffic control duty at Whitehorse were firmly rebuffed. More serious- 
ly, when the USAAF began to build a control tower at their Watson Lake 
facility and stated that it was their intention to build such towers at 
each of the main station5 on the route, the project was seen by the RCAF 
officers working on the NWSR a-s "an effort to move towards the estab- 
lishment of USAAF control organization along the Route by a procession 
of limited objectives. "' The USAAF was instructed by Canada to stop 
unauthorized constructions. Control remained in RCAF hands. 
The internal control of the NWSR underwent several administrative 
and control changes during the war. Initially, the route was run by 
No. 2 Wing of 4 Training Command, RCAF. On 1 January 1944 control was 
transferred to Western Air Command. This particular change is indica- 
tive only of the changing wartime structure of the RCAF. The formation 
of a new command, North West Air Command, on I June 1944, with the 
unique responsibility of running the route, was significant in that it 
represented a clear and conscious attempt by Canada to exert a greater 
level of control over American defence activities carried out on Canadian 
soil. Speaking to a group of officers who were to staff the newly formed 
North West Air Command, Air Vice Marshal H. D. Lawrence said, "what we 
2 
are going to do is to Canadianize the Route" . 
characteristic of joint Canadian-American defence projects in 
the North is that they were rarely used for their original intended 
purpose. Three general categories of aircraft operation took place 
1D Hist 181-009 (D3391) North West Air Command (RCAF) 31 December 
1942 ,4 April 1944, "USAAF Control Towers on Hangers - NWSR'l, '17 
January, 1944. 
2D Hist 181-009 (D3941) North West Air Command - North West 
Staging Route Organization and Administration. "Conference - June 10th 
1944". 
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along the Northwest Staging Route: the deployment of short range 
tactical aircraft to Alaska for the purposes of Alaskan defence, admin- 
istrative and logistic flights in support of the Alaskan garrison, and 
aircraft being ferried to the USSR via Alaska and Siberia. As was noted 
above, it was mid-1942 Wore the Siberian ferry route was accepted by 
the USSR, yet by far the majority of the flights along the airway were 
in support of this program. Of the 8,646 aircraft deployed over the 
staging route between 1942 and 1945,7,930 continued on to the Soviet 
Union; only 716 were destined for Alaskan defence. Most of the aircraft 
delivered to the USSR were short-range tactical aircraft; the Northwest 
Staging Route was the most secure and most direct means for the United 
States to provide war aid to its Soviet ally. 
The Alaska Hiqhway 
The geographic isolation of Alaska was a minor cause of concern 
to American strategic planners throughout the 1930s. 
2 In 1936, the 
United States government acting mainly out of economic interest ap- 
proached Canada to consider the advisability of undertaking the construc- 
tion of a northern road. Reflecting Canadian strategic thinking of the 
day, a Canadian General Staff Memorandum rejecting the proposal read 
in part: 
1 Dziuban, pp. 215-216. 
2 Donald MacD-6nald, a leading citizen of Fairbanks, Alaska began 
a crusade to build a northern highway in 1928. Two years later in 
response to public interest in the project, the Hoover Administration 
in the United States appointed three commissioners to study the possi- 
bilities of an Alaska road. In 1932 an international board including 
both Canadian and American officials studied the problem and concluded 
that the proposed highway could be built for 27 million dollars and 
recommended that both countries share the cost. The-project was shelved 
at the time because of the financial problems resulting from the Great 
Depression. See Philip H. Godsell, Alaska Highway (London: Sampson, Low, 
Marston and Company Ltd. ), 1946, p. -109. 
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The building of a... highway through British Columbia and the 
Yukon would provide a strong military inducement to the United States 
to ignore our neutral rights in the event of a war between that 
country and Jap I n, a danger which we should do everything in our 
power to avoid. 
In March 1937, President Roosevelt brought up the subject when Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King visited Washington. The President saw the pro- 
posed road to Alaska in terms of a defence facility in the event of a 
war with Japan. Mackenzie King was noncommittal. Roosevelt found a 
more enthusiastic supporter in the person of P. D. Pattullo, the Premier 
of British Columbia, whom he visited in September of the same year; but 
Pattullo's public statements in favour of the proposed highway were based 
on the anticipated economic advantages that would accrue to the province. 
The Premier's remarks did nothing to change the federal government's 
determination to remain uncommitted. Mackenzie King wrote that: 
Grounds of public policy would not permit the using of funds of a 
foreign Government to construct public works in Canada. It would 
be ... a matter of financial invasion .... 
2 
Canada, however, agreed to participate in another joint study on the 
feasibility of the project with respect to prospective routes and costs. 
In April 1939, the representatives of both countries met in Victoria, 
and later undertook ground and aerial reconnaissances of the three poss- 
ible routes that had been identified. A year later, the joint com- 
mission recommended the selection of an Edmonton-Fairbanks route. It 
was estimated that wIth a 24-foot grade, the road would cost approxi- 
mately 25 million dollars and take five to six years to build. 
3 
While all evidence points to the fact that the United States and, 
to the extent that she was interested, Canada also, saw the proposed 
'Cited in Eayrs, II, p. 178. 
21bid. 3 Godsell, p. 110. 
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highway in terms of defence of Alaska, it was not seen in those terms in 
Japan. When the Japanese foreign office learned of the development of 
the Northwest Airway and the proposals to build the Alaska Highway, they 
treated it as an offensive gesture. The newspaper Hochi commented that 
"American measures in this direction will be regarded as a continuation 
of the horseshoe-shaped encirclement of Japan by the Washington Govern- 
ment". 
' 
During 1941, interest in the Alaska highway project increased in 
the United States and Canada. States and provinces which stood to benefit 
in an economic sense from the highway (depending upon which route it took) 
lobbied for the highway to be built on a course that favoured their own 
geographic location. Still, the Canadian federal government remained 
reluctant. When the United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, 
sought Mackenzie King's support for the project, King demurred, stating 
that he favoured developing instead the Northwest Airway, a project al- 
ready underway. In October 1941, the United States War Department threw 
its weight behind the highway proposal, declaring the projected road to 
2 
be "a long-range defence measure" . 
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, event relating 
to the Alaska Highway moved toward a swift conclusion, as apprehension 
over Japanese capabilities and intentions infected the highest levels of 
American government.. On 16 January 1942, the President directed his 
Secretaries of War, Navy, and Interior to report on the need for a high- 
way. At the same time, he sounded out his two principal military ad- 
visors, General Marshall and Admiral King. Both anticipated a Japanese 
'Cited in Godsell, p. 115. 
2Dziuban, pp. 217-218. 
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raid on Alaska, and Marshall favoured a highway. Admiral King, on the 
other hand, while refusing to guarantee uninterrupted sea communications 
with Alaska, did not feel that a highway was required. Roosevelt's 
cabinet committee reported that they felt that a highway was necessary 
in the event that sea lanes to Alaska were cut by Japanese action. It 
was also recommended that the road should follow the general line of the 
Northwest Airway. From a purely military point of view, this particular 
choice of route was attractive in that it was relatively secure, located 
as it was behind a formidable mountain range. Another advantage was that 
the road when completed would form a valuable navigational aid for pilots 
flying the airway. On 11 February 1942, the President approved the plan, 
funded it, and directed that the necessary arrangements be made with 
Canada through the PJBD. 
During the same period, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee 
had examined the highway proposal, taking a narrow, purely Canadian view- 
point. They concluded that 
... even if this highway could be completed 
during the present 
war, it would only indirectly affect the defence of the West Coast. 
We are of the opiýion that the construction of this road by Canada 
is not warranted. 
To the Chiefs of Staff, defence against any Japanese threat to Canada 
required efforts to be focused on the ports and waters of British Columbia. 
Alaska, and the road to it, was an "American problem". 
Given the prpvailing American mood in the early days of 1942, it 
is unlikely that the United States would have accepted Canadian refusal 
or continued delay on the highway project. Had Canada not co-operated 
1 Ibid, pp. 218-221. 
2D Hist, 193.009 (N), Vol. 39 "Chiefs of Staff Committee Memo- 
randum" (To Cabinet War Committee), 9 February, 1942. 
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it is most likely that tremendous American pressure would have been 
brought to bear to force the issue. The American ambassador to Ottawa 
had forewarned the Canadian government the previous week that his govern- 
ment had decided that a highway to Alaska was vital to the defence of the 
territory. On 12 February, the United States ambassador formally re- 
quested permission to deploy survey teams to Canada and, subsequently, to 
construct the road. The Canadian government capitulated and, forgetting 
its earlier reservations concerning sovereignty, agreed to a survey and 
the construction of a pioneer road between Fort St. John, B. C., and 
Boundary, Alaska. The PJBD somewhat belatedly considered the project in 
its meeting of 25-26 February. Although some Canadian members remained 
skeptical about the wartime utility of the road, discussion was somewhat 
academic since the two governments had already agreed to build the road. 
The PJBD's 24th Recommendation read, 
as a matter pertaining to the joint defence of Canada and the 
United States, a highway be constructed along the line of staging 
route airports and I connecting with the existing road system in Alaska and Canada. 
The American Section of the PJBD informed their Canadian colleagues that 
the United States was prepared to pay the entire cost of building and 
maintaining the highway in view of the Canadian contribution to the war 
effort since 1939 and Canada's financial obligation for the North West 
Staging Route. 
The agreement to build the Alaska Highway was formalized with the 
approval of the PJBD's 24th Recommendation and by an exchange of diplo- 
matic notes between the two countries on 17 and 18 March. The plan was 
that the United States would survey the route, build a pioneer road using 
civilian contractors. The United States further agreed to maintain the 
'Published in Dziuban, Appendix A. 
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highway until six months after the war's end, at which time it would 
become an integral part of the Canadian highway network. 
Canada, for her part, provided only the right of way for the 
highway and a number of financial reliefs and customs exemptions in re- 
spect of the entry of equipment, materials, and construction workers 
destined for the highway. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee main- 
tained their parochial attitude throughout. They allowed that the PJBD 
recommendation made sense--just as lon g as the United States was prepared 
to pay the bill and do the job. 
' For the remainder of the war the 
Canadian military showed little, if any, interest in the Alaska Highway. 
The construction of the Alaska Highway was by far the greatest 
engineering project undertaken in the Canadian North up to the end of 
the Second World War. Between Dawson Creek, British Columbia and Fair- 
banks, Alaska, stretched 1,523 miles of wilderness. Both the climate 
and the terrain contributed to the obstacles the American engineers had 
to face. Winter cold, break-up and freeze-up, permafrost, swamp, ice, 
mountains, virgin forests, and innumerable rivers had to be met and dealt 
with. The United States Army approach to the problem took the form of a 
massive military campaign. On 16 March 1942, the initial contingent of 
construction troops arrived at the railhead at Dawson Creek. The troop 
build-up continued until there were seven regiments of engineers working 
2 
on the project, a tolal of over eleven thousand men. 
Work was undertaken at both ends of the route and at those inter- 
mediate points where it was possible to deploy men and equipment. 
1D Hist, 193.009 (D5), Vol 4,3 March, 1942. 
2 A detailed account of the engineering aspects of the construc- 
tion of the Alaska Highway is to be found in Lyman L. Woodman, "Building 
the Alaska Highway: A Saga of the Northland". The Northern Enqineer, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer, 1976. 
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Initially the project was divided into two independent commands with 
headquarters for the north at Fairbanks and for the south at Fort St. John. 
In August, with work well under way, the two formations were merged into 
a single Northwest Command under Major General James A. O'Connor, who 
established his headquart"ers at Whitehorse. In mid-August, 1942, the 
engineers were reinforced by 7,500 men from the U. S. Public Roads Com- 
mission who assisted in the construction of the pioneer road and began 
the work of upgrading the highway to a regular two lane, 26-foot highway. 
1 
A longtime northern resident, Philip Godsell, described the impact 
of highway construction on small northern communities during 1942 and 
1943. The boom and bust cycle was no new phenomenon to the North. It 
had been seen in the Klondike at the turn of the century and repeatedly 
in the Mackenzie during the-interwar years. The locals, realizing that 
it would not last forever, made the most of the opportunity. 
Dawson Creek pyramided from a few hundred disgruntled settlers 
to a thriving town of ten thousand. 
**** 
(T)his unexpected eruption furnished a cash market at 
boom prices for all their ... produce; employment for themselves 
and their teams at unheard of prices. 
Dawson Creek at the end of steel daily added new spurs to 
accommodate the lines of flatcars loaded with bulldozers, trucks, 
cranes, giant scrapers and bulging boxcars. 
(A) boom frontier town of cafes, pool rooms, frame 
hoteis*, warehouses and barber shops arose to the eternal tattoo of 
carpenters' hammers. Within a miraculously short time the hamlet 
of Dawson Creek with its three hundred population became a rip- 
snorting frontier town oI ten thousand with a floating population 




p. 134. It was not all that rip snorting--at least by 
American frontier standards. A newspaper article of 30 November, 1942 
was headlined "Man Willing to go to Jail to Get a Few Hours Rest. " The 
story, howeyers revealed that because of a housing shortage the jail was 
the only place in Dawson Creek that was not filled. Iocal officials, 
when interviewed, reported that there was no crime Oýoblem as "both 
soldiers and civilians are so busy on the road that there is little time 
for getting into trouble". The fact that the closest liquor store was 
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A similar fate overtook Whitehorse. The administrative centre 
of the construction work was located there and it also developed as a 
major base on the North West Staging Route. Despite the lack of rec- 
reational facilities (Whitehorse boasted three "dingy" beer parlours and 
a cinema that featured long-dated news films) the boom was orderly. A 
newspaper report appearing in hovember 1942, read in part: 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police of the neighbourhood are high in 
their praise of the sTbriety of the American soldiers who have been 
building the highway. 
The construction of the Alaska Highway caused considerable public 
interest and attention in Canada. In part, this was due to the massive 
publicity that attended the decision to build it, and the subsequent 
opening of the route seven months later. This was in contrast to many 
other northern defence-related projects which, if not classified as being 
secret, certainly did not have public attention drawn to them. On the 
whole, comments in newspapers and journals were strongly in support of 
the project. The defence aspects of the route were treated in a rather 
uncritical and simplistic fashion; in other instances, newspaper interpret- 
ation of the intended use and significance of the highway was simply wrong. 
The Sydney Post-Record reported: 
(I)n building it the Army was interested in just one thing; cutting 
a swath over which supplies could be slugged from America's industrial 
arsenals to the strategic bases in Alaska which extend a friendly 
hand towards Ruisia and China and point a potential dagger at the 
heart of Japan. - 
It has been seen that the North West Staging Route was important to the 
supply of combat aircraft to the Soviet Union and the relationship 
several miles distant perhaps contributed to this happy state of affairs. 
See Hamilt-on Spectator, 30 November 1942. 
1 Winnipeg Free Press, 12 November 1942. 
2 The Sydney Post Record, 17 December 1942. 
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between the Alaska Highway and the North West Staging Route has been 
noted. It is simply incorrect, however, to argue that the route was 
built for that purpose. In the same vein, the possibility of launching 
a major offensive from Alaska toward the Japanese homeland was not a 
significant strategic alternative by the end of 1942. 
A member of the Manitoba provincial government made a tour of the 
highway in early 1943 and spoke of-his visit on the service club luncheon 
circuit after his return. He too showed signs of confusion. In his 
interpretation, completion of the Highway would permit regular shipping 
to Alaska to be switched from sea to road, a change that he regarded as 
desirable, I presumably because such a move would free shipping for use 
in other theatres. As noted above, this was never the intention: the 
highway was built as a backup for use in the event that the more econo- 
mical and efficient sea route became unusable. 
The main focus of Canadian public comment during the 1942-1944 
period was the impact the Highway was expected to have upon northern 
British Columbia and the Yukon in the post-war era. The highway was seen 
as a means of opening up the Northwest in terms of markets, settlements, 
and commerce. Thomas H. Ross, a Canadian Member of Parliament who visited 
the highway in the spring of 1943, predicted "a great rush to populate 
that part of the Dominion after the war ... ." In particular, the 
Peace River District-of northern British Columbia, now that access had 
.: I 
been created to "the abundant farming, mining and trapping opportunities, 
.. 2 Mas expected to fill up fast . Several other visitors to the area 
commented upon the impact the highway would have in terms of new markets 
'Req ina Leader Post. 12 April 1943. 
2 The Ottawa Citizen, 14 April 1943. 
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for western Canada and an anticipated high tourist trade in the area it- 
self. Edmonton, it was predicted optimistically, would replace Seattle 
as the main source of supply for Alaska. 
I 
While southerners and transients in the North waxed enthusiastic 
about the future of the Yukon, northerners on the whole remained un- 
convinced that a new day had dawned in the Northwest. May were doubtful 
that the highway would remain open after the war. General O'Connor, 
however, explained in an interview that "the peacetime maintenance of the 
road would probably induce less cost and effort than most people realized", 
and expressed the opinion that the road would remain in service. He 
added that the upgrading work done by the United States Public Roads 
Administration personnel had already taken the route well above the 
required military standard. 
2 
Public interest in the relationship of the native peoples of the 
North to the highway tended to be marginal and was used to provide 
'colour' for various articles appearing in Canadian newspapers. It was 
noted that at native communities the highway passed by, there was a rush 
on the souvenir moccasin business. It was undoubtedly some unknowing 
American soldier or construction worker who brought measles to the small 
Indian settlement at Teslin. The resultant epidemic, which touched all 
but four members of the band and killed three of them, was reported in 
3 
southern newspapers without editorial comment. There appears to have 
26 
been no suggestion ever made in either Canada or the United States that 
the native peoples should be asked what they thought of the project. 
'Regina Leader Post, 12 April 1943. 
2Hamilton Spectator, 30 September 1943. 
3Edmonton Jaurnal, 24 November 1942. 
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No effort appears to haye been made to safeguard the native way of life 
or their aboriginal rights. Native rights were simply not an issue in 
Canada at that time, particularly during a period of wartime urgency. 
The northern Indians were left to stand at the roadside to watch and to 
wonder at the "black white men", the negro construction troops of the 
United States Army. Inarticulate in terms of white society, and unor- 
ganized in any way that was politically meaningful, there was nothing 
that they could do, and nobody to do anything for them. Godsell, who 
knew the territory and the people as well as any white living at the 
time, wrote: 
Penned up on their reservation ... the ragged remnants of the 
once-powerful Beaver tribe gathered around ... and gazed with 
smouldering eyes and tight-drawn lips as convoy after convoy of 
American troops hurtled through their erstwhile hunting grounds 
without so much as giving them a passing glance. 1 
The project to improve the road to highway standard continued 
until November 1943. Most of the American engineer troops were with- 
drawn upon completion of the pioneer road and further work was done by 
civilian contractors. At the height of the construction season, 81 firms 
employing a total of 16,000 men were operating 11,100 pieces of road 
building equipment. American Army engineers were returned to the job 
in its final stages and finished the construction phase and for the re- 
mainder of the wartime period the highway was operated and maintained by 
the United States Amy. The road that previous studies had estimated 
would take five to 
s`ix 
years to build had been smashed through in seven 
months and transformed into a higher quality frontier highway in another 
year. 
1 Godsell, p. 134. 
2Dziuban, p. 222. 
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Even as the United States-Corps of Engineers were just beginning 
to come to grips with the full range of construction problems facing 
them, the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy clashed at 
Midway. The American victory marked the turning point of the Pacific 
war; but this fact was not immediately appreciated in the Northwest, for 
as a subsidiary operation, Japanese forces had struck at Dutch Harbour 
in Alaska and occupied the barren Aleutian Islands of Attu and Kiska on 
7 June 1942. There the Japanese stopped: there never was any Japanese 
plan to invade Alaska. At best, the--tWo lodgements served to tie up a 
few American units in masking them, and substantially more when, nine 
months later, the United States and Canada finally mounted a campaign to 
eject the invaders. 
The Alaska Highway, in keeping with its official status as a 
back up facility, played no significant part in the build-up of American 
forces in Alaska. By the autumn of 1943 when the Aleutian campaign had 
been concluded, a mere 54 tons of supplies had been delivered by road to 
Alaska Defence Command. ' In retrospect, the military leaders of both 
Canada and the United States were correct in their initial appreciation 
that the highway would not be necessary for the defence of Alaska. That 
they changed their views must be attributed to the emotional climate of 
pessimism that swept the West in the wake of the unbroken string of 
Japanese victories in the early months of the Pacific war. The highway 
as it stood in the fall of 1943, when there was demonstrably no require- 
ment for it for the needs of Alaskan defence, had an annual capacity of 
400,000 tons, a figure which could have been increased to 720, ooo tons 
in an emergency. 
2 
'Stacey, Armsý Men and Governments, p. 383. 
2 Dziuban, p. 222. 
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The military importance of the Alaska Highway lay in its relation- 
ship to the North West Staging Route. The highway played an important 
part in staging route construction programs an in the routine operation 
of the airway. By the end of 1943, the United States Army was operating 
over 1,500 vehicles on the highway, moving an annual total of 134,000 
tons of supplies and 42,000 passengers. These figures remained more or 
less constant through 1944 and only diminished in 1945 with the end of 
the war. 
The Canol Project 
The Canol Pipeline is the third in the triumvirate of major 
defence projects undertaken in the Northwest during World War II. 
1 Like 
the Alaska Highway, which in many ways it complemented, the project was 
a major feat of engineering-undertaken on an intensive "crash" basis. 
In the end, it turned out to have a marginal impact on the defence of 
Alaska and an insignifican impact on the conduct of the war. 
Canol, an acronym for CANADIAN OIL, had its origins in a 
United States War Department study of January, 1942, wherein the possi- 
bility of using oil from the Norman Wells field on the Mackenzie River 
was examined with respect to the military needs of Alaska and ongoing 
defence projects in northern Canada. The rationale that prompted this 
study and the eventual conclusions reached were, like the decision to 
build the Alaska Highway and improve the Northwest Airway, a product of 
the military appreciation of the situation as it existed in early 1942. 
The possibility of losing control of the marine route to Alaska, coupled 
with a critical shortage of tankers, provoked the American administration 
into proceeding with the project. On 30 April 1942,, -the 
United States 
lDziuban; unless otherwise noted, all references in this section 
are from this source, pp. 228-235. 
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Amy Chief of Engineers was directed to carry out the program. The 
following day the United States government signed a contract with Imperial 
Oil Limited, the owners of Norman Wells; and the Canadian government was 
notified informally of the American proposal! Negotiations for American 
construction rights were carried out via the classical diplomatic route, 
rather than through the PJBD. 
1 As was usual, Canada, although. concerned 
with sovereign implications and possible disadvantageous post war pre- 
cedents, agreed to the American requests. 
The main project, or Canol 1, as it came to be known, called for 
the drilling of nine additional wells at Norman Wells and the construction 
of a pipeline between the wellhead and Whitehorse, where a refinery was 
to be built. 2 Canol 2, subsequently authorized, was a pipeline leading 
from Skagway on the coast to the refinery at Whitehorse. This project 
permitted crude oil to be shipped by tanker along the relatively secure 
inside passage to the Alaskan panhandle and thence by pipeline to White- 
horse where it would be refined and used on the Alaska Highway or North- 
west Staging Route. Canol 3 and Canol 4 were gasoline pipelines laid to 
distribute the product of the Whitehorse refinery, the former leading 
south to Watson Lake, the latter north to the Alaska boundary. 
3 In quest 
for more sources of oil, the United States sought and obtained Canadian 
I The American secretary of the Board later said that the reason 
the United States Section never tabled the Canol proposals was that the 
American members did'not wish to insult the Board with "such a fool idea". 
See Stacey, Armst Men and Governments, p. 348. 
2To establish the Whitehorse refinery, the United States govern- 
ment purchased an existing refinery in Texas, dismantled it, shipped it 
by sea to Skagway and thence by rail to Whitehorse where it was reas- 
sembled. Lyman L. Woodman, "Canol: Pipeline of Brief Glory". The Northern 
Engineer, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 1977. Woodman's art. icle includes a 
detaileT study of the engineering aspects of the Canol project. 
3D Hist, 348.013 (Dl), U. S. Defence in Canada, Canadian General 
Staff Memorandum, 11 July 1945. 
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authority to sponsor wildcat drilling throughout the Yukon and in the 
Northwest Territories. 
With the exception of a few individuals in the higher levels of 
American government, virtually every public and private agency in both 
Canada and the United States, including senior American military engineers, 
expressed grave doubts as to the utility of the Canol project. The main 
tenor of their objections was that the system could not possibly be ex- 
pected to produce enough oil quickly enough to have any significant effect 
on the course of the war. 
' In retrospect, these critics were absolutely 
right, for the originators of the project simply had no idea whatsoever 
of the engineering and transportation problems attendant upon the iso- 
lation of the Canadian Northwest. The first requirement given to the 
Corps of Engineers was to have the pipeline laid and the refinery in 
production by October 1942. 
When the 1942 freeze up occurred, at about the same date that the 
Canol 1 was originally supposed to be in full production, less than two 
thirds of the materials needed to build the pipeline had even arrived at 
Norman Wells. This was in spite of a truly massive American construction 
effort by 2,500 troops and an additional 2,000 civilian workers. The 
Americans built wharf facilities, feeder roads, air strips, and construc- 
tion camps all over the Northwest in aid of the Canol project but this 
had not been enough. , 
The movement of equipment and material for the 
pipeline continued throughout the winter via winter roads bulldozed 
across frozen waterways and through snow covered woodlands. When the 
'Steffanson had recommended the development of the Norman Wells 
oil fields to the United States War Department in 19-40 and again in mid 
1941 as- a defence measure, but no action was taken in the absence of 
the imperative of war. Woodman, "Canol", p. 16. Steffanson was notorious 
for underestimating the difficulties of northern development and oper- 
ations to men less dedicated than he. 
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1943 shipping season opened, huge amounts of stores were still required 
to be moved north. 
At the same time as the necessary equipment was being assembled 
in the Mackenzie Valley and in the Yukon, an extensive survey and re- 
connaissance was underway-to determine the route the pipeline should take. 
This survey was not completed until May 1943, although actual construction 
of the pipeline was able to begin in December 1942. Work continued 
throughout 1943; at its peak, the work force numbered over 10,000 civ- 
ilian construction workers. The pipeline was not completed until Feb- 
ruary 1944 and the Whitehorse refinery did not come on line until April. 
On the whole, the Canadian government had little or no idea of 
the magnitude of the American enterprise. When rumors of the actual ex- 
tent of operations began to leak out of the North, Canadian leaders uni- 
formly reacted with shock and dismay. In far distant London, Vincent 
Massey of the Department of External Affairs (and the man destined to 
become Canada's first native-born governor general) learned from a senior 
officer of the Hudson's Bay Company that 
Large numbers of men have been discovered well established in certain 
parts of the North without Ottawa knowing anything about the matter 
at all or any permission having been asked or given. 1 
In the winter of 1944 Mackenzie King twice brought up the Canol project 
at War Committee meetings. The Prime Minister's chief concern was with 
the actual control of the oil wells, holding that "we ought to get the 
Americans out of theýfurther development there and keep complete control 
,, 2 in our own hands . 
If Canadian leaders were privately unhappy with the entire Canol 
'Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue (Toronto: MacMillan of 
Canada), 1963), p. 371. 
2J. W. Pickersgill (ed), The Mackenzie Kinq Record, Vol 1 1939-1944 
(Toronto: U of T Press), pp. 644-645. 
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project and distrustful of the ultimate intentions of the United States, 
the American Senate was also having serious second thoughts about the 
northern pipelines. The Truman Committee Investigating the National 
Defence Program criticized both the initial decision to launch the Canol 
project and later decisions, some made as late as October 1943, to con- 
tinue with the project in the fight of a vastly improved strategic situ- 
ation in Alaska. The United States Petroleum Administrator for War viewed 
the project as being inordinately expensive in relation to the expected 
return. In addition, the Truman Committee concluded that the contracts 
negotiated with the Canadian government were unfair and failed to safe- 
guard post-war American interests and investments! 
Despite constant criticism, the United States War Department 
forged ahead, determined to complete the project long after their critics 
had proved to be manifestly right, and even the remotest strategic threat 
had passed. When production finally started, the Whitehorse refinery 
could only process 3,000 barrels of crude oil a day. - As such, the output 
of gasoline, fuel oil, and aviation fuel could only partially meet the 
needs of the military operations by then taking place routinely along the 
Alaska Highway and the Northwest Staging Route. 
Canol was to be as ephemeral as it was costlY. In June 1945 the 
Whitehorse refinery was closed and soon after was dismantled and shipped 
back to the South. Neither the Canadian government nor any private 
enterprise could sed any economic justification for the facility in terms 
of northern requirements during peacetime. Very few of the elaborate 
facilities that had been built to support the pipeline were of any use in 
the immediate post-war years. A few airstrips were subsequently developed 
to meet the needs of commercial and private aviation in the upper 
Mackenzie Valley. The main pipeline was abandoned. The wilderness 
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encroached on most of the airstrips and the service road that ran along- 
side the pipeline. Empty construction camps crumbled into decay; wharfs 
were swept away. Canol, at a cost of 134 million dollars, briefly opened 
up a remote area of the Canadian North. Since 1945, the North has re- 
claimed its own. 
Crimson Route 
A Trans-Arctic Airway between Europe and North American exerted 
a considerable fascination for air-minded people on both sides of the 
Atlantic during the 1930s. The theoretical potential of the route was 
clearly understood, but given the state of aviation art, the problems 
presented by the route seemed to be insurmountable in terms of technology, 
cost, and reliability. It was desirable that no open sea crossing should 
involve a greater distance than 450 miles. The projected route led from 
London to Scotland and thence north to the Faroe Islands. From there the 
route envisioned aerodromes at Angmagsahik and Holstenborg on the east 
and west coasts of Greenland respectively, and on to Pangnirtung on 
Baffin Island, the first point of the route on Canadian territory. From 
Pangnirtung, there existed two alternatives: a westerly route via 
Chesterfield Inlet and Churchill on Hudson Bay, and on to Winnipeg; or a 
more easterly route going via Wakenham Bay in Hudson Strait, Whale River, 
Rupert House and Cochrane in northern Ontario. 
While these routes met the requirements of the airway in terms of 
airfield intervals they also encompassed, from an aviator's point of view, 
particularly foul climatic conditions, including long hours of darkness 
'It 
should be noted that the Trans-Arctic Airway was only one of 
several means considered to link the two continents by air. A series of 
floating aerodromes located at intervals along the ffain North Atlantic 
shipping route remained no more than an idea. The possibilities of 
using rigid airships for commercial purposes seemed more promising; it 
was to take the Shenandoah and R101 disasters before this alternative 
was given up. 
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during winter, blizzards, sleet, fog, and critical temperatures condusive 
to aircraft icing. In addition, winter ice and varied times of break-up 
and freeze-up along the route meant that flying boats could not be used; 
ski and wheel equipped aircraft operating between prepared aerodromes were 
the only possible solutioh at the time. The cost of building such facili- 
ties in Canada during the 1930s was perceived as being excessive. In the 
final analysis, a commercial Trans-Arctic airway would have to present a 
fast and reliable alternative to the well established North Atlantic steam- 
ship route. As is often the case with pioneering ventures, reliability 
was the great question mark. In depression era Canada, the solution to 
the inherent problems of the route were not apparent. 
Canada approached the Trans-Arctic Airway project with great 
caution. The British Watkins--air- expedition to Greenland to explore the 
eastern portion of the proposed route was watched with interest. Men of 
the RCMP stationed in the Eastern Arctic again proved their multi-purpose 
utility by gathering meteorological data along the Canadian section of the 
proposed route. Charles Lindbergh carried out a partial aerial survey of 
the route in 1933 on behalf of Pan American Airways, but his report was 
noncommittal and PanAm took no further action. 
1 
The Canadian position was best summarized by an undated memorandum 
prepared by the Civil Aviation Branch, probably in 1936. It concluded 
(T)he route was only feasible for multi-engined aircraft using land 
bases. The prepAration of these, together with the equipment of the 
route, presents great difficulties. Many of the bases would be 
inaccessible for many months of the year, which is an obvious draw- 
back. Their inaccessibility makes the investigation expensive and 
difficult. 
We felt that, while the route could probably be flown with fair 
regularity if properly equipped, yet, the difficulties of its oper- 
ation and the cost of its maintenance, together with its inaccessi- 
1D Hist, 75/52, "Trans Arctic Airway" memorandum, 6 February 
1932. 
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bility, qo not make it a practical proposition under present con- 
ditions. 
Nobody seems to have considered, even in the late 1930s, that conditions 
might change abruptly and an air route that was not a "practical prop- 
osition" as a commercial -venture might take on a vastly more important 
role in war. 
During the summer of 1941, both Canada and the United States had 
sponsored air expeditions along ttýe Labrador coast to examine the possi- 
bilities of establishing a major air base at North West River. 
2 Both 
groups had met at the site that was to become known as Goose Bay and 
agreed that it met the requirements. While Goose Bay was the main base, 
the need to ferry strategic and tactical aircraft from North American 
factories to the European theatre of war led to the construction of exten- 
sive airway facilities throughout Canada and Newfoundland. It was antici- 
pated that a movement bottleneck would be created at the Newfoundland 
bases of Gander and Torbay particularly when massive numbers of USAAF 
aircraft began to deploy to Europe. The huge new facility that had been 
constructed at Goose Bay, Labrador in late 1941, was, in early 1942, 
still unpaved and unusable during the spring thaw. In addition to these 
problems, short-range fighter aircraft required bases that were more 
closely sited than those that the Newfoundland route provided. 
The American 1941 air expedition had been commanded by Captain 
Elliot Roosevelt, VT6 President's son. In the latter part of July he had 
proceeded further north and had located potential air base sites at 
Fort Chimo in Arctic Quebec, at the head of Frobisher Bay on Baffin Island, 
'D Hist, 75/52, "Arctic Air Route Between UK--and Canada" memo- 
randum nd. (1936 ? ). 
2 Dziuban, pp. 193-194. 
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and on Cumberland Sound on the east coast of Baffin. 
1 (Subsequent inves- 
tigation revealed that Padloping Island was even more suitable than 
Cumberland Sound). On 9 August 1941, during the Atlantic Conference at 
Argentia, Newfoundland, the President had discussed these sites with his 
son and General Arnold, his senior air adviser, with a view to developing 
a ferry route for short-range aircraft. 
Nothing could be done about air base construction at these remote 
sites during 1941 as the open water season was too far advanced. The 
United States did, however, request permission from Canada to construct 
meteorological stations at these sites to provide weather forecasts rel- 
evant to North Atlantic flying. Canada accEýýded to this request and the 
United States quickly deployed the necessary resources. By year's end, 
the three bases, code named Crystal, were all in operation with Crystal I 
at Fort Chimo; Crystal II at Frobisher Bay and Crystal III on Padloping 
island. 
By the spring of 1942, the anticipated air bottleneck was clearly 
developing in Newfoundland and Labrador. In May the United States pre- 
sented a plan for what was to become known as the Crimson Project to the 
PJBD. Fiorelle La Guardia, the Chairman of the United States Section of 
the Board, saw the project as one of the most important subjects the 
Board had touched on saying: "The plan challenges the imagination. It 
is so gigantic and dramatic. " He reported to the President that the 
magnitude of the proposal startled the Canadian members of Board. An 
unofficial Canadian opinion on the project, rendered by C. D. Howe, was 
that the Americans were perhaps underestimating the climatic difficulties 
'A detailed account of this expedition is to - be found in Alexander 
Forbes, Quest for a Northern Air Route (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1943). 
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that would be encountered in the construction and operation of the 
Baffin Island bases. 
I 
On 9 June 1942, the PJBD convened to examine in detail the 
American proposal for the North East Staging Route. In the view of the 
United States Army Air Force, there would be a requirement, by 1943, for 
a series of aerodromes every four or five hundred miles, the whole system 
being capable of handling up to one hundred combat aircraft and forty 
transports a day. To this end, the United States proposed three alterna- 
tive-routes: an eastern route via Fort Chimo, Baffin Island, the east 
coast of Greenland, Iceland and on to Great Britain; a western route 
originating in Regina, Saskatchewan and going northeast via The Pas, 
Churchill, Southampton Island, and thence connecting with the eastern 
route at Baffin Island; and a central route, following the east coast of 
Hudson Bay by way of Moose Factory and Richmond Gulf to Baffin Island. 
In the view of the PJBD the project held the promise of having 
a decisive effect on the duration of the war and in its 26th Recommen- 
dation, recommended taking action as soon as possible. Each country was 
to bear the costs of the airfields it undertook to construct, defend, and 
operate, but the proviso was added that all facilities built in Canada 
would become property of the Canadian government after the war. 
If the magnitude of the project had staggered Canadian officials 
when it was first presented to them, it had similar effect on the United 
States Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee when they came to consider the 
logistic support and shipping requirements entailed by the construction 
phase. In the view of the American military leaders, Crimson would place 
an unacceptable delay in the build up of American forces in Europe and 
I Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 375. 
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they recommended that the project be dropped unless the shipping require- 
ments could be considerably reduced. A modified plan was eventually ap- 
proved by the United States military on 2 July 1942. In its final form 
it called for only three permanent airfields at The Pas, Churchill, and 
Southampton Island. An additional three winter strips were to be built 
at Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay and on the east coast of Greenland. The 
"central route" was abandoned completely. Canada, faced with the peren- 
nial problems of limited resources, and with heavy on-going commitments 
to construction on the North West Staging Route and at Goose Bay, stated 
that she would only be able to build the field scheduled for The Pas. 
The Eastern Arctic became the responsibility of the United States. 
Work on all five fields in Canada went ahead with surprising 
speed. By the end of the year, usable strips had been built at every 
site and construction of housing and other support facilities was pro- 
gressing well. In addition to the main sites, the United States built a 
feeder base at Mingnon, Quebec, and undertook the construction of thirty 
meteorological stations throughout the Eastern Arctic and the northern 
portion of the central provinces to support the system. 
I 
By the spring of 1943, the steadily improving allied situation 
caused the United States War Department to reconsider the entire Crimson 
project. The ever increasing range of successive technological gener- 
ations of fighter aircraft negated the need for relatively closely spaced 
bases, and it was al so proving possible to deploy large numbers of disas- 
sembled aircraft to Europe using regular North Atlantic shipping. As a 
result, the United States felt that it would be reasonable to modify and 
reduce Crimson considerably. The exact nature of these modifications, 
1 Dziuban, pp. 193-194. 
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however, was a matter of some indecision, and it was early summer before 
negotiations between the two governments were complete. In the interval, 
work continued on all sites. The final result was that the eastern route 
bases at Chimo and Frobisher were designated as emergency strips to be 
used in the event that it-became necessary at some later date to deploy 
large numbers of aircraft quicCly to Europe. 
I To this end, these far 
northern strips were paved. Work on the sites at Southampton Island, 
Churchill and The Pas that was more than fifty percent finished was pushed 
through to completion and facilitiesý-were maintained at all sites to sup- 
port flying operations. The meteorological net was modified by closing 
2 
down some stations, but at the same time other new ones were opened. 
Crimson Route was never used for its designed purpose. At the 
most northerly bases, aircraft were few and far between. Fort Chimo 
recorded 85 landings in 1943 and seven in all of 1944: most of these were 
by ice patrol aircraft working in support of shippling related to the coniý- 
struction of the bases. A total of 323 aircraft landed at Frobisher Bay 
during 1943, almost all of them for the purposes of supporting construc- 
tion activities. In the words of the official United States Army his- 
torian, "an insignificant number of ferry aircraft passed through these 
bases. " 3 Although the bases had manifestly no role to play in the war 
effort, what to do with them remained a perplexing problem to the govern- 
ments of both countries. 
1 There is an oft expressed statement in the popular press that 
Crimson Route was built to facilitate the air medical evacuation of the 
heavy casualties that were expected as a result of the invasion of Europe. 
No official documents on the subject could be located by the author that 
suggested even remotely that this was ever a real purpose of Crimson Route. 
2D Hist, Chiefs of Staff Committee Mtmoranda-, - (D22), Vol. 21,5 
August 1943. 
3 Dziuban, P. 194. 
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The United States had attempted to shift the control responsi- 
bility for The Pas, Churchill, and Southampton Island to Canada in early 
1943 when the first major reevaluation of the project was undertaken. 
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee was still studying the proposal 
when the United States again changed its mind about future development. 
With respect to the original request, the Canadian view was that the most 
southerly base, The Pas, should be taken over by Canada; that the United 
States should maintain its commitment at Churchill, and that Southampton 
could be abandoned, providing that, as a precaution, the runway was made 
unserviceable. 
1 In the fall of 1944, the United States again considered 
the abandonment of the route, 
2 
and the Canadian government again con- 
sidered what to do with the facilities. In the summer of that year, 
several departments of the federal government conducted a joint explora- 
tory flight over the Crimson Route 
for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the usefulness 
of the bases and any other information wqich will assist in 
assessing the future value of the Route. 
Several reports were submitted to the Cabinet War Committee on 
the subject. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff agreed that from a defence 
point of view, the bases at The Pas, Churchill, and Southampton Island 
were not required, but that they should be maintained by the Americans 
on a caretaker basis until such time as the aircraft ferrying require- 
inents for the Pacific war became clear. The issue was still dragging on 
when the war ended in Europe. On May 19,1945, a Canadian staff study 
stated that "there is no military value to the aerodromes at Chimo and 
1D Hists Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda, (D20). Vol. 19, 
14 Jun 1943. 
21bid. (D36), Vol. 35,5 October 1944. 
3 D, Hist, 181.009 (D1062), Northeast Staging Route Exploratory 
Flights, 26 July 1944. 
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Frobisher Bay" and recommended that no attempt should be made by the 
Department of National Defence to maintain either of the stations or 
Southampton Island. 1 Finally, in August 1945 The Pas and Churchill were 
turned over to the Canadian Department of Transport while Southampton 
Island was transferred in September. The United States, however, kept 
small caretaker detachments at Frobisher and Chimo until the winter of 
1949-50.2 
The Crimson Project in the Eastern Arctic was closely analagous 
to the three United States defence projects in the Northwest. All were 
conceived and approved in the early months of 1942. All were eventually 
used for purposes other than that which their designers had originally 
intended. All brought a relatively massive United States military pres- 
ence to the sparsely settled Canadian North. 
Impact and Aftermath 
The main purpose of all the Second World War northern defence 
projects was to permit the United States to bring its military power to 
bear on distant lands. Faced with a common foe, Canada often "went along" 
with American projects for the sake of allied co-operation and in order to 
11protect" her sovereign rights. In permitting what was, in the final 
analysis, a foreign power to undertake major construction projects using 
American troops, American contractors, and American materials, Canada, to 
a degree, gave up some of her sovereign authority over her own territory 
but maintained an apparent ultimate control. These projects are all 
amenable to concrete measurement--the number of aircraft delivered to 
Russia, the number of barrels of oil pumped, etc. The sacrifice of 
'D Hist,, Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda (D43), Vol. 42, 
18 May 1945. 
2 Stacey. Arms, Men and Governments, p. 377. 
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sovereignty in the interests of a common cause is unquantifiable. 
The attitudes of officials of both countries towards the matter 
of sovereignty differed considerably. As a broad generalization it could 
be said that American defence planners involved in northern projects, and 
American troops involved in their execution, were not concerned in the 
least about this sovereignty factor; their sole interest was the efficient 
prosecution of the war. Canadians-, on the other hand, tended to be ex- 
tremely suspicious of American motives. Canadian officials were continu- 
ously examining American proposals in the light of anticipated post-war 
political, economic, and commercial factors. These differing attitudes 
caused certain difficulties in Canadian-American wartime relations, and 
they were particularly acute in the North where the Canadian infra- 
structure and presence was at its weakest, and the American involvement 
was at its greatest. 
Three of the four main military construction projects: the 
Alaska Highway, Canol, and Crimson were exclusively American. Even the 
North West Staging Route, despite the fact that it was constructed by 
Canada, and operated by the RCAF, was run for the benefit of the United 
States, and, during 1943, relied heavily on American construction teams 
who were building the necessary improvements and enlargements. The 
Liberal government of Mackenzie King was quick to seize opportunities to 
emphasize Canadian spvereignty and to reassert Canadian control over 
American projects. At the official opening ceremony of the Alaska High- 
way, held at Soldier's Summit on 21 November 1942, both the message of 
congratulations sent by Mackenzie King, and the speech by the cabinet 
minister who attended the ceremony emphasized the Canadian "contribution" 
to the project and reiterated the fact that the highway had been built 
on Canadian territory. The Prime Minister's message read, in part, that 
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Canada's 
unprecedented action in granting the United States permission to 
build the road across Dominion territory was another symbol that 
we are brothers 1 
in arms, waging a life-and-death struggle against 
a common enemy. 
Ian Mackenzie, the cabinet minister was somewhat less subtle. He said 
that "the soil is ours, the toil has been yours. " He emphasized that the 
highway was just a part of the Alaskan route and that the Northwest 
Staging Route was the other half. In his words, "We have built the sky- 
way--you the highway. " Somewhat ungraciously on that, the official 
opening of the highway, he went on to extol the anticipated post-war 
importance of the airway. 
Mackenzie King saw American projects as an attempt to link Canada 
more closely to the United States at the expense of Canada's relationship 
to the British Commonwealth just as he saw British attempts to involve 
Canada in South East Asia as efforts to tie Canada more closely to the 
Commonwealth at the expense of the American connection. An impolitic 
suggestion by the United States that a joint international committee be 
formed to study the territory opened up by the Alaska Highway was objected 
to by the Prime Minister. On 30 December 1942 he wrote in his diary that 
he was "strongly opposed to anything of the kind" seeing such a project 
as the first step of "the efforts that would be made by the Americans to 
control developments in our country after the war. ,3 
Canadian contern over sovereignty in the North continued to grow 
as the war progressed and American involvement in the area increased. 
In early 1943, the British High Commissioner to Canada, Malcolm MacDonald, 
'Reported in Vancouver Province, 22 November--1942. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Vol. II, p. 436. 
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visited the Northwest, and was later invited to inform the Cabinet War 
Committee of his impressions of the situation there with respect to 
American activity. MacDonald painted a gloomy picture about the situation 
vis a vis Canadian sovereignty. He observed that the scale of the American 
projects could not be imagined without actually seeing what was going on, 
adding that the few Canadian officials in the area could not maintain 
control, or even keep touch with day to day developments. More omin- 
ously, he stated that he felt the American defence projects were being 
planned and carried out with a view to the post-war situation. 
1 
In April 1943, the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, Dr. 
Charles Camsell, was directed to study and report on the situation in the 
Northwest. Basing their decisions on Camsell's report, the Cabinet War 
Committee resolved that in, future all subsequent programs in Canada in- 
volving the United States defence establishment would be the subject of 
specific agreement between the two countries; that Canada participate as 
fully as possible in the actual program of development; and that a special 
Canadian commissioner be appointed to oversee all military activity in 
the Northwest. On 5 May 1943, Brigadier W. W. Foster was named Special 
Commissioner for Defence Projects in the Northwest. Included in Foster's 
instructions was the sentence: 
The Canadian Government desires to ensure that the natural resources 
of the area shall be utilized to provide the maximum benefit for the 
Canadian people and to ensure that no commitments are made and no 
situation allowed to develop as a result of which the full Canadi n 
control of the area would be in any way prejudiced or endangered. 
The United States regarded this appointment of a Special Com- 
missioner as a measure taken by Canada to simplifyliaison and to centralize 
'Stacey, Arms, Men and Governmentst p. 386. 
21bid. 
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Canadian authority in the area--it certainly had that effect. 
' There can 
be no question that the real purpose of the Canadian Government was to 
provide for better Canadian control over American activities and more 
effective protection of C anadian sovereignty. 
2 Nevertheless, despite 
these steps, Canadian apprehension continued. In March 1944, the Prime 
Minister wrote in his diary that he thought that 
we ought to get the Americans-out of the further development (in the 
North) and to keep complete control in our own hands .... With the United States so powerful and her investments becoming greater 
in Canada, we will have a great-difficulty to hold our own against 
pressure from the United States. 3 
By 1944, the great construction projects that had been undertaken 
with so much military urgency in 1942 were in the main completed, or, at 
least, the military construction phase had ended. In most cases, how- 
ever, the remaining work had been turned over to civilian contractors, and 
there still remained a sizeable defence sponsored work force in the North. 
Changes in the strategic balance also served to lessen the importance of 
the area. The Japanese had been expelled from the Aleutians and the 
security of Alaska was no longer an issue. The United States had been 
prepared to abandon Crimson Route in 1943, and only continued the project 
on the possibility that the route might have some role to play in the 
redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe. 
At the level of the PJBD, and in concerned government departments 
in both national capitals, officials began to consider the problem of 
post-war disposition of defence facilities in the Canadian North. In some 
cases, the original international agreement had been specific as to the 
future of any facility. The Alaska Highway, for example, was to be turned 
1 Dziuban, pp. 137-138. 
2 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 386. 
3Makenzie King Record, Vol. 1, p. 644. 
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over to Canada six months after war's end, although Canada was in no way 
committed to its subsequent upkeep, and in 1944, the post-war role of 
the highway was by no means clear. 
The future of the various airways was seen as being much more 
important. Intercontinental air routes from the United States to both 
Europe and the Orient involved the use of the Canadian air space and 
aerodrome facilities. Officials in both countries anticipated that the 
war-time staging routes would have a key role to play in peace-time civil 
aviation; both sides were suspicious of the other's intentions. Canadians 
feared that the United States would use its war-time position as the 
basis for a future claim to operating rights. This feeling was heightened 
in Canada by the fact that American commercial carriers were operating in 
the Northwest on charter to-th-e-U-nited States War Department and Navy 
Department. On the other hand, Mackenzie King had stated that Canada 
intended to use her geographic location to full advantage in developing 
post-war civil aviation. 
' The PJBD's 32nd Recommendation reconfirmed 
Canadian control over the Northwest Staging Route. Flight strips associ- 
ated with Canol and the Alaska highway were seen as having only a local 
or emergency utility and remained under American control as did Crimson 
Route, also seen as being unimportant to future civil operations because 
of the extreme northern location of the bases. It is important to note 
that interest in the. future use of the airways was in terms of civil 
aviation, and not for any future military role. In 1943-44, Canadian and 
American political and military leaders were not thinking in terms of the 
possibility of rivalry with the Soviet Union. 
The actual transfer of defence facilities from the United States 
lDziuban, pp. 303-304. 
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to Canada was a gradual process that took several years, starting before 
the war's end and continuing well into the Cold War period. Canol flight 
strips on the Mackenzie River were turned over to the Department of Trans- 
port in November 1944. From October 1944 to April 1946, the United States 
gradually turned over facilities it was using on the Northwest Staging 
Route. The aerodrome facilities at Churchill and The Pas were-abandoned 
by the United States in August 1945, as was the Southampton Island base 
the following month. The more northerly bases of Fort Chimo and Frobisher 
Bay were retained by the United States until October 1949 and September 
1950 respectively. Canada took over control of the Alaska Highway in 
April 1946. The Canol facilities were dismantled in bits and pieces and 
sold to various commercial firms between 1946 and late 1947. 
The military activity associated with the North during the Second 
World War is best seen in terms of the "boom and bust" phenomenon which 
has historically been so common in the region. There are two aspects to 
the issue: the impact of the actual construction and wartime operation 
phases, and the importance of the permanent facilities that remained at 
war's end. Those construction projects that touched or passed by northern 
communities brought short-term economic prosperity in their wake for those 
who had skills or services to offer to the builders. No cons1deration was 
given at the time to environmental impact or native land rights and cul- 
tural identity. In the absence of detailed studies on these latter two 
issues, one can only generalize and say that the results of the defence 
projects were probably negative, but in what way and to what degree 
remains unknown. The long-term results of the northern projects are 
somewhat easier to measure. The great expectations Ossociated with the 
northern airways failed to materialize. War inspired aviation technology 
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developed so quickly, particularly with respect to the range of multi- 
engined aircraft, that there was ultimately no need for the closely spaced 
bases of either the North West Staging Route or Crimson Route. The various 
landing fields became important to local and regional air services, but, 
with one or two minor exceptions, played no subsequent part in trans- 
continental aviation. The Alaska Highway turned out to be the most im- 
portant of the war-time ventures to subsequent northern development, but 
even then, the great population rush and industrial development that 
many "northern optimists" forecast during the war did not develop. Growth 
occurred, much of it made possible by the existence of the highway, but 
this growth was slow; setbacks were as common as successes in the realm 
of commercial ventures in the area. Revenue from tourism in northern 
British Columbia and the Yukon became an important economic factor to 
Canadians who made their homes in the area, but by the standards of a 
Yellowstone Park, a Niagara Falls, or a Disneyland, northern tourism 
remained at a very modest level. Canol, given a comparison of costs and 
results must, in truth, be put down as a 134 million dollar fiasco. 
At the end of six years of war, Canadians knew a bit more about 
the North than they had previously. Americans, in comparison, know much 
more. Permanent facilities, in the sense that they formed a transpor- 
tation grid contributed to future development. The size and isolation 
of the North had again underlined the fact that development of any sort 
would represent a massive and costly engineering effort, and if Canada 
could not undertake such projects on her own, there would be serious 
implications for national sovereignty in the area. The North itself had 
yet to prove that it had any great intrinsic value tqthe nation. 
CHAPTER VI 
NORTHERN APPROACHES 
The Defence of a Strategic Frontier 
The Aerial Defence of North America 
When Canadian and American planners were formulating their joint 
defence schemes in 1941 before the United States entered the Second World 
War, they thought exclusively in terms of "both coasts", the Atlantic and 
Pacific. The fact that North America had an arctic coast was ignored. 
A scant two years later, the United States was building a line of north- 
ward facing radar stations across northern Ontario. Canada was organ- 
ising the Central Canada Aircraft Detection Corps with detachments at 
700 points across the central provinces. At Sault Ste Marie, the United 
States was deploying unit after unit of anti-aircraft artillery, military 
police, engineers, and fighter squadrons while Canada contributed a heavy 
anti-aircraft battery under American command. This massive, and, in 
retrospect, excessive reaction on the part of the United States, with 
Canada meekly following along, had but one purpose: to defend the locks 
at the Sault against an Axis attack mounted from the Canadian North. 
1 
1 In an average year the locks at Sault Ste Marie between Lake 
Superior and Lake Huron handled a greater tonnage of shipping than did the 
Panama, Suez, and Kiel Canals combined. Ninety per cent of American iron 
ore destined for eastern smelters as well as vast quantities of wheat 
passed through the system. The locks certainly formed a lucrative stra- 
tegic target. Post war investigation has revealed that no Axis power ever 
even considered a bombing attack or "suicide" raid b: 7 paratroops into the 
heartland of North America, let alone such a venture mounted through the 
des, olate wasteland of the Canadian North. The Sault defence project is 
best viewed in terms of an understandable reaction to the precedent of 
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In post war North America, consciousness of the vulnerability of 
the continent to attack from the North became a major consideration in 
defence planning. Many factors combined to create this new frontier: 
knowledge of the use to which the North had been put during the course of 
the war, greater familiarity with the North itself arising out of those 
defence projects, and the changed international scene. Greatest of all, 
however, was the development of aVJation technology. The advent of air- 
craft that could carry out intercontinental attacks by using the polar 
route focused the immediate post-war attention of military men, scientists 
and statesmen on the North. Once attention was focused, a host of prob- 
lems and relationships were identified, with a rigorous analysis following 
closely on the heels of identification. To North Americans, the "northern 
approach" became a reality. 
Interest in, or concern for, the North did not equate to under- 
standing or knowledge. Defence planners had to come to grips with many 
notions before realistic programs could be undertaken, notions such as the 
use of polar projection maps for strategic planning; the deeply imbued 
North American popular image that "north" equated to "cold" or "winter"; 
the differing strategic implications between the North as a battleground 
in itself and north as a direction of approach to the heartland of the 
continent. Inevitably, theoretical speculations tended to be Coloured by 
experience. 
During the interwar years, the apostles of strategic air forces, 
pearl Harbour. Having been bitterly surprised once, the United States 
did not i, ntend to be caught again--and military resources were readily 
available as the United States girded itself for total war. Both 
American and Canadian official historians discuss the defencesat the 
Sault in considerable detail. See Dziuban, pp. 194-198; and C. P. 
Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, 
Official Wistory of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. 1, 
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), pp. 158-159. 
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Douhet in Italy, Mitchell and Seversky in the United States, and 
Trenchard and Liddell Hart in Great Britain, developed theories of stra- 
tegic bombing. In its extreme forms, these theories maintained that air 
power alone could destroy a state's means and will to fight. The events 
of the Second World War, particularly the American and British bomber 
campaigns against Germany, and the American operations against Japan, 
proved the theorists, in a large measure, to be wrong. British and 
American air force leaders seriously underestimated almost every aspect 
of bomber force capability including-the amount of physical damage that 
could be inflicted by a given weight of bombs, navigational accuracy, 
the degree of destruction necessary to neutralize an area, the effective- 
ness of anti-bomber defences, and the resiliance of the civil population. 
Bombers, it appeared, were not the ultimate answer to war. The attacks 
on Hiroshima and Nagisaki changed the entire picture. Thousand bomber 
raids in air campaigns that lasted months, if not years, would now no 
longer be necessary. Whereas during the Second World War a bomber loss 
rate of ten per cent was thought to be unacceptable, the same bomber 
fleet, armed with nuclear weapons could suffer a fifty per cent loss and 
still accomplish the aim of the mission. It was widely realized in both 
military and civilian circles that North America was vulnerable to an 
attack over the North Pole. As relations with the Soviet Union deterio- 
rated in 1946, a wave of immediate concern swept the United States and to 
a lesser extent, Canada. Much of this concern now appears to have been 
ill-founded. 
The basis of Soviet strategic bomber fleet was not established 
until early 1945 when an American B29 "Superfortress'-' force-landed in 
Soviet territory, thus providing the Soviet Union with a gratuitous, if 
unintended,, strategic bomber prototype. To suggest, prior to 1949, that 
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the Soviet Union might attack the United States with a puny, by World 
War II standard, fleet of bombers on a one-way mission with conventional 
bombs, was fantastic. Yet the suggestion was made and often repeated in 
the press. Starting in 1946, reports of plans for massive defence proj- 
ects in the Canadian North flooded the newspapers of both Canada and the 
United States. Numerous radar and fighter bases, along with protective 
army garrisons were projected. 
- 
An article appearing in the Chicago Tribune identified the issue 
in a rather alarmist and spectacular fashion, but the basic points of the 
story were accurate. It was reported that "members of a military mission 
for Alaska" had said that: 
the entire concept of arctic defence is based upon current or imminent 
developments in high speed bombers, in supersonic rockets and guided 
missiles, and radio contr-611-ed pilotless aircraft. Long range air 
operations are so routine today that trans-polar flights are con- 
sidered to be within the capabilities of the air forces of any great 
power. 
The arctic has been picked as the shortest aerial distance between 
the United States and any other nation in the northern hemisphere 
that might have technological know-how permitting it to engage in a 
war with this country. A 3,000 mile flight from an advanced arctic 
base on the continents of Europe or Asia could strike to the manu- 
facturing heart of North America. 
The article then went on to state that the United States intended to 
construct a radar picket line and interceptor rocket and fighter bases 
roughly along the arctic coast of Canada. It was also reported that 
these "steps are being taken in conjunction with authorities responsible 
for Canadian defenses .... 
In North America, several concepts coloured strategic thinking in 
the early years of the Cold War. During this period air power was seen 
as being the dominant component of military force. S7ir John Sessor argued 
1 Chicaqo Tribune, 19 January 1947. 
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that Mackinder's notion of the impregnable Russian heartland was no longer 
valid since "air power has turned the vast spaces that were her prime 
defence ... into a source of weakness". 
A. P. de Seversky rejected the 
mercator map and used the polar projection map in expressing his ideas. 
Many other military thinkers seized on this approach, emphasizing the 
global proximity of the two super powers across the polar basi'n. Another 
concept that was tremendously popular and often referred to, was 
Steffanson's notion of the arctic basin as the "new Mediterranean". 
' 
Inevitably, the defence policies of Canada became increasingly 
involved with those of the United States. Sandwiched between two hostile 
super powers, Canada was in the unenviable position of having to seek 
defence accommodation with the United States, no matter what the issue 
might have been. The disproportionate strengths of the two North American 
allies resulted in Canada, as often as not, playing a supporting or sub- 
orinate role in the defence of North America. The important notion here 
is embodied in the expression "defence of North America". In terms of 
polar defences against the emerging Soviet bomber threat, it was impossible 
to differentiate between the interests and security of the two nations. 
The Canadian government was less concerned with the Soviet threat 
than it was with the strong rumour that the United States was interested 
in establishing bases in the High Arctic, and that Canada was under con- 
siderable pressure t. 9 agree to the program. Public speculation was also 
made that northern defence works were required and if Canada did not co- 
operate, the United States would take unilateral action to protect her 
own interests and establish the bases anyway with a consequent loss of 
A useful summary of early Cold War strategi c analysis is 
Stephen B. Jones "Global Strategic Views", The Geographical Review, 
Vol. 45, No. 4, October 1955, pp. 500-505. 
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Canadian sovereignty over the area. 
I In order to quell the resultant 
public clamour, the United States and Canada issued a joint statement in 
February 1947 wherein the principles of post-war defence cooperation were 
delineated. The document provided for general cooperation relative to 
developments of common ifterest, mutual availability of military facili- 
ties in each country, and a vague statement of intention to standardize 
equipment and methods. More important than the document itself were the 
accompanying statements made by leading members of the Canadian govern- 
ment. Mackenzie King was at some pains to quash rumors of American bases 
and American pressure on Canada: 
The subject (of northern Defence) has naturally engaged the attention 
of many people both here and abroad and some quite unfounded sugges- 
tions have been put forward. There is a persistent rumour, for 
example that the United States Government has asked for bases in the 
Canadian North. This is a rumour which I should like to deny em- 
phatically. There has been talk of Maginot Lines, of large-scale 
defenceiprpjects, all of which is unwarranted and much of it 
fantast c. 
The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Louis S. St. Laurent, the 
future prime minister, spoke to the same effect later in February in 
New York claiming that 
(I)t was quite absurd to suggest, as some imaginative people ; aWdone, that your government was applying some sort of pressure 
in order tg take over responsibilities (for defence) in Canadian 
territory. 
While the Canadian government denied that great works were planned for the 
1 R. J. Sutherland, one of Canada's few bona fide strategists has 
observed that "The 6xistence of (the great American air base at Thule, 
Greenland) has had a significant effect upon the military importance of 
the Canadian Arctic and upon Canadian-American relations. If Thule had 
not been available to the United States the question of a major US base 
in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago would certainly have arisen. " See 
R. J. Sutherland "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic" in 
The Arctic Frontier. 
2 Cited in W. Eggleston, "Strategy and Wealth in Northern Canada", 
Queens Quarterly. Vol. 54, No. 2,1947, p. 241. 
3Cited in Ibid. 
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North or that there would be extensive involvement of American troops in 
the area, the Prime Minister admitted that in future 
When we think of defence of Canada, we must, in addition to looking 
east and west, as in the past, take the north into consideration as 
well. 
The Prime Minister went on to outline a plan in which he saw defence and 
northern development being ultimately linked: 
Our defence forces must, of course, have experience of conditions 
in these regions, but it is cl-ear that most of the things 1hat should 
be done are required apart from considerations of defence. 
Mackenzie King had in mind improved mapping and weather reporting as well 
as more and better aviation facilities. He felt that communication in 
the North should be improved. By learning about and developing the North, 
the Canadian leader felt that the national interest would be served as 
well as the more narrow military interest. 
2 
In the 1948 May Day Parade the Soviet Air Force had displayed 
several long-range bombers. The following year the Soviet Union's first 
atomic device was detonated. By 1950 Eastern Europe and mainland China 
had come under what was seen in the West as a communist hegemony and the 
Korean War had started. To North American defence planners, the USSR now 
unquestionably had the capability, and, it was suspected, the intention 
to attack the United States and by association, Canada. In the face of 
this crystallized threat, it became obvious that something more than 
'Cited in lbid, p. 244. 
2 James Eayrs has observed that when the British government called 
for Imperial defence in the 1880s, Canada's response was to offer to 
build the Canadian Pacific Railway. In the late 1940s when a potential 
strategic threat in the form of Soviet bombers was perceived, Canada 
offered to undertake a modest program of northern research and develop- 
ment. it is understandable that this Canadian national characteristic 
of being relatively unconcerned with the needs of national defence during 
time of peace, may, upon occasion, severely frustrate allies and friends. 
See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. III. 
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Mackenzie King's northern research and development would be required to 
assure the security of North America. 
In summary, the emergence of the Soviet Union as a potential ag- 
gressor and the development of aviation technology and nuclear weapons 
forced North American defence planners to accept "the psychological fail- 
ure of the Mercator projection map". 
' In turning to the polar projection 
map, it was revealed that the shortest distance between Siberia and the 
United States was over the Canadian North. As one Canadian officer wrote 
It has taken the electric atmosphere of a world braced for the shock 
of mankind's most destructive war to drive home the realization that 
Canada has breadth as well as length, and that this second dimension 
may have some strategic significance. 2 
Robert Logan had said as much in 1922. 
The air defence of the United States and Canada which was the 
subject of high priority studies of the late 1940s became the object of 
major construction projects in the early 1950s. Two continent-spanning 
radar arrays were built: The Pine Tree Line running roughtly along the 
international frontier, the 49th Parallel of Latitude, and the Mid Canada 
Line extending along the 55th Parallel. The former was a joint Canadian- 
American venture while the latter was an exclusively Canadian facility. 
Although these systems provided a modicum of early warning and interceptor 
control, it was soon evident that yet another radar line would be required 
in order to extend warning time. 
In the late-, 1940s and early 1950s, it was thought that the most 
likely targets of Soviet bombers would be the industrial centers of the 
United Statess and, to a lesser degree, of Canada. By 1952, however, the 
'Rear Admiral Lepotier, "The Strategic Importance of the Arctic 
Sector", Revue de Wense Nationale, January, 1947. 
2Maj J. E. G. de Domenico, "The Strategic Importance of Canada's 
North". Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 14, No. 4, Fall, 1960. 
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American strategic consensus was that the rational target for the Soviets 
would be the heavy bomber wings, by then located in the main, in the 
heartland of America. Were Soviet bombers to destroy the American stra- 
tegic bombers on the ground in a surprise attack, the Soviet Union, so 
the theory went, would be in a_position to dictate terms to the United 
States under a threat of nuclear bombardment, without fear of retaliation 
in kind. 
In 1952, a scientific study group concluded that the then existing 
air defence system could not prevent a mass attack from crippling the 
United States by striking at selected strategic targets. A warning system 
restricted to the border of the United States would provide less than one 
hour's warning of an imminent attack. The group recommended the estab- 
lishment of a distant early warning line in the Arctic designed to provide 
from four to six hours warning of attack. Bell Telephone Company was 
contracted to develop the necessary system and by the end of 1953, tech- 
nical answers had been found for the myriads of possible electronic, 
communications, and logistic problems that were facing the builders. 
' In 
1954 an experimental station was opened in northern Alaska; its success 
proved the basic workability of the plan and in December of the same year, 
a contract was let to Western Electric Company to build the Distant Early 
Warning (DEW) Line between Cape Lisburne, Alaska and Cape Dyer on Baffin 
Island, running roughly along the 70th parallel of latitude. 
Since it was proposed to locate the majority of sites in Canadian 
territory, it was necessary, before proceeding any further, to obtain the 
concurrence of the Canadian government. The matter was discussed at the 
still-operative PJBD. and on 5 May 1955, both countffes exchanged notes 
'Press handout, "Joint Press Tour'Distant Early Warning (DEW) 
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covering the agreement. Canada had indicated earlier that she wished to 
participate in the project in some manner; her eventual contribution was 
limited, during the construction phase, to 
give assistance to the United States authorities in organizing and 
using Canadian resources, and to helping by making available the 
facilities of the armed forc 7s and other agencies of the Canadian 
government when appropriate-. 
Canadian participation in the operation and maintenance phase was to be 
decided upon at a later date. 
Responsibility for the project was vested with the United States, 
but Canada proposed, and the United States accepted, numerous clauses 
relating to the conditions under which the line should be built. From the 
detail and number of these clauses, it is evident that the Canadian govern- 
ment was concerned over the possible ill-effects that the project would 
have on sovereignty in this remote area and was taking steps to ensure 
that some modicum of Canadian control was maintained. It is likely, also, 
that Canada wished to avoid a repetition of the World War II situation 
where for a time the government had only the vaguest idea of what the 
Americans were doing in the Northwest and in the Eastern Arctic. 
In terms of the engineering problems, numbers of men involved, 
levels of support required, and cost, the construction of the DEW Line was 
the greatest engineering project yet to take place in the Canadian North. 
Like other "crash" defence projects the United States had undertaken in 
the North, the DEW 44ne contract called for speed; the system was to be 
in operation by the summer of 1957. Since the Alaskan portion of the 
system had been operational since 1953, the work between 1955 and 1957 
focused on the Canadian sector. The requirement was to build four main 
lCanada, Treaty Series 1955, No. 8. Defence, Establishment of a 
distant early warning system, (Agreement between Canada and the United 
S-tates- of America), (henceFforth DEW Line Agreement , p. 2. 
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sites, eighteen auxiliary stations, twenty intermediate posts and one 
communications relay facility. 
The bare statistics of the construction phase give an idea of the 
magnitude of the effort. Sites required precise survey, construction 
camps had to be built, and workers and materials assembled on the sites. 
Lastly the complexes themselves had to be built. At the peak Qf con- 
struction, 25,000 men were employed on the project. Survey teams travelled 
more than a million miles in selecting sites and access routes. Almost a 
half million tons of goods had to be moved into the North by convoy during 
the summer shipping season and by air at other times. Fifty thousand air- 
craft flights were made in support of the construction phase, 75 million 
gallons of petroleum were used, and almost a billion tons of gravel. Over 
one million formal tests were made on the intricate equipment of the system 
before it was pronounced ready for operation in July, 1957.1 Operation 
of the line was entrusted to the Federal Electric Company, the service 
division of the mammoth International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. 
2 
Using a commercial firm to run a major military installation was an inno- 
vative, and on the whole successful idea. (A labour dispute in 1964 was 
3 
settled without a strike). Federal Electric ran the system for the 
United States Air Force, and the USAF stationed officers at the main sites 
throughout the Arctic. The auxiliary and intermediate sites were manned 
exclusively by the clvilian employees of Federal Electric. Many of these 
civilian technicians and support staff were Canadians and Canadian commer- 
cial aviation and shipping companies resupplied the sites. Despite this 
I"Welcome to the Distant Early Warning Line", visitors' handbook 1973. 
2 H. La Fay, "DEW Line Sentry of the Far North", The National Geo- 
graphic Magazine, Vol. 114, No. 1, July 1958. 
3. Montreal Star, 24 September 1964. 
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Canadian content, from the very beginning of the project there were major 
objections in Canada to the implications of the DEW Line, a USAF instal- 
lation, to Canadian sovereignty. 
The Canadian government had been at some pains to safeguard 
sovereignty when the original agreement was drawn up. Canada retained 
title to all sites in the Canadian portion of the system, and insisted 
upon the right of inspection of work and consultation on any changes of 
plans. RCMP Constables and Northern Service Officers were stationed on 
several construction sites to ensure that the regulations relative to 
intercourse with Eskimos and game laws were adhered to. The United 
States agreed to transmit to Canada, geological, hydrographical and other 
scientific data obtained in the course of the construction and operation 
of the line. The agreement also included an important clause relative to 
landing facilities at beaches and airstrips--both were to be available 
for use to the ships and aircraft of the government of Canada. The United 
States was prohibited from using the airstrips for any activity, other 
than DEW Line support, without Canadian agreement. Canadian civil air 
carriers were to be allowed to use the DEW Line airstrips when such use 
did not conflict with military requirements, but the USAF in this specific 
matters was permitted to have the final say on any arrangement. 
' 
Despite all these measures, many Canadians retained grave doubts 
as to the ultimate cost in terms of sovereignty, that the DEW Line would 
bring. Ralph Allen, the editor of Maclean's Magazine in a major article 
asked, "Will DEW Line cost Canada its northland? " His conclusion, like 
that of many other commentators, was that loss of sovereignty was quite 
likely unless Canada were acutely attentive to the s_ttuation and took some 
'. DEW Line Agreement, p. 6. 
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positive steps to assert control. Allen felt that Canada had traded off 
her whole northern frontier for while "in law we still own this northern 
frontier, in fact we do not". 
' What bothered Allen was the size of the 
American enterprise. He looked at it as a "U. S. military base 2,500 
miles long within Canada's geographical limits". Lying across the top of 
the continental land mass, the almost fifty sites formed a belt across the 
Canadian Arctic. In the past access to these areas had been difficult. 
The DEW project theoretically opened up the North by providing airstrips 
and beach landing facilities in a hitherto remote area. The problem lay 
in the fact that a private citizen or commercial firm of Canada had to 
have the permission of the United States Air Force to use these facili- 
ties. In reality, the USAF has over the years proved to be remarkably 
cooperative in granting permission to land, when requested, but it has 
also insisted that the appropriate clearances be obtained before-hand. 
This, in Allen's view constituted de facto control over the area. 
Editorials in Canadian newspapers between 1955 and 1959 harped 
continually on this theme of loss of sovereignty. Public concern over 
this issue was probably one of the main factors that caused the Canadian 
government to exercise its option, under the terms of the DEW Line Aqree- 
ment, to participate more fully in the operation of the system. The 
Agreement had provided that: 
Canada reserves ýhe right, on reasonable notice to take over the 
operation and mahning of any or all of the installations. Canada 
will ensure the effective operation, in ass2ciation with the United 
States, of any installations it takes over. 
In early 1959 it was announced that Canada would take over "operational" 
control of the line effective I February. In making the announcement 
I Ralph Allen, "Will Dewline cost Canada its northland? ", 
Maclean's Maqazine. ý 26 May 1956. 
2DEW Line Agreement,, p. 6. 
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the Minister of National Defence, George Pearkes, gave no reasons for this 
organizational change, but newspapers interpreted the move as being made 
for the purposes of sovereignty. 
1A 
strong case could also be made in 
arguing that the step was also taken to satisfy domestic political press- 
ures. The Windsor Star noted that Prime Minister Diefenbaker speaking in 
the House of Commons, had said that the "switch was a step to assure that 
there will be no misunderstanding-as to whom the North belongsq. 
2 
The actual changes were relatively small in terms of the numbers 
of people involved. Less than two dozen RCAF members were divided among 
the four main sites in the Canadian sector of the line. Most of the USAF 
personnel were withdrawn, but a few remained at each main site to act as 
liaison officers between the USAF and the contracting company which ran 
the system. Canada, of course, paid the salaries of her own troops, but 
the DEW Line as a whole continued to be financed by the United States. 
The auxiliary and intermediate stations continued to be manned exclusively 
by civilian staff; even at the main sites the military section was only a 
small component of the total station strength. This organizational 
change, on the whole, appears to have satisfied those Canadians who were 
concerned with the sovereignty issue. Lester Pearson, the Leader of the 
Opposition, noted a few months later that "it has been suggested ... that 
the situation in the DEW Line in regard to protection of Canadian sover- 
o3 eignty is much better than it was a couple of years ago 
In addition to Canada assuming operational control of the DEW Line, 
the establishment of a joint North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) 
I Kinqston-Whiq - Standard, 20 January 1959. 
2W indsor Star, 20 January 1959. 
3 Debates, 4 July 1959, p. 5497. 
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in 1957 also helped rationalize the aerial defence of North America. 
Although the United States with its massively greater resources dominated 
the alliance, Canada was at least assured a say in the planning and con- 
duct of operations, that by their very nature, could not be isolated on 
narrow national lines. The purpose and relevence of NORAD, which con- 
trolled the DEW Line, has been periodically questioned in the media, but 
despite increasingly vocal opposit-ion, the system continues to function 
in much the same manner it did in 1959, although technological improve- 
ments permitted the closing of the intermediate stations. 
The non military "by products" of the DEW Line construction proj- 
ect were important to several sectors of the Canadian economy and to 
northern development in general. One of the most important of these was 
the hydrographic survey of the Arctic carried out by the United States. 
While vessels of the Hudson's Bay Company, the RCMP Schooner St. Roche 
and other ships had sailed in coastal waters north of the mainland for 
years, the existing charts and aids to navigation were found to be com- 
pletely inadequate to meet the needs of the many large ships the United 
States would have to bring into the area in order to position DEW Line 
building materials. Over a three year period ships of the United States 
Navy and the United States Coast Guard aided by HMCS Labrador from the 
Royal Canadian Navy, charted a thousand miles of the coastline of the 
Canadian Arctic. from Labrador westward. In 1955 the survey ships oper- 
ated ahead of the supply convoys, locating and exploring dangerous 
stretches. In addition to locating a usable deep water channel it was 
necessary to locate and survey beach landing sites to each radar station. 
During the second and third seasons, detailed survey5'were made of par- 
ticularly critical areas. The total result of this project was the 
charting of a thousand mile long deep water Northwest Passage, including 
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five hundred miles of detailed hydrographic survey and the establishment 
of twenty-eight radar reflector towers to aid navigation. 
1A Canadian 
government official who was involved with the construction of the line 
wrote in The Geographical Magazine as the system neared completion, that 
the main impact of the construction of the line lay in the improved trans- 
portation facilities that had, of necessity,, been established in an area 
that was formerly almost inaccessible. He also felt that these new 
facilities, particularly the vastly improved water transport system 
"may even mean that minerals, the one naturýl resource that seems 
capable of development, will be exploited. " 
Despite this optimism, which was common to many Canadians at the time, no 
mineral exploitation or even significant shipping developed in the area. 
The ships that ply the southern Northwest Passage annually, come, in the 
main, to resupply the DEW Line stations. 
The construction of landing strips and aids to aerial navigation 
at virtually every one of the radar sites has had a much more important 
effect on the North. Contemporary northerners are essentially air-minded. 
Although there were some embarrassing and politically sensitive incidents 
relating to access to the strips in the early years of operation of the 
DEW Line when security measures were relatively strict, the situation has 
eased considerably since the mid 1960s. The DEW Line strips, as antici- 
pated, have permitted government officials, police, teachers, doctors and 
private businessmen-to move around the North much more freely than would i 
otherwise have been possible. 
(T. K. Treadwell) "United States Hydrographic Surveys in Canadian 
Western Arctic, 1955-57". Polar Record, Vol. 9, No. 62, May 1959, pp. 
450-452. 
2C. J. Marshall, "North America's Distant Early Warning Line", 
The Geoqraphical Magazines Vol. 29, No. 12, April 1957, p. 628. 
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The native people of the North were given a good deal of con- 
sideration in the DEW project, considering the prevalent social attitudes 
of the mid 1950s. At the time the Eskimos had no political organization, 
and the Canadian government's attitude toward them was basically paternal- 
istic. While there were no consultations with the natives to determine 
their views on where sites should not be located, for example, -the govern- 
ment did take steps to protect their traditional way of life. The Canadian 
note agreeing to the DEW Line contained a section titled "Matters Affecting 
Canadian Eskimos" and noted that 
It is important that these people be not subjected unduly to dis- 
ruption of their hunting economy, exposure to diseases against which 
their immunity is often low, or other effec Is of the presence of 
white men which might be injurious to them. 
The agents of the Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, 
or, in their absence, the RCMP were given the final say relative to employ- 
ment of Eskimos on the project, the relocation of settlements and burial 
grounds, and the disposal of surplus supplies and materials. The govern- 
ment made a definite effort to isolate the building crews from the Eskimos, 
stipulating that "all contact with Eskimos, other than those whose employ- 
ment on any aspect of the project is approved, is to be avoided except in 
cases of emergency. " 
2 
The southern perception of the Eskimo was that his absorption into 
the mainstream of Canadian life, and its value system, was simply a matter 
of time, but that VTý process should be gradual and closely controlled. 
About two hundred Eskimos found employment on the DEW Line construction 
phase at one time or another. Considering that at its peak the construc- 
ti-on force number 7,500 men, this was not a particularly high figure. 
1 DEW Line Agreement, p. 10. 
2 Ibid. 
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For many Eskimos this represented the first time in their lives that they 
had been employed for wages. While most started as unskilled labourers 
many in time became semi-skilled, or skilled at carpentry, mechanics, or 
heavy equipment operation. Following the construction boom, a few managed 
to find continuing employment at the various sites doing menial labour, 
outside work, or operating vehf'cles. Southern foremen appear to have been 
pleasantly surprised at the competence of Eskimo workers, but reflecting 
a different set of values, were constantly frustrated by Eskimos period- 
ically quitting their jobs in order to pursue their traditional occu- 
pations of hunting and fishing for a time. 
' While some managers accepted 
the Eskimo approach to wage employment philosophically, there is an under- 
lying current in newspaper reports that suggests that many of the natives 
were having difficulty in becoming "white men". No one suggested that 
perhaps the Eskimos did not want to become exact copies of their southern 
breathern. 
The DEW Line project had an economic effect on many more Canadians 
than just northerners. The joint agreement had stipulated that as a 
general principle, electronic equipment used at installations on Canadian 
territory should as far as practicable be manufactured in Canada. The 
Canadian government also insisted that Canadian contractors and suppliers 
be allowed to compete on equal terms with their American equivalents. 
In the case of the actual site works, the government insisted that Canadian 
labour be given preference. The two main contractors for the Canadian 
sectors were Canadian firms and it would appear that Canada also got its 
fair share of subcontracts and purchase orders. To build the DEW Line 
cost the United States Air Force approximately 400 million dollars. A 
1, Windsor Star, 11 April 1956; Ottawa Citizen, 16 September 1958. 
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good part of this economic windfall landed in Canada. 
In addition to using the North to provide depth to North American 
bomber defences, the United States, in a relatively unheralded project, 
prevailed upon Canada to permit the use of Canadian territory in a program 
designed to increase thepperational effectiveness of the main arm of the 
American retaliatory force--the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Between 
1946 and 1953, the Strategic Air Command of the United States Air Force 
relied on overseas bases in the Urrited Kingdom, North Africa, and Guam 
for operating and pre-strike locations. By 1953, however, these bases 
had become both politically and strategically vulnerable and the United 
States began to seek means of reducing reliance upon them. At the same 
time, the new B47 all jet medium bomber was coming into service and the 
B52 heavy bomber prototype was nearing completion. Modern aircraft, 
coupled with the development of mid-air refueling techniques and equip- 
ment, made it feasible for the Strategic Air Command to plan to attack 
Soviet targets directly from the continental United States. 
The "strike from the homeland" concept, known by the code name 
Fullhouse in the USAF, was presented for consideration in the United 
States in early 1954. To be fully effective, the program required an 
extensive refueling and logistic support system in the North. Various 
models were examined and tested throughout 1954. The inescapable con- 
clusion was that if there were bases in the North from which aerial 
tankers could sally-, out to refuel bombers, and to which bombers could 
deploy both on pre-strike and post-strike flights, strategic targets 
deep in the Soviet Union could be successfully engaged. The United States 
already had a base in Labrador, and a base in Newfoundland as a result of 
wartime agreements with the government of the United Kingdom (Newfound- 
land was a British colony at the time and did not join the Canadian 
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Confederation until 1949). In addition, as a result of wartime arrange- 
ments with the Danish government, the United States controlled a massive 
air complex at Thule, Greenland. These three bases, however, no matter 
how far they were developed could not meet the full SAC requirement. 
Furthermore, the three ba-Ses would have been vulnerable and lucrative 
targets for a Soviet first strike. The acquisition of more bases in the 
North would force the Soviet Union to disperse their attacking forces 
while at the same time permitting the United States to bring a greater 
number of bombers into the attack than would otherwise have been possible. 
The minimum number of new bases to support the concept, or so SAC claimed, 
was twelve--eleven in Canada and one at Sondestrom, Greenland. 
The original plans for the bases were quite modest. The USAF 
envisioned using them for tankers and then only in war time. A small 
detachment at each site would be sufficient to maintain the facilities. 
The tankers would fly in when the alert sounded. The American project 
was funded for fiscal 1958, but before anything could be done, it was 
necessary to approach Canada, upon whose territory these bases were to be 
built. Apparently informal talks had been going on between the USAF and 
the RCAF since the beginning of Fullhouse, but the first formal proposal 
was not made by the USAF until February, 1956. 
Air Vice Marshal C. R. Dunlap, the Canadian Vice Chief of Air 
Staff, replied to the American proposal suggesting that the USAF be very 
cautious in the manner in which they promoted the program, for there was 
a very real possibility that the Canadian government would object on 
political grounds. The government was already facing intense criticism 
for having "sold out" control of the North to the United States to build 
the DEW Line. Permitting that nation to build almost a dozen additional 
bases to be used in support of offensive nuclear operations might well 
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have been politically unacceptable. Canada wanted full details on the 
role the bases would play in strategic operations. The United States 
replied that this question could only be answered following a survey of 
the proposed sites. Canada agreed to the survey. Nine sites were deemed 
to be suitable for the Mericans' purposes. Preliminary planning and 
intermediate level negotiation dragged on into early 1957 when the RCAF 
informed the USAF that the Canadian government was agreeable to develop- 
ment of SAC refueling facilities. At this point the issue was trans- 
ferred to the diplomatic level and a draft note was presented to Canada 
by the American ambassador in August 1957. At the end of 1957 the United 
States was still waiting for a reply. 
While the Canadian government presumably pondered the political 
and sovereign implications of--tha American proposal, the USAF reconsidered 
its entire position. In the light of Soviet development of ballistic 
missiles, SAC concluded that emphasis should be placed on forces-in-being 
that were ready for immediate reaction. As part of the "new look" the 
American requirement for bases was reduced to four, only two of which were 
to be in the North: Frobisher and Churchill; the other two were to be 
sited in Northern Alberta. However, in view of the reduced warning 
time that could now be expected, the USAF felt that they could no longer 
await the outbreak of war before deploying their tankers northward. The 
bombers would remain based in the central United States where they were 
most distant from Soviet strategic weapons, but the USAF now wanted the 
right to station six tankers at the forward bases in peacetime and the 
right to deploy an additional twenty in an emergency, but still short of 
war. The support facilities for these aircraft woul& naturally have to 
be more elaborate than the original plans envisioned. 
The RCAF were somewhat cool to the idea, feeling that SAC should 
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have brought them into the picture earlier and anticipated some diffi- 
culty in explaining the new proposal to the government, but undertook to 
try. SAC agreed, but if agreement could not be reached by the end of 
1958, the USAF was prepared to abandon the proposal. Canadian agreement, 
however, was quickly fort-hcoming, the air refueling facilities program 
being incorporated as a concomitant of the NORAD agreement which was 
signed on 20 June 1958. 
Considering that five years of planning and negotiation were 
required before the project was allowed to proceed, the upshot of it all, 
for the North at least, was surprisingly insignificant. Between 1959 and 
1961 Canadian contractors built huge paved runways at Churchill and 
Frobisher Bay, along with the necessary support facilities and accommo- 
dation for the permanent garrisons that maintained the bases. A few 
northerners found employment during the construction or later during the 
operational phase. Canadian sovereignty remained intact. Both Frobisher 
and Churchill had been used extensively by the United States during the 
war and into the later 1950s. The addition of an airbase squadron and a 
handful of aerial tankers did nothing to materially change the balance. 
It has been seen how American strategic postures changed three 
times in less than a decade in response to political and technological 
developments. By the mid 1960s, the manned bomber had been replaced by 
the Intercontinental and the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile in the 
forefront of the American deterrent force. While the bomber wings re- 
mained operational, the latest "new" concept of operations did not require 
the advanced refuelling bases. The United States abandoned them in 1963, 
leaving in the North some massive buildings which could only be partially 
used by Canadian government activities, commercial firms or private indi- 
viduals. They left a few hundred thousand more empty 45 gallon fuel drums, 
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an insignificant number when compared to the millions that were already 
lying rusting all over the North. They also left two magnificent, long, 
paved runways that were capable of receiving the largest aircraft yet to 
fly. But even this legacy has had no real meaning to the North. The 
range of modern commercial jets is such that they can easily make inter- 
continental polar flights without the need to refuel in the North. The 
Churchill and Frobisher strips could, it is admitted, play an important 
role were a large commercial aircraft ever to become distressed on a 
polar flight and have to land. Aside from that, the capacity of these 
two northern fields remains considerably beyond any requirement of the 
smaller aircraft that fly the internal northern routes. 
1 
The Defence of Northern Lands 
At the same time as air-minded strategists and military leaders 
grappled with the problems posed by the shattered northern barrier, 
soldiers also were turning their attention to the North. If bombers could 
approach North America over the pole, it followed that so could transport 
aircraft carrying light infantry or paratroops. Similarily, once soldiers 
turned to the popular polar projection map, the proximity of the Soviet 
Union to Alaska and the Canadian Northwest became strikingly apparent. 
As was the case with their air force counterparts, the army's perception 
of the North was coloured by historical experience. 
During the Second World War, Canada led her western allies in the 
development of specialized equipment and techniques for winter warfare. 
The genesis of Operation Plough in 1942 kindled allied interest in winter 
operations: Plough was conceived by then Vice Admiral Lord Louis 
The Fullhouse project received little publiýity when it was 
inaugurated. One of the few sources is United States Air Force, Strategic 
Air Command Historical Study No. 87, History of the Canadian Refuelling 
Base Programme, 1961. Held in D Hist, 181.001 (DRf)-. 
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Mountbatten, the British Chief of Combined Operations, as a diversionary 
operation. The plan envisioned using troops specially trained and equip- 
ment to operate across snow to carry out sabotage raids on Norwegian 
hydroelectric facilities and thus divert German forces from the intended 
invasion area of Normandy. Great Britain was unable to produce a highly 
mobile oversnow vehicle in sufficient time, and the concept was offered 
to General Marshall who accepted it on behalf of the United States. 
The American agencies assigned the responsibility of producing the 
vehicle, eventually christened the "Weasel", used the services of the 
National Research Council of Canada in the research and development stage. 
Canada also undertook to develop an armoured snowmobile of her own design. 
Eventually, the Plough project was dropped in the autumn of 1942 due to 
lack of transport aircraft to support the operation. The importance of 
Plough to the development of a winter warfare capability was that it en- 
gendered the development of two vehicles specifically designed for cross 
snow operations. Although neither vehicle ultimately proved to be totally 
acceptable in its designed role, they both were important first Steps in 
solving the all important winter mobility problem. 
Western interest in winter operations waned after the demise of 
Plough, but Canada continued to press on with various experiments with her 
allies looking on with moderate interest. Virtually every aspect of 
combat operations in winter were examined in Canada between 1941 and 1944, 
albeit, on a modest s cale. A winter warfare school was opened in Petawawa, 
Ontario during the winter of 1941-42. Experiments were carried out on 
the effect of snow and cold on smoke and gas. Power driven toboggans were 
tested. Adaptor kits to "arcticize" vehicles so that they could continue 
to operate at temperatures as low as -40 C were developed. At Shilo, 
Manitoba, experiments with vehicles and weapons were conducted in snow 
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and extreme cold. Special clothing for both dry and wet cold was devel- 
oped. The Royal Canadian Engineers carried out various trials associated 
with vehicle mobility across snow and ice. By the end of winter in 1944, 
the Canadian Army had developed a substantial body of technical knowledge 
and special equipment rel'ated to winter warfare. 
By the winter of 1944-45 it was obvious in the West that no 
special winter warfare skills would be required in order to obtain victory 
in either Europe or the Pacific. Still Canada pressed on with'her develop- 
mental work. The Canadian General Staff proposed "collective and tacti- 
cal winter warfare tests with skeletonized formations of all arms and 
112 services . Britain and the 
United States agreed, and committed a hand 
ful of observers to the three exercises that Canada conducted during the 
winter. These exercises are of importance to this study for two reasons. 
First, historically, for the first time the Canadian Army went into the 
North with the objective of conducting tactical manoeuvres. Second, and 
most important, the experience gained was to colour Canadian military 
perception of the North for over a generation following the end of the 
war. Exercise Polar Bear delved into the problems of operations in a wet 
cold in a deployment that extended from Prince George to Bella Coola in 
Northern British columbia. 
3 Exercise Eskimo concerned itself with dry 
cold in the boreal forest between Prince Albert and Lac La Ronge, 
Saskatchewan. Exercise Lemming, explored the problems that would be 
D Hist, 112.352 (N), Exercise Eskimo, "Briefing on Exercise 
Eskimo for Visiting Senior Officers from, U. K., U. S. A. and Canada" 
(henceforth Ex Eskimo Briefing), 21 January 1945, Appendix 17. 
2 Ibid. 
3D Hist, 746.083 (D20), Canadian Army Operat-fonal Research Group 
R eport 28 "Polar Bear", 15 July T95-45. All subsequent references to this 
exercise are from this source. 
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encountered on the barrens between Churchill and Eskimo Point on the west 
coast of Hudson Bay. 
Exercise Polar Bear was probably the most challenging of the three 
exercises in that it encompassed a wider variety of terrain and tempera- 
ture than did the other two. These varying conditions imposed an ad- 
ditional strain on the particiýating troops in that different terrain and 
different climates demanded different equipment, different clothing, and 
different techniques to cope with the environmental problems. Tempera- 
tures ranged from -31 F to /54 F; -snow conditions went from none on the 
coast to over six feet in the interior; terrain varied from rolling pla- 
teau with a limited road grid to mountains where passable routes were 
limited to austere trails. The brigade sized Polar Bear Force was in the 
field for over two months--February to April 1945. 
The lessons learned and the doctrinal points established by the 
exercise emphasized the heightened importance, as compared to conventional 
operations, of logistic support, mobility, and specialist training. It 
was felt that the terrain and climate imposed no necessity to modify tac- 
tical doctrine. On the other hand, special measures had to be taken to 
ensure troops were in a position and a physical condition to fight at the 
appropriate time. It was evident that combat operations in isolated cold 
areas of the coast would be dependent upon a single road at best and on 
a mountain track at worst. A major conclusion of the exercise analysis 
was that the strain' imposed on troops by deep snow, rough terrain, and 
cold necessitated an extensive reliance upon transport. Troops simply 
could not man-pack their own equipment and survival gear and still be 
expected to fight. Where mechanical transport could not go, horses often 
could, hence horse transport, particularly in artillery units, was thought 
to be essential. It was realized that reliance upon a single line of 
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of communication particularly when that line was subjected to the extreme 
stress of break-up season might spell disaster to a force in contact with 
the enemy. Reliance upon air resupply proved to be both practical and 
essential. It was discovered that it was a comparatively simple task for 
troops to build advancedair strips on frozen lakes along the line of 
march. Army medical personnel-learned the fundamental lesson that there 
is no such thing as a minor casualty in winter operations. An early 
evacuation system was essential if-one hoped to minimize the seriousness 
of wounds and hence, to preserve the morale of the advancing troops. The 
full magnitude of the problems of winter warfare began to be understood 
by some of Canada's army leaders. Realization began to dawn that troops 
engaged in winter operations would inevitably spend the vast majority of 
their time and energy in moving and surviving, and that the effort to do 
so would require extensive support resources. 
Exercise Eskimo was carried out by a skeleton brigade group with 
the aim of identifying and solving problems faced by an army force moving 
in the boreal forest beyond its railhead or staging base. 
1 Specifically, 
the exercise was designed to determine the limits of mobility in such a 
situation and "variations from the accepted tactical doctrine which will 
be caused by the winter conditions of snow and extreme cold. " 
The conclusions reached on Exercise Eskimo are somewhat perplexing 
and are at variance with the tenor of the conclusions of the sister exer- 
cise to the west. was found that the dry cold and terrain of northern 
Saskatchewan produced no particular problems that could not be coped with, 
'Igiven adequate equipment and training". Just what precisely constituted 
adequate equipment and training the post-exercise report did not deign to 
'D Hist, 746.009 (D17), Ex "Eskimo", undated (probably summer 
1945). All subsequent references to this exercise are from this source. 
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say. It was found, however, that there would be requirement for road 
building plant and personnel as well as an increased lift capacity to 
help move all the survival paraphenalia of winter warfare. The exercise 
study group concluded that only vehicles operating in the forward areas 
needed an oversnow capabi-lity. They were content that the rear area ve- 
hicles could safely remain road bound without affecting the tempo or se- 
curity of combat manoeuvre. In view of the fact that in their analysis 
of tactical doctrine they concluded that each of the many frozen lakes in 
the sector was a potential landing ground for enemy airborne troops, one 
must question the validity of accepting a logistic tail that could only 
move on prepared and maintained roads. If the authors of the report had 
had the opportunity to interview a Russian survivor of the battle of 
Souomoussalmi which was fought on terrain almost identical to that of 
northern Saskatchewan, they might have drawn different conclusions. 
Named after the diminutive arctic mouse, Exercise Lemming lived up 
to its name in that it was by far the smallest and most northerly of the 
three exercises-' A party of twelve men, equipped with two Canadian 
armoured snowmobiles, two American Weasels, and two American M7 half 
tracks penetrated into the barrens from Churchill to Eskimo Point, turned 
inland to the half limit of their fuel and returned to Churchill. The 
aims of Lemming were more general than those of the other two exercises. 
It was hoped that the expedition would provide "nontactical" information 
that would help round out the winter doctrine that was being developed 
out of the other schemes. The terrain encountered over sea ice and the 
barrens was radically different from that met by the other formations 
farther to the west. The Department of Mines and Resources had expressed 
1D Hist, 314.009 0179), Winter Trials: Tests 1944-45""Exercise 
Lemming". I March 1945. 
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an interest in using oversnow vehicles to supply survey parties which they 
hoped to dispatch to Victoria and Banks Island during the winter of 1945- 
46; Lemming provided a means of evaluating the utility and reliability of 
these vehicles in the Arctic. A third objective was to examine the barren 
grounds with a view to hulding a major exercise there the following winter. 
Exercise Lemming was unique in its execution in that, unlike the 
others, the moving force operated entirely self-contained and did not rely 
upon a line of communication for daily resupply. Once the convoy-departed 
from its staging base, the USAAF facility at Churchill, it moved as a 
compact group across sea ice and along the shore line to the RCMP post at 
Eskimo Point where it refuelled for the return journey. The actual ex- 
pedition covered a total distance of 653 miles between 22 March and 6 
April 1945. Because of the requirements of maintenance and troops rest, 
the force was only on the move for a total of ten days. Movement was 
found to be surprisingly easy. On the best day a distance of 113 miles 
was covered. 
The post exercise mobility analysis developed what could be called 
"the North African analogy". It was noted that military operations in the 
barrens were as feasible as they had proven to be in the Libyan desert. 
The study made the important point that operational conditions on the 
barrens were as different from operations in the boreal forest as was the 
variance between operations in the North African desert and sub-Saharan 
jungle. Given the virtual unfettered scope for manoeuvre on the winter 
barrens, the report concluded that 
it would therefore seem desirý, able that for defence purposes Canada 
should develop further overs? ow vehicle types and train personnel 
to operate in these regions. 
ID Hist, 746.083, Cold Weather Trials: Exercises Ex Lemming CAORG 
B, gort Eo. 25,24 May 1945. 
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It was further noted that the training and equipping of men to operate in 
the Arctic presented a different set of requirements from those encoun- 
tered in winter operations within the tree line. Key personnel had to be 
trained in route finding and navigation in the poorly mapped and feature- 
less Arctic. Special clothing, training, and life support equipment had 
to be provided to permit troops to cope with the arctic wind. The matter 
of vehicular mobility was given close attention in the exercise report. 
A 700 mile unsupported range was thought to be a reasonable capability 
for arctic operations. Neither the Canadian armoured snowmobile nor the 
American Weasel were found to be completely acceptable, but a series of 
recommendations were made, aimed at improving their overall capability. 
The M7 half track was deemed unsuitable for arctic operations. 
By the end of the winter of 1944-45 the Canadian Army had taken 
major steps forward in consolidating its knowledge and capability for 
operations in the winter. The wet and dry colds of the boreal forest had 
been met and survived. Troops had ventured into the formerly forbidding 
barren lands. It is important to note that all Canadian efforts to this 
point had been devoted to the mastery of winter warfare and the notion of 
northern operations had been only peripherally addressed. 
The 1944-45 northern exercise series was carried out quietly with 
li-ttle attendant publicity. In any case. world shaping events were being 
played to their ultimate conclusions in Europe and Asia at the same time. 
The following winter, however, the world was at peace and Musk Ox, the 
climatic Canadian Army winter exercise was carried out in the full glare 
of national and international press coverage. The scheme was designed to 
"study movement and maintenance in differing cold weather conditions". 
' 
9.1D 
Hist, 746-033 (D2), Ex "Musk-Ox", (henceforth Musk-Ox Report) 
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While this in itself was a modest enough aim, the proposed plan to move 
a mechanized force over 3,000 miles across northern Canada, relying chiefly 
on air resupply, caught the attention of Canada and the international 
defence community. 
In essence, Musk. Ox was conceived as a "non-tactical exercise" and 
the government, when questioned-in the House was at pains to emphasize the 
non-military, scientific aspects of the expedition. Douglas Abbott, the 
Minister of National Defence said: 
The benefits derived from it may well be of greater civilian valu 
than military value, although it is hoped that they will be both. 
T 
The specific subjects to be studied during the trip included techniques of 
amy-air force cooperation under varying conditions of terrain and weather. 
The exercise members were also to look into several aspects of northern 
movement including the use of Loran (Long Range Aid to Navigation) and the 
astro-compass for ground navigation. In the realm of pure science, the 
troops were required to make magnetic and auroral observations and collect 
snow and ice data. Completing the research list was the requirement to 
make notes on the flora and fauna encountered en route. 
It is of interest to note that great disparity in size between the 
group that made the voyage and the several groups that were required to 
support them. The Moving Force numbered only 40 souls (including British 
and American observers and Canadian civilian scientists) operating a dozen 
oversnow vehicles. special Royal Canadian Air Force squadron operating 
nine aircraft was formed and trained for the unique task of providing 
aerial resupply to the Moving Force. Over two hundred additional soldiers 
were required to man a base camp exclusively dedicated to providing 
support of a platoonTsized force operating in a nontactical setting. 
'Debates, 14 December 1945, pp. 3552-3553. 
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Preliminary winter training for the exercise began with a month 
long concentration at Shilo, Manitoba, followed by an additional six weeks 
at Churchill, the starting point for the expedition. During this portion 
of the work-up phase, all members of the Moving Force qualified as snow- 
mobile drivers. Supplemeýntary training in navigation, shelter building, 
and a host of other arctic skills was undertaken. Short patrols into the 
barrens served to confirm newly acquired skills and unite the group into 
an efficient team. On 15 February 1946 the Moving Force rolled out. In 
front of them lay a 3,200 mile journey. Their route took them north to 
Eskimo Point and then west and north via Baker Lake and Perry River to 
Cambridge Bay. At Cambridge the force rested for ten days before con- 
tinuing on the Coppermine and thence south through Port Radium, Fort 
Norman, and Fort Simpson to the Alaska Highway at Fort Nelson. From 
Nelson, it was intended to press south along roads to that final desti- 
nation at Edmonton. Dust did what cold, snow, forest and river could not 
do--stop the snowmobiles. The vehicles were loaded onto rail flat cars 
and the convoy rolled into Alberta's capital after 81 days on the trail. 
Considerable publicity attended the completion of Musk Ox but the 
Canadian government made no attempt to capitalize on this national and 
international attention, and in fact, tended to play down the operation. 
The Minister of National Defence speaking in the House said, "There is 
nothing secret about this expedition; it is a very small one. "' In some 
respects, it is surprising that Canada did not attempt to develop the 
sovereign implications of the expedition. Certainly the government had 
often expressed concern oVer the extent of wartime America military 
Ibid. Despite the "non-secretive" nature of the expedition, 
the exercT-s-ereport was not classified as an open source until, at the 
author's request, it was so graded on 25 November 1975. 
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development in the North and American long-term commercial designs on the 
region. No evidence could be found that would indicate that either the 
Canadian military or government considered this option. 
The public and military reaction to Musk Ox blew the solid re- 
search accomplishments of-the exercise beyond reasonable proportions. 
Commentators in Canada and abroad persisted in ignoring the often repeated 
Canadian government claims that Musk Ox was a small non-tactical exercise 
designed to work out several technical problems related to military oper- 
ations in the winter and to support certain limited scientific experiments. 
One French military writer even went so far as to claim that, "Since World 
War II two events have held the interest of military circles--Bimini 
(referring to the American nuclear tests in the Pacific) and Operation 
Musk Ox in the Canadian Far--Nor-th. 111 American newspapers gave extensive 
coverage to Musk Ox and headlines such as "U. S., Canada Plot Far North 
Defence"; "U. S., Canada to Prepare A-Bomb Defence in Arctic"; and "U. S. 
and Canada Join to Guard Polar Area" were common. While it was noted that 
the expedition had scientific as well as military objectives, the former 
were given scant attention in newspaper articles and editorials. The 
basic theme was that the development of long range bombers had made North 
America vulnerable to an attack over polar regions, and that the develop- 
ment of an army combat capability in the North would in some way allow 
the North American allies to defend against such attack* 
2 
Exercise Musk Ox straddles the hazy temporal boundary that marks 
the beginning of the Cold War. Historically it must be seen as the final 
1 French Army Scientific Bureau in Revue des Troupes Colonia-less 
1946 (Trans and digest in "Polar Expeditio Military Reviews Vol. 27, 
No. 1, April 1947. 
2D Hist, 314-009 (D15), Press Analysis Section C. I. S. - Canadian 
Embassy, Washington, D. C. Exercise Musk-Ox.. 
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phase of the four winter exercises conducted by Canada during the war. 
Planning for the exercise was done during the final months of the conflict; 
that the war ended in both Europe and the Pacific before Musk Ox could be 
launched is only coincidental. As has been noted above, the development 
of a winter operational c-apability by the Canadian Army, it would appear, 
was not initially undertaken with any specific future enemy in. mind. 
Rather it represented an abstract approach to defence capability. If 
Canada's soldiers were to have the responsibility of defending the country 
from aggression, it was axiomatic that there should be a capability to 
operate in any season. Inasmuch as winter demanded special skills and 
equipment, efforts were made to develop the necessary capability. 
An important transition occurred with the coming of the Cold War. 
During the Second World War the Canadian Army had been extensively engaged 
in the study of the techniques of winter warfare. That many of these 
studies had taken place in or on the fringes of the North was largely 
incidental. In the face of an emerging, but as yet undefined Soviet 
threat, the winter experience and capability of the Canadian Army was 
suddenly transformed into northern experience in the eyes of the Canadian 
government and the Canadian military establishment. In retrospect the 
equating of winter operations to northern operations was a fundamental 
analytic flaw that warped Canadian military thinking and programs for many 
years to come and, tp a degree, extends into the present day. 
While winter is the dominant season in the Canadian North, it 
by no means encompasses the totality of the region. Ignoring the other 
northern seasons led to the neglect of a large and important range of 
problems that had to be identified and solved before--the Army truly could 
claim to have a fully operational capability in the North. A research 
paper written in mid 1946, was a classic example of this approach. In 
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making the point that "Russia was more advanced in Arctic warfare than 
any other nation, "' the author cited Soviet combat experience in Finland 
and the winter campaigns of the Great Patriotic War as evidence in sup- 
port of his contention. What he really meant was that The Soviet Army 
was highly experienced in- winter warfare. An article in a Canadian news- 
paper in 1949 made the same fu6damental error. Headlined "Arctic Push 
Button War 'out'; Winter Too Tough for Army, " the story dealt with a 
series of trials that had been conducted at Churchill the previous winter. 
The author emphasized the "cold arctic" claiming that "keeping alive (was 
the) biggest problem. " The article went on to recount problems raised by 
extreme wind chills, the necessity of training troops to load sleds and 
toboggans, to ski, to pitch a tent, to shelter in snowbanks. 
2 In short, 
"arctic" was equated directly to "winter". In a study published in 
Military Review, the professional journal of the United States Army, an 
American officer fell into the same trap. Although his article was en- 
titled, "The Arctic Can Be Our Ally", to him, the Arctic was an area 
"where conditions of snow and extreme cold make necessary the use of 
special Arctic equipment and training. 113 
The most significant military characteristic of the North, be it 
mountains, barrens, or boreal forest, is not the cold, but the isolation 
of these areas. Most areas have no road access at all; others may have 
a single dirt all-weather road connecting to the "outside". Thus the 
development of cross country mobility is the most important technical 
1 Kendrick Lee, "Arctic Defences", Editorial Research Reports, 
Vol. 2, No. 59 31 July 1946. 
2, Winnipeg Tribune, 10 May 1949. 
3Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Peot, "The Arctic Can be Our Ally", 
Military Review, Vol. 31, No. 11, February 1952. 
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problem to be faced by a military force attempting to operate in the North, 
for mobility is essential both for combat manoeuvre and logistic support. 
This particular aspect of northern operations was identified as early as 
1944, but it was repeatedly submerged in the popular notion of "the frigid 
Arctic" and had to be restated on several occasions in professional 
journals over the years. 
The initial troop and equipment trials carried out by both the 
United States and Canada between 1945 and 1950 were geared to solving the 
mobility problem in winter. The need for oversnow vehicles capable of 
operating throughout the North was repeatedly stated. The Royal Canadian 
Army Service Corps carried out extensive investigations on the feasi- 
bilitY of using tractor trains for resupply purposes. Major studies were 
I made on the measures necessary 
to render general purpose vehicles oper- 
ative in extreme cold. Development projects were also undertaken by both 
countries to provide the necessary individual clothing that would permit 
soldiers to live, work and fight in a cold environment. Although some 
specific technical problems remained only partially solved, by the early 
1950s, the United States Army in Alaska and the Canadian Army working out 
of Churchill had more or less come to grips with the problems of mobility 
in the northern winter. It had been noted that when lakes, streams, and 
muskegs were frozen, movement was relatively simple. 
Realization had also dawned that the oft-forgotten northern 
summer presented obstacles to mobility that were infinitely greater than 
those of winter. As one American officer wrote, "you can walk on water 
only if it's frozen. "" Surface water in the form of rivers, streams, 
lakes and muskegs was a major feature of most northern areas. The United 
'Major E. C. Gibson, "Summer Arctic Operations, Military Review, 
Vol. 32, No. 7, October 1952, p. 50. 
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States Army's Arctic Indoctrination School had conducted annual courses 
beginning in 1950 to train troops, and to develop equipment capable of 
cross country movement in summer. Even in the days before environmental 
impact became a popular national concern, their efforts were only par- 
tially successful. Foot -movement across muskegs proved to be exhausting 
in a remarkably short time. There was a stated need for an all terrain 
vehicle capable of cross country movement in all northern seasons, but 
development of such a vehicle proceeded slowly. Increasing attention was 
paid to airborne operations and the use of aerial resupply. As helicop- 
ters became more common in the military inventory, increasing emphasis was 
placed on "heliborne" operations in an attempt to solve the problems posed 
by the summer terrain. 
1 
As for the other two northern seasons--break-up and freeze-up 9 
both the Canadian and the American armies were generally agreed that mili- 
tary operations were just not feasible during these periods. The indi- 
vidual soldier could not even begin to carry the range of clothing that 
was required to survive during these critical seasons. It was further 
realized that the logistic back-up required to support combat operations 
during these periods would have been out of all proportions to the size 
of combat force that could have been maintained. Howeverg military oper- 
ations do not take place in a vacuum--one requires an enemy to have a 
battle. The general.. conclusion was that any enemy would be confronted 
with the same insurmountable problems of mobility as would the North 
American forces. It was accepted that should war ever come to the North, 
there would be a pause in operations during spring and fall. 
Lieutenant Colonel John S. Zimmerman, "Arctic Airborne Oper- 
ations", Military Review, Vol. 28, No. 8, August 1949, p. 28. 
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In addition to considering the technical details of how one fought 
in the North, considerable attention was paid to the probable scale of 
conflict. Eventually, a consensus developed, but not before a lot of what 
was manifestly nonsense was written. When the Cold War became an inter- 
national reality, there were early voicings of a fear of a massive Soviet 
invasion of North America. An American officer, writing in 1949, com- 
mented that if an enemy force (obviously Russian) could succeed in over- 
running Alaska, they would be in a "splendid position to invade the main- 
land of the United States. "' A Canadian officer writing as late as 1960 
argued that Northwest Europe simply did not provide manoeuvre room for a 
limited war, be it nuclear or non-nuclear. He posited a massive Soviet 
invasion of Alaska wherein, once the beachhead was established, "Russian 
forces could be pushed eastwards and southwards in an enormous pincer 
aimed at snuffing out the industrial heart of the continent .. . .,. 
2 
This extreme position was never accepted by military or political leaders 
of Canada and the United States. 
Most who considered the massive invasion scenario argued that it 
was a most unlikely occurrence. Speaking in the House of Commons, George 
Pearkes, a future Minister of National Defence said, "It is fantastic to 
think that large armies could be landed on the Arctic shores of Canada 
and advanced through the barren lands of the great north. ., 
3 When one 
considers that the distances involved here are measured in thousands of 
miles, the point of Pearkes' argument is heightened further still. Even 
in the west, where at least there was the Alaska Highway, one does not 
I Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Collins Jr., "The Army Arctic Indoc- 
trination Schooll's Military Review, Vol. 28, No. 8,. August 1949, p. 28. 
2 De Domenico, p. 9. 
3Debates, 16 June 1955, p. 4870. 
166 
talk of invading the most powerful nation in the world relying upon a 
single road for supply and advance. Whatever fears of a massive invasion 
there may have been in the early years after the war were laid to rest 
when military planners of Canada and the United States became familiar with 
the realities of northerrf terrain and climate and its effect upon military 
manoeuvre. A newspaper article written in 1949 was accurate when it said: 
The military planners appear to have abandoned thought of a full 
scale invasion of North American across the Polar region. On the 
basis of experience at ýort Churchill and elsewhere, they do not 
think it could be done. 
If the threat of a full scale invasion could be ruled out the 
possibility of a Soviet lodgement in the North could not be. The argu- 
ments over a projected foothold in the North were compelling given Cold 
War attitudes in North America. An Albertan Member of Parliament observed 
in 1951 that if a lodgement were made in the Canadian North, 
that the object in doing this would be to create confusion and alarm, 
in the hope that it would prevent us from sending troops and material 
abroad. 2 
This same theme had been developed in an earlier newspaper article where 
it was observed that 
an enemy could establish a token foothold on any of the thousands of 
islands in the Canadian Arctic, or anywhere in the sparsely populated 
area of northern Canada. 
Thus a diversion would be created that might keep large bodies of 
Canadian and United States forces pre-occupied, cutting down the 
forces available for action in more active theatres. 
3 
An American. Dfficer argued against the lodgement for the sake of 
a lodgement theory by asking the simple question, what would be the 
object of such an operation. In the North at the time there were no 
1 Halifax Herald, 9 May 1949. 
2Debates., 15 February 1951, p. 384. 
3 Halifax Herald, 9 May 1949. 
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population centers, no industrial areas, no ports, no communications net- 
work, no great developed deposits of natural resources. 
' A Soviet lodge- 
ment "in the middle of nowhere" in the North might have been a challenge 
to Canadian sovereignty, but in itself, such a deployment could not have 
threatened the security of North America. The occupation of the Boothia 
Peninsula, or Prince of Wales Island. could have been left in situ indefi- 
nitely. Rather than diverting masses of Canadian and American troops 
from the main theatres of war, such a deployment could have had the exact 
opposite effect--that of diverting Soviet resources to support the lodge- 
ment. It is impossible for a military force to live off the land in the 
North and still hope to fulfill a military task. The logistic require- 
ments of any lodgement would have been heavy, particularly in view of the 
transpolar distances involved. Thus, in reality, the occupation of a 
piece of barren land was not a likely or reasonable objective. 
The possibility that any enemy airborne force might seize an air- 
base in the North was much more real. 
2 The defence programs of the 
Second World War had led to the construction of airbases throughout the 
North. While most of these did not have the capacity to accept long 
range bombers, a few of them did. In particular, Whitehorse, Churchill, 
Colonel Paul V. Kane, "If War Comes to the Arctic", 
-Military Review, Vol. 27, No. 10, January 1948, p. 25. 
2 As early as. 1946, Field Marshal Alexander as Governor General 
of Canada drew to the attention of the Prime Minister the obverse of the 
coin with respect to the construction of air bases throughout the Canadian 
North. Mackenzie King wrote in his diary on 22 November that "The 
Governor General says (they) may become bases from which the enemy him- 
self may operate, but would not operate were they not there. It is a 
difficult problem. " Mackenzie King Record, Vol. 3, p. 370. Lester 
Pearson held similar views. -He accepted that eventually both military 
and commercial needs would dictate the construction ot northern airfields 
which would necessitate the capability to defend them, but wanted to 
delay such development as long as possible. Pearson coined the phrase 
"scorched ice" to describe his preferred solution to the dilemma of 
defence in the North. Cited in Sutherland, p. 264. 
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Frobisher Bay, and Goose Bay in Labrador were attractive targets. It 
must be remembered that in the late 1940s and early 1950s aviation tech- 
nology, despite the tremendous strides made during wartime, still had 
some very important limitations. There were no truly intercontinental 
bombers and mid-air refue-Iling techniques were still to be perfected. 
Intercontinental missiles were-a technological generation in the future. 
The popular war scenario as it related to the Canadian North was 
that Soviet bombers would strike over the pole at the heart of the United 
States. In the wake of these bombers would come airborne troops who 
would seize a number of bases in the Canadian North where the bombers 
could land, refuel and return to the main Soviet bases to rearm. 
While the discussion of the likelihood of northern ground combat 
operations, and their scale, rumbled in political speeches, staff col- 
leges, professional military journals and letters to the editor columns 
of newspapers, the Canadian Army quietly went about the business of learn- 
ing and practising how to live and fight in the North. By 1949 the three 
regular infantry battalions of the peace time Canadian Army had been 
trained as parachutists and the three, along with supporting arms and 
services, were styled the Mobile Striking Force. While in theory the 
Mobile Striking Force was a brigade group ready to defend northern Canada, 
in reality. the "brigade" had no designated headquarters and never trained 
together. Battalion groups exercised independently although a shortage 
of transport aircraft usually limited parachute training to company level 
operations-' 
'See Floyd Low, "Canadian Airborne Forces, 1942-1979". University 
of Victoria, unpublished Hons BA thesis, 1979, pp. 37-47. After 1954 
the reality of the situation was recognized by the D6partment of National 
Defence when the three independent battalions were styled the Defence of 
Canada Force. Reflecting the lessened importance of the North, the Force 
was reduced to a single reinforced company per battalion after 1958. 
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In the winter of 1950 a joint U. S. Canadian tactical exercise, 
"Sweetbriar", was organized and conducted along the northern part of the 
Alaska Highway. Over 5,000 army and airforce personnel, the majority of 
them Americans, participated in this exercise, designed to test clothing, 
equipment, vehicles, airc7raft, and weapons and to serve as a means of 
developing a common doctrine and standard operating procedure between the 
two nations. 
' The conclusions reached after this exercise were similar 
to those rising from the earlier Canadian exercises held in 1944-45. The 
relative immobility of ground forces in remote forest areas remained the 
chief constraint on operations. Wheeled forces remained roadbound; there 
was a call for the development of a doctrine of employing bulldozers to 
make roads. It was again realized that success in winter combat in the 
North would primarily be a function of mobility. More and better over- 
snow vehicles were obviously required. Within the treeline, however, any 
vehicle was limited by the paucity of open spaces. While oversnow vehicles 
could use frozen lakes and rivers as highways, there was no question of 
forcing vehicles in any significant number through the dense bush. While 
movement over frozen water-ways would obviously canalize manoeuvre, it 
was further realized that the potential enemy would face the exact same 
sort of problem. The idea of going over the terrain rather than across 
it was increasingly seen as the possible ultimate solution to the problem 
of tactical manoeuvr; e in the North. Speaking to the Empire Club in 
Toronto in March, 1950, the Chairman of the Defence Research Board of 
Canada argued that the air force would play an increasingly important 
2 
part in northern operations as techniques and technology developed. 
1- "Exercise Sweetbriar and Exercise Sun Dog P, The Arctic 
Circular, Vol. 3, September 1950, p. 34. 
2Cited in Ibid. 
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His forecast was to prove accurate. 
At about the same time as Sweetbriar, Canada conducted a smaller 
northern exercise in the area of Churchill.. Dubbed Sun Dog I, a company 
group carried out a series of tactical movements and patrols along the 
edge of the treeline andout into the barrens. Sun Dog was part of the 
Canadian Army's continuing attd'mpt to develop appropriate equipment and 
an operational doctrine for winter operations. Churchill represented an 
ideal training area, for in addition to having year round rail and air 
links with the outside and a substantial army garrison to provide base 
support services, the surrounding terrain featured both tundra and taiga 
conditions. 
1 
The outbreak of the Korean War and the need to build up NATO 
forces appears to have diverted the attention of the Canadian military 
from the North for about a year. There were no major exercises during 
the winter of 1950-51. The following winter, however, found Canadian and 
American army engineers at Kluane Lake in the Yukon. Over a six month 
period about 300 Americans and 135 Canadians trained in building emerg- 
ency airstrips on frozen lakes in winter and on muskegs after the snow 
had gone. 
2 The importance of air mobility in northern operations had 
long been a point of theoretical discussion. With Eager Beaver, as the 
exercise was named, the two armies finally got down to the actual prac- 
ticalities of training troops in the construction of the field expedient 
facilities that woul d be necessary adjuncts to air combat support. 
Throughout the 1950s the Canadian Army continued to exercise and 
train in the northern winter. The Canadian Army fixed its eyes'firmly 
1 Canada, DND (Amy) Public Relations P. N. 116-49, press release. 
2 "Exercise Eager Beaver", Arctic Circular, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
February 1953, p. 22. 
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on the lodgement as the main security threat to the North. Various exer- 
cise scenarios envisioned small groups of "enemy" landing in northern 
Canada to set up navigational beacons for bombers or to seize an airhead 
to support sustained operations against southern targets. Later scen- 
arios, reflecting changing technology, dealt with enemy attempts to neu- 
tralize early warning radars and to retrieve intelligence satellites that 
had landed in the Canadian North by error. It would be a mistake to 
place too much emphasis on these exercise scenarios. Scenarios are 
usually painted into the exercise preliminaries to increase troop interest, 
add "realism" and to help train unit intelligence staffs. What the 
Canadian Army and the RCAF accomplished in the 1950s was to develop a 
good joint operational capability in the North during winter. Parachute 
assaults, aerial resupply, airfield building, army-air co-operation and 
navigational techniques were all developed. 
On the whole, these exercises were successful in terms of their 
training aims but the North showed its teeth upon occasion. In December 
1954, Exercise Bull Dog II posited an enemy lodgement at an isolated radar 
station on the northwest coast of Hudson Bay. A battalion of the Royal 
Canadian Regiment was assigned the task of recapturing the facility. Then 
the North struck. Temperatures below -40 C and winds gusting from 20 to 
40 miles per hour eliminated any possibility of a parachute assault. The 
alternative of air lpding the assault troops on ice covered lakes was 
abandoned when it was learned that the ice was still too thin to support 
the weights of the transport aircraft. The exercise petered out with the 
"enemy" still ensconsed on the objective. 
Summarizing the press reports on the. exercise that appeared in 
British newspapers, Polar Record concluded that the failure of the 
infantry to reach their objective indicated that paratroops could not be 
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relied on as an effective striking force in arctic regions. 
' This rep- 
resented an extreme view. Given the vastness of the area involved and 
the lack of a communications grid, it is difficult to fathom what other 
method or system would offer greater reliability. The implicit flaw in 
the Polar Record argument was that it anticipated a northern operational 
tempo that was the same as in temperate zones. The northern environment 
places a restraining hand on the speed of all human activity. Canadian 
military commanders, schooled on the battlefields of Northwest Europe or 
the training exercises of NATO, repeatedly had to learn this fundamental 
lesson of the North and develop a special northern "time sense". 
A pattern developed in the continuing series of exercises. The 
major emphasis was placed upon operations during winter. The Canadian 
Army approached summer operat-ions-with a good deal of caution and only a 
modest program. In the summer of 1950, Exercise Shoo Fly I and Exercise 
Cross Country explored the problems likely to be faced by small infantry 
2 
and engineer units on the snowless tundra. Shoo Fly II the following 
summer "was designed to re-assess the findings of previous summer exer- 
cises employing a larger force. ,3 During 1952 and 1953, training in 
summer continued around Fort Churchill, but like the previous exercises, 
these were limited fn size. Whereas a battalion group was normally de- 
ployed on winter exercises, the summer equivalents were limited to 
companies, with the aim of identifying problems and developing tech- 
niques. In winter operations, the Mobile Striking Force troops were 
generally practising established methods. After 1954, the army gave up 
"'Canadian Combined Forces 'Exercise Bull Dog IV, 1954", Polar 
Record Vol. 7, No. 51, September 1955, p. 492. 
2 DND Report,, 1951, p. 55. 
31bidq 1952, P. 49. 
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northern summer exercises completely. No official statement was ever 
issued explaining the end of the summer program. It is likely that with 
the equipment then available, the problems associated with mobility were 
just too great. 
Another striking aspect of the army's intense involvement with the 
North during the 1950s was the fact that all exercises were conducted on 
the mainland. The army did not venture into the Arctic Archipelago at all. 
The question as to why the army had never gone farther north never arose 
during this period. There are some obvious reasons for what seems today 
to be a strange void; most of them are associated with peacetime limi- 
tations. An advanced base was needed for administrative and safety reasons. 
There were simply more settlements with the appropriate facilities in the 
treeline. Churchill in particular was an ideal training site and in time 
came to be psed almost exclQsively for exercises. On the other hand, 
considering that the main requirement of a support base was that it have 
a suitable airport, there were three sites in the islands that met this 
qualification: Cambridge Bay on Victoria, Frobisher Bay on Baffin, and 
Resolute on Cornwallis. The most likely explanation is that the army was 
simply interested in suitable training areas and could find these along 
the southern fringes of the North. The possible value of a large scale 
army exercise as a method of preserving sovereignty in the High North 
does not seem to have occurred to Canada's leaders at the time nor was 
there a perceived requirement. 
It should be noted that army combat training in the North was 
carried out by southern based units. Here, the army followed the air- 
force system of deploying troops northward on an exertises carrying out 
the training, and then withdrawing the troops until the next training 
cycle brought them into the North again. There appears to have been no 
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serious consideration ever given to actually stationing combat troops in 
the North. A small garrison would have been lost in the utter vastness 
of the region. A more fundamental reason, no doubt, was the cost such a 
program would have entailed. To build a base capable of supporting an 
infantry battalion and its dependants, along with the necessary impedi- 
mentia of schools, hospital, sFopping facilities, recreational facilities, 
etc., would have been prohibitively costly. Even the annual operating 
costs might well have been unacceptable. 
While the regular army made only periodic forays into the North, 
there was one military organization that made its home in the North: The 
Canadian Rangers. During the Second World War, the Department of National 
Defence organized an auxiliary corps on the west coast, known as the 
Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Basically, they were coast watchers de- 
tailed to provide information and report suspicious activities. Unpaid 
volunteers, these men--loggers, fishermen, miners, road maintenance men-- 
carried out their military duties as they went about their regular civ- 
ilian employment. 
I The Rangers were disbanded at the end of the war, but 
in 1947, the ever widening rift with the Soviet Union led to the reacti- 
vation of the force, this time on a national level. The Canadian Rangers, 
as the force was now styled, formed a component of the reserve militia. 
Their purpose was to: 
provide a military-force in sparsely settled northern, coastal and 
isolated areas of Canada which cannot conveniently 2 or economically be covered by 6fher elements of the Canadian Army. 
Rangers received no pay but were provided with a . 303 Lee Enfield rifle, 
and one hundred rounds of ammunition a year. Later a distinguishing arm 
'Larry Dignum, "Shadow Army of the North", Pre Beaver, autumn 
1959, p. 22. 
2Canada, DND. Directorate of Public Relations (Army), Memorandum, 
27 January 1954. 
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band was added to the basic equipment. 
There was a certain logic to the Ranger project. Scattered 
throughout the remote coastal areas of the Atlantic and Pacific, and 
throughout the North, they were the permanent residents who knew both 
the terrain they worked i-n and all their immediate neighbours. At a 
time when there was a general Military concern over the possibility of 
saboteurs infiltrating the country or small clandestine military bases 
being established in isolated areas, the main role of the Canadian Rangers 
was to report any suspicious activities occurring in their locality. Since 
the nature of the Rangers' civilian work took them out onto the land it 
was thought that eventually they would detect and report any lodgement 
that might be made. The Mobile Striking Force could then be deployed to 
deal with the enemy. 
In addition to their primary role, the Ranger organization, by its 
very nature, had the potential to fulfill a host of secondary roles. Ex- 
perience proved that they made excellent guides for regular army troops 
exercising in their locality. In addition they could supplement the 
RCAF's Ground Observer Corps with reports of aircraft sightings, form 
ground search parties for lost aircraft, or assist the RCMP in apprehending 
"enemy agents or saboteurs". 
' Replying to a question in the House of 
Commons as to the purpose of the organization, the Minister of National 
Defence said: 
The intention ii that the corps shall be organized in companies in 
areas where there are no reserve army units, particularly in the 
north and along the coasts of Canada. The purpose will be to act 
as guides, to make available local knowledge, to assist in search 
and rescue work, and to report any activities that should pt be 
going on in consequence of action by an enemy or the like. 
'Ibid. 
2 Debates, 23 March 1948, p. 2504. 
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The Ranger organization did not spring to full strength overnight. 
Because potential recruits lived in isolated areas, officers from the 
various "commands", or divisional areas, into which the country was div- 
ided at the time, had to make their way around the scattered settlements 
explaining the Ranger idea, entering recruits on the rolls, and issuing 
equipment. It would appear that the normal system was to locate a likely 
company or platoon officer in a community, and leave it to him to recruit 
his friends into the force. 
1 As was observed in the DND Report for 1950, 
"this process has, of necessity, been slow, owing to the large area covered 
,2 by the organization and the nature of existing communications . As late 
as 1954, the recruiting process was still going on. Along the Pacific and 
Atlantic coasts the recruiting went relatively quickly as each community 
inevitably had year round access to the sea. In the North, the process 
was much slower. 
It was inevitable that, at best, a regular force Ranger officer 
might get to see his charges once a year. Native Rangers might leave one 
settlement and move to another, or go live on the land. White Ranger 
officers might leave the North or be transferred to a different locality. 
Some Rangers might just lose interest in the program and stop reporting. 
The northern Ranger companies, platoons, and sections, in the final 
analysiss ran themselves on an all but autonomous basis. What fragmen- 
tary records still exist of the early Ranger program are full of corre- 
spondence from Ranger officers trying to determine just who was on their 
unit strength and where the weapons were. In some instances, command of 
the local Ranger detachment came to be vested in the occupant of a certain 
'Canada, DND Leport, 1953, p. 46. 
2 Ibid. , 1950, p. 46. 
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job in the community. For example, there exists a letter from a new 
manager of a Hudsons' Bay Company store in the Eastern Arctic to the 
Department of National Defence stating that he understood his job in- 
cluded commanding the settlement Rangers, that he was willing to do so, 
but just what did it all-involve? 
' The impressive organization of army 
companies, platoons, and sectins that existed on paper was not really 
reflected in the reality of the North. Companies and platoons existed 
for administrative purposes, the ýanqers' "military" job was carried out 
on an individual basis. 
The personnel who made up the Rangers were a varied lot. In the 
High Arctic a serious effort was made to recruit Eskimos. Within the 
treeline, the situation was somewhat different. The local detachment 
commanders established their own recruiting policies without much refer- 
ence to Ottawa or Command'Headquarters. Captain John Anderson-Thompson 
commanding the Yellowknife Company recruited only Whites; 
2 
at Norman 
Wells the Rangers were all employees of Imperial Oil. In the Yukon, most 
of the permanent civilian staff at maintenance camps along the Alaska 
Highway were Rangers, but these men tended to be Whites. Kit Squirechuk, 
commanding the Whitehorse detachment, however, numbered about a dozen 
Indians in his 35 man group. At Dawson City, all fourteen Rangers were 
White. 3 The officering of the Rangers reflected contemporary military 
and southern Canadian attitudes: all the officers were white. At the 
time this was probably a necessity since the administrative responsibilities 
'Canada DND, Northern Region Headquarters, Central Registry, 
"Rangers - dead file". 
21nterview, Mr. John Anderson-Thompson, Yellowknife, 18 July 
1975. 
3 "Outpost Defenders 'Just a Bit Better Prepared"', Canada Month, 
March 1964, p. 20. 
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and paperwork requirements of the job probably would have required an 
education beyond that which most northern natives had at the time. In 
the High Arctic, however, Eskimos were made sergeant section commanders 
in some instances. 
The Canadian Rangers in the North reached their peak during the 
early 1950s at a time when the Mobile Striking Force was conducting major 
winter exercises North of 60. In the "Bulldog" series, White Rangers at 
Yellowknife and Norman Wells proved to be enthusiastic "participants" in 
the exercises, acting as guides and scouts for the regular paratroops. A 
few White Rangers from the more settled southerly reaches of the North 
were able to get time off from their regular jobs to take army-sponsored 
survival courses or military training at Camp Wainwright, Alberta. Dis- 
tance precluded any attempt-ever-being made to conduct similar training 
for the Rangers scattered along the arctic coast. 
' 
In theory, the Rangers served a useful purpose at the height of 
the Cold War. As far as is known no "saboteurs or enemy agents" were ever 
landed in the remote areas of the Canadian North during the late 1940s and 
1950s. There were easier, and safer ways to enter Canada. The issue 
service rifle and ammunition was undoubtedly an effective means of saving 
money in the North. Nobody has ever attempted to calculate, or could if 
one wanted to, the number of caribou, moose, and seal that fell to the 
Ranger marksmen. The argument could be made that the Eskimo Rangers in 
particular, by having a definite role to play in the defence of Canada, 
became more closely attuned to national aspirations and values. In the 
absence of any concrete evidence or detailed studies, such a notion is 
pure speculation. An equally strong case could be made to the effect 
ID Info, Morgue file, Rangers--PR release, 8 October 1958; 
"Outpost Defenders", P. 20. 
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that the Ranger program was nothing more than a way to get a free rifle 
for the natives, and a diverting "social club" for the Whites. We just 
do not know. 
What does seem clear, from the scanty evidence available, is that 
the Rangers provided the-popular press with a field day throughout the 
1950s. Much of what was written was grossly exaggerated, a fl. ight of 
fancy, or just plain wrong. The Montreal Gazette in a short article on 
the Rangers entitled the piece "Unsung Ranger Arctic Defenders in 
'Guerrilla Warfare' for Army". The article clothed the Rangers in mys- 
tery, claiming that their numbers and locations were secret and that 
Should an enemy ever advance over the Arctic barrens, the Rangers' 
role would be hit-and-run operations to stall the invading force 
until Canada's mobile striking force could be transported or para- 
chuted into the area. 1 
Two years later, The Star Weekly Magazine produced a feature article on 
the Rangers entitled "Eyes and Ears of the North" claiming that "unsung, 
almost unknown, the Rangers keep watch--the pick of the volunteers who 
form Canada's first line of Arctic defence. " This article too suggested 
that "the Rangers would be invaluable if it were ever necessary to wage 
"2 
guerrilla warfare in the northern most parts of this country. These 
repeated references to guerrilla warfare were creations of the popular 
press; army press releases continued to emphasize the roles of the Rangers 
in observing and in aiding civil authority in time of civil emergency or 
disaster. If guerri. 3las are "fish who swim in the sea of the people" they 
would find the Canadian North to be a very small pond in terms of popu- 
lation. It is difficult to conceive of how a successful guerrilla campaign 
'Montreal Gazetteg 13 February 1954. 
2Robert Taylor, "Eyes and Ears of the North", The Star Weekly 
Magazine, 22 December 1956. 
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could be mounted in the North and particularly in the Arctic. While 
those who knew the area intimately might be able to avoid capture by 
withdrawing to the empty spaces, living off the land has always been a 
full time occupation. There would be little time or energy left over 
for the Ranger-guerilla-t-o fight. Still, the image of the Rangers as 
a "shadowy band of defenders"' was one that pleased Canadian readers, and 
articles to that effect continued to appear. 
Army activity in the North peaked in the late 1950s and there- 
after began a gradual decline until, by the mid 1960s, the military had 
virtually abandoned the area as a potential operational theatre. Sub- 
units continued to train from time to time at Churchill, but after 1964 
when the military base was closed, this training became increasingly rare. 
The Canadian Rangers were seriously affected by the diminished army 
interest in the North. The Rangers were not disbanded, but they were 
left to wither on the vine. White Rangers left the North and replacements 
were not recruited. Rifles were lost or damaged and were not replaced. 
The annual resupply of ammunition became sketchy. Regular Force Ranger 
Liaison Officers made fewer and fewer visits into the North. The White 
Paper on Defence of 1964 gave official utterance to what had become an 
informal reality. There is not a single reference to the North in the 
entire White Paper. In point of fact there is very little attention paid 
to the defence of Canada in the document. The section entitled "Defence 
of Canada" begins wfth the opening sentence: 
It is, for the foreseeable future, impossible to conceive of any 
signiftcant external threat jo Canada which is not also a threat 
to North America as a whole. 
'Victoria Colonist, 10 September 1958. 
2 Canada, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa; Queen's Printer 1964), 
p. 13. 
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It was allowed that: 
the minimum requirements for the defence of Canada are: the ability 
to maintain surveillance of Canadian territory, airspace and terri- 
torial waters; the ability to deal with military incidents on Canadian 
territory .... 
I 
While these: may have been the minimum requirements, there is no indication 
in the subsequent structuring of the Canadian Armed Forces that any 
specific steps were taken to develop a surveillance or combat capability 
in the forces appropriate to the needs of the North in the 1960s. 
1 Jbid 
CHAPTER VII 
THE OTHER OCEAN 
Naval Operations in the North 
For the first four decades of its existence, the Royal Canadian 
Navy studiously ignored the seas that surround Canada's North. Until 
after the end of the Second World War, no Canadian government or admiral 
ever found reason to dispatch any element of the fleet to far northern 
waters. In this respect, the navy was not unique for, as has been seen, 
the entire Canadian military establishment had shown only minimal interest 
in the North. In 1945, however, the Royal Canadian Navy was swept up in 
the "polar passion" that gripped the Canadian and United States govern- 
ments and military for about a decade. 
' 
Canada considered and studied her options and needs. The United 
States Navy and United States Coast Guard sailed into the arctic seas. 
Starting in 1946 with an exercise dubbed Nanook, American maritime el- 
ements began a vigorous program of scientific study aimed at increasing 
military knowledge and operating capability in northern waters. it is 
probable that this not-inconsiderable American effort provoked the Canadian 
government into taki ng measures to create an immediate Canadian naval 
The Royal Canadian Navy emerged from the war as the world's 
fourth largest navy, this unusual state of affairs admittedly being due 
to the fact that many of the world's traditional naval powers--Germany, 
Italy and Japan being temporarily hors de combat. Circumstance and war 
necessity, however, had made CanadF-snavy into whatwas primarily a 
highly specialized anti-submarine force. Particularly limited were its 
offensive capability and its ability to participate in combined oper- 
ations. 
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presence in the North. The problem faced by the government and the navy 
was to determine just what a specialized anti-submarine warfare navy was 
to do in the North and how it could do it. 
The RCN, on the whole, was reluctant to take on a northern commit- 
ment. While the United States became increasingly committed to the 
"Polar Concept" in her strategic outlook, and fashionable strategists 
agreed that the Arctic Ocean would be the "Mediterranean of the future", 
senior officers of the Royal Canadian Navy kept their eyes steadfastly on 
the North Atlantic. As late as 1941, - -6-ey were arguing, with some justi- 
fication, that an ASW force had no place in the Arctic: historically, 
there was not enough shipping to tempt an enemy submarine into the area. 
The following year, the professional naval opinion changed slightly, main- 
ly due to the decline of international relations with the Soviet Union and 
knowledge of high Soviet naval competence in their own northern waters. 
The first public acknowledgement that the RCN had an interest in 
the North came in June 1948 when Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National 
Defence, announced in the House of Commons that elements of the navy would 
undertake a northern cruise that sumer. Canada's only aircraft carrier, 
HMCS Magnificent, was "arcticized" to permit her to operate in high lati- 
tude. ' This modification, however, related exclusively to preparing 
working and living quarters and equipment for low temperature operation. 
No work was done on the hull or power plant to give a capability for oper- 
ating in ice. In this sense, the Minister was exaggerating the capa- 
bilities of the ship when he said that she had been "arcticized". The 
cruise was to be made at a time when sea conditions would be at'their 
optimum. Hudson Strait and Hudson Bay were, in reali_ty, much less chal- 
lenging and difficult than the more northerly waters of the Northwest 
'Debates, 24 June 1948, p. 5785. 
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Passage. Still, it was a beginning which promised a more extensive 
northern involvement for the navy in future. In making the announcement, 
the Minister had referred to "the importance to us of the northern waters". 
' 
No attempt was made to explain why Korthern waters were suddenly important 
to Canada after almost a -century of neglect. 
Magnificent, with the destroyers Nootka and Haida in company, 
sailed from Halifax on 2 September 1948 with army and airforce observers, 
a representative of the Dominion 15bservatory, and the naval attach6s of 
the United States and Great Britain on board. Five days later the ships 
were in Hudson Strait, operating off Wakeham Bay, the former headquarters 
of the 1927-28 Hudson Strait Expedition. The navy did what it could to 
help the missionary and the eighty Eskimos that constituted the total 
population of the settlement. The ship's doctor held a "sick parade" and 
naval communications technicians repaired the missionary's radio. The 
following day, Magnificent sailed for home, leaving the two destroyers to 
continue the cruise into Hudson Bay. 
on 11 September 1948, Nootka and Haida. tied up at Churchill--the 
first ships of the RCN ever to enter Hudson Bay. After a four day visit 
at Churchill, the destroyers sailed north, calling at the village of Coral 
Harbour on Southampton Island and at Port Burwell. Harbour soundings and 
chartings were made at both locations. By 23 September, the two ships, 
having rendez-voused with a tanker for refuelling, had cleared the Strait 
2 
and were en route for Halifax where they arrived five days later. The 
navylsý first venture into northern waters was, within its very limited 
objecttves, a success. 
Ibid. 
2 "The RCN Northern Training Cruise", The Arctic Circular, Vol. 
No. 7, November 1948, pp. 75-76. 
185 
The 1948 northern cruise received considerable publicity in Canada 
and was commented upon favourably in several journals specializing in 
northern matters. It is important, however, to keep the voyage in per- 
spective. Its sole importance is historical in that it marked a "first" 
for the RCN. Certainly, the challenge presented by Hudson Strait and Bay 
in late summer is insignificanf in comparison to that of the North Atlantic 
in winter. In any case, the ships were simply following an established 
shipping route that had been in existence for three centuries and which 
had been marked with modern aids to navigation for twenty years. Still, 
the navy and the Canadian public took considerable satisfaction in what 
was popularly thought to have been a significant accomplishment. In re- 
ality, concerned Canadians were simply underlining their woeful' ignorance 
about the North. 
The following year, the frigate HMCS Swansea continued the program 
of familiarizing naval personnel with operating conditions in the North 
by undertaking a cruise to the southern portion of Baffin Island. As in 
Vie previous-year. the voyage was undertaken at the height of the shipping 
season. A thin skinned frigate had to rely on avoiding ice, not chal- 
lenging it, if it hoped to reach its destination. Swansea arrived at 
Frobisher Bay on 30 August 1949, and continued up the east coast of Baffin 
Island, eventually reaching Clyde River, before turning south. A cour- 
tesy call was made at Godthaab, Greenland on the return voyage. 
I 
The RCN's n6rthern program evoked a small spark of interest in the 
House of Commons in 1949 when an opposition member requested assurance 
from the Minister of National Defence that "an adequate portion of the 
naval training is being carried out in Arctic waters". He made, however, 
"'Royal Canadian Naval Cruise 1949", The Arctic Circular, Vol. 2, 
No. 8, pecember 1949. 
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no attempt to explain why he felt such training to be important. The 
member envisioned a possible new role for the navy in the North when he 
suggested that annual resupply, community support, and scientific research 
tasks might well be done by the RCN. He observed that hitherto when work 
was required to be done in the North, the Department of Transport had 
usually contracted a commercial firm to do the required job; he felt that 
the navy could be trained to do the required work. Presumably he was 
suggesting that responsibility for the Eastern Arctic Patrol be given to 
the navy. His suggestion evoked no reply and the issue was never raised 
again. 
The idea was somewhat simplistic. For the navy to venture into 
the waters of the High Arctic would have meant the acquisition of new, 
ice-capable ships in addition to new training. It also again begged the 
question of the purpose of such training and experience. A naval presence 
in the North might have been important for maintenance of sovereignty, but 
in the late 1940s, the North was not considered to be a potential battle- 
ground either by naval leaders or thoughtful civilians. In addition to 
the purely military aspects of the thesis, there was an important politi- 
cal aspect. It was a well established principle in Canada that the 
military would carry out national development tasks only when no commer- 
cial firm or civil department of government was capable of doing so at a 
reasonable cost. In the case of the Eastern Arctic Patrols, the Depart- 
ment of Transport, in conjunction with the Hudson's Bay Company, had been 
successfully operating the program for over two decades. 
Despite the Minister's assurances that arctic training would be 
carried out by the RCNq Swansea was the last Canadian warship to visit 
'Debates, 19 November 1949, p. 1974. 
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northern waters for several years. By the time the 1950 shipping season 
opened, Canada was involved in the Korean War. In Europe, the Soviet 
threat was perceived with growing western apprehension and the RCN was 
fully occupied with Canada's anti-submarine role of keeping the North 
Atlantic open in the event of another major war. 
The next warship of the Royal Canadian Navy to operate in the 
North was HMCS Labrador, a purpose-built Arctic Patrol Vessel. The min- 
ister had spoken of the government's intention to acquire such a ship in 
1948 when he announced plans for the RCN's first northern cruise. 
' By 
1949, detailed plans were well advanced and in November, 1949 the keel for 
the new ship was laid in the yards of Marine Industries Limited at Sorel, 
Quebec. The design was based on that of the Wind class icebreakers of the 
United States Navy and Unites States Coast Guard. 
2 Work progressed very 
slowly on the ship due to design changes during construction and delays in 
delivery of building materials. The ship was not launched until December 
1951 and was only handed over to the RCN in July 1954.3 
HMCS Labrador was a modern ship in all respects. Displacing 
6,790 tons and 269 feet overall length, she was the RCN's second largest 
ship. The ship's company numbered 24 officers and 204 ratings although in 
practice she usually carried additional civilian scientists and observers. 
As befitted her role, she was built for power rather than speed. Her top 
speed was a mere sixteen knots, but with all six of her diesel engines on 
'Canada, DND, Naval Historical Section, History of HMCS Labrador, 
(ýhenceforth Labrador-History), Ottawa: ms. unpublished 1960, p. 1. 
2 "The Northwest Passage Navigated, HMCS Labrador, 195411, (hence- 
forth "Labrador 1954") Staff Monograph held in HMCS Labrador file, Canada, 
DND, D Info. Morgue. 
3 Labrador History, pp. 3,6. It is interesting to note that when, 
a few years later, the United States built its first nuclear powered sub- 
marine, USS Nautilus, it took only one year from keel laying to launching. 
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line, she could develop an impressive 10,000 horsepower. A flight deck 
aft accommodated two light helicopters for general reconnaissance work 
and, in particular, to assist in route finding in heavy ice. The ship's 
boats were specially designed for use in hydrographic surveys. 
1 
If it had taken the RCN a long time to actually get its ice- 
breaker, the navy was quick to put it to use. Barely two weeks after 
commissioning, Labrador had been steamed to her home port of Halifax, 
provisioned, and was on her way to the Arctic. By the end of the month 
she had entered Lancaster Sound, the eastern entrance to the Northwest 
Passage--a new "first" for the Royal Canadian Navy. 
Labrador had five "official" functions. The main role was to 
carry out patrols in northern waters with a view to providing the RCN with 
the knowledge and experience required for the planning and conduct of fu- 
ture naval operations. She was also to conduct hydrographic and scien- 
tific surveys as needed by the navy and, naturally, to carry out ice- 
breaking as required during arctic operations. In addition, the ship was 
to provide logistic support for Canadian arctic bases and, within her 
capabilities, to perform rescue and salvage duties in arctic areas. 
2 On 
her first cruise she was to perform all of these duties--and more. 
During her first season of operation, Labrador ranged through 
Lancaster Sound. She operated along the east coast of Ellesmere Island 
as far north as Kane Basin. Later in the season she moved westward in 
the Passage, eventually breaking into the Beaufort Sea. At the season's 
end she rounded Alaska. thus becoming the first warship ever to transit 
the Northwest Passage. 
"IHMCS Labrador: Arctic Patrol Vessel", (Ship's brochure 1955, 
held in D info Morgue, HMCS Labrador file). 
2Labrador History, pp. 6-7. 
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Her accomplishments, however, are best measured in terms of what 
she did rather than where she went. Hydrographic studies and equipment 
and clothing trials were conducted in early August in and around Lancaster 
Sound and Baffin Bay. The ship then headed south back to the Passage where 
she based herself at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island. Various soundings, 
surveys and scientific project§ were continued until 19 August, when a 
distress call took Labrador to Baring Channel north of Prince of Wales 
Island. The motor vessel Monte Carlo had become trapped in the ice between 
Prince of Wales and Russell Islands. - Monte Carlo was a small fishing boat 
crewed by a party of students from an American college. Labrador felt her 
way along in dense fog for two days until visibility improved on the after- 
noon of the 21st. One of the ship's helicopters located the stranded 
vessel and Labrador broke through twenty miles of ice to free her and tow 
her out to the main channel. The small craft was reprovisioned and her 
crew advised to stay out of dangerous waters in future! 
For the remainder of August, Labrador slowly worked her way westward 
through Barrow Strait into Viscount Melville Sound, carrying out oceano- 
graphic and hydrographic studies as she went. South of Melville Island, 
Labrador fell into company with the American naval icebreaker USS Burton 
Island which was working with the joint United States-Canadian Beaufort Sea 
Expedition. A program of co-operation and mutual support was laid out in 
which the two ships jointly sounded the eastern end of M'Clure Strait. 
Having transited Prthce of Wales Strait, the two ships joined USCGS North- 
wind at Richard Collinson Inlet on Banks Island. A survey team from the 
Dominion Hydrogrphic Office was rescued from the east coast of Banks Island 
when they reported that all their Weasel vehicles had broken down. 
' The 
'In the Report on Exercise Musk Ox it had been noted that Weasels 
were not sufficiently robust for independent operation in the Canadian Arctic. 
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research program was continued until 21 September in and around the Beau- 
fort Sea. On that date one of the crew members fell gravely ill and 
Labrador immediately sailed for the Pacific coast naval base at Esquimalt, 
arriving there on 27 September, 67 days out of Halifax. 
1 
Considerable publ-icity and public interest attended Labrador's 
arrival at Esquimalt. The fact that she had sailed through the Northwest 
Passage was seen by the press as being the most important accomplishment 
of the voyage, although the research activities were also noted. To the 
ship's company, and to the navy, however, the most significant result of 
the first cruise was the training and experience gained in operating in 
the polar sea. The ship's unofficial history also noted a more subtle re- 
sult of the voyage, as 
it marked the first incursi-on of a Canadian naval vessel into waters 
which the U. S. Navy and Coast Guard might well be excused for con- 
sidering mare nostrum. For a good many years, particularly since the 
establishment of the joint U. S. -Canadian weather stations in 1947, 
the only ships seen in the waters of the Canadian Archipelago, apart 
from a few government supply ships, were those flying the Stars and 
Stripes. In 195ý for the first time Canada had a ship patrolling her 
northern waters. 
Labrador's arctic program for 1955 was every bit as demanding as 
had been her first cruise, although the focus of employment changed con- 
siderably. The 1955 shipping season marked the beginning of major con- 
struction on the DEW Line, and Labrador was given an important role to play 
in support of the supply convoys operating in the North. On 15 June, 
Labrador sailed into. Hudson Strait to begin preparatory work for the mass- 
ive sea lift of supplies and equipment that would come later in the summer. 
This- work included more hydrographic surveys, installation of navigational 
control stations, and the selection, survey and preparation of actual beach 
"'Labrador" 1954". 
2 Labrador History, p. 219. 
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landing sites. The most important task of all, however, would be ice- 
breaking support for the forty-ship convoy expected in Hudson Strait in 
ealy August. By September the task was finished and the American ships 
departed for the South, none having received more than superficial damage. 
Labrador remained in the North for another month to continue hydrographic 
and oceanographic studies that had been started the previous year; then, 
she too turned south and abandoned the Arctic to winter. 
The navy was flooded with requests for the Labrador's services for 
the 1956 season. The United States Military Sea Transport Service wanted 
her for support of DEW Line constructions and supply. The Defence Research 
Board, the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys and the Fisheries 
Research Board all made bids to use her facilities for arctic research 
projects. One of the few agencies that could not see much use for the ship 
was the Royal Canadian Navy. In August, 1956 the navy began seriously to 
consider the possibility of turning Labrador over to the Department of 
Transport. The Director of Naval Plans and Operations, Captain W. M. 
Landymore, produced a major study examining the military implications of a 
continued naval presence in the North. He noted that if the ever popular 
enemy lodgement were made, the other fighting services were much better 
equipped and trained to respond than was the navy. He further noted that 
no matter what the operational requirement, ship's movements were governed 
by seasonal navigational limits. In any case, even if Labrador could 
operate in ice strewn waters, other ASW ships of the navy had no combat 
capability whatsoever under such conditions. 
' Landymore apparently did 
not consider the sovereign implications of operating a naval ship as op- 
posed to a Department of Transport ship in the arctiý, patrol role. 
'Cited in Labrador History, p. 219. 
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The naval staff accepted the logic of Landymore's arguments and 
in October recommended a departmental transfer of the vessel. They were 
reacting in part to a governmental directive which stated that the navy's 
highest priority be given to having a maximum number of effective fighting 
ships. Under such ground-rules, Labrador had, admittedly, no place in the 
RCN, whose main focus of interest remained on NATO and the North Atlantic. 
The Naval Board, on the other hand, adopted a somewhat more cautious atti- 
tude and declined to take any action on the proposal for the time being. 
During the summer, Labrador's activities had been a virtual repeat of her 
1955 cruise, her main mission being in support of the DEW Line sealift. 
In September, following the end of her sealift responsibilities, she had 
established another record by executing the first east to west passage of 
the difficult and often ice clogged Fury and Hecla Straits between Baffin 
Island and the Melville Peninsula. 
During the 1957 season, the pattern of employment that had devel- 
oped over the previous two years continued. Hydrographic and charting 
activities, Defence Research Board activities, and support of other govern- 
ment agencies' research projects alternated with DEW Line resupply duties. 
By the summer of 1957, however, it was clear that the days of Labrador as 
a ship of the Royal Canadian Navy were numbered. At the end of July, the 
Department of Transport requested the services of Labrador for ice breaking 
duties in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and offered to take over formal oper- 
ation of the ship. this time, the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral H. G. 
De Wolf, agreed. In a letter to the Minister, De Wolf carefully examined 
the implications of the navy giving up Labrador. He noted the valuable 
arctic experience gained by the ship's company (but did not say in what 
manner this experience was useful to the RCN). He also noted the satis- 
faction obtained in performing "useful service to the country and assistance 
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to other government departments with resultant goodwill". De Wolf showed 
his awareness of the important sovereign implications of HMCS Labrador's 
northern cruise when he wrote: 
(T)here is, I believe, a very real value in showing the white ensign 
in the Ca7adian North_where the stars and stripes are so much in 
evidence. 
on the negative side, however, -it was noted that Labrador's employment was 
essentially non-military; that the ship had no operational role in war. 
In fact, existing plans were such that if war were to break out, Labrador 
would have been paid off in order to permit the manning of "additional 
escorts". De Wolf took the position that in view of the government's in- 
structions to reduce expenditures for fiscal year 1958-59, this could best 
be done by transferring Labrador to the Department of Transport. The one 
proviso to the transfer was that should a war or a national emergency arise 
that called for the military operation of an icebreaker, the ship was to 
be made available to the RCN. 
2 
In the autumn of 1957 Labrador sailed to the port of Saint John, 
New Brunswick where she went into a major refit prior to departmental 
transfer. Most of the crew was paid off at that time with the exception 
of a small refit detachment which remained with her until the end of March 
1958, when she officially ceased to be a ship of the Royal Canadian Navy. 
opposition members of parliament appeared to be quite skeptical 
when details of the proposed transfer of authority over the ship were an- 
nounced. When one isked if "the traditional role of exploration and 
charting in arctic waters" was being cancelled in the interests of econ- 
omy, the Minister of Transport, George Hees, explained that the summer 
'Ibid, 
p. 130. 
21bid, p. 131. 
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exploration charting program would continue under Department of Transport 
auspices, but more economical use would be made of the ship by using her 
as an icebreaker in the Saint Lawrence during the winter. 
I Another member 
questioned the advisability of the transfer on the grounds that Labrador 
was ! 'Canada's medium for-exhibiting sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic". 
He wondered if the Department af National Defence was really in favour of 
the transfer or if the project were simply a case of the powerful Depart- 
ment of Transport "calling the tu -1,. 
2 
ne In this respect, the suspicion of 
bureaucratic power politics was misplaced for it is clear that the RCN was 
as eager to get Labrador off its hands as DOT was to take it over. George 
Pearkes, the Conservative Minister, replied that the transfer of Labrador 
was the result of government review "of those responsibilities of the 
defence department which might, with economy, be assumed by civilian de- 
3 
partments of the government" . What remains unclear is the degree to which 
monies were actually saved by the transfer. The work performed by Labrador 
represented a fixed annual commitment. Any absolute reduction in defence 
expenditures would have, presumably, been off-set by an approximate similar 
increase in the DOT budget. 
Despite the explanations of both ministers concerned, the oppo- 
sition remained unhappy. In January 1958 a question was asked as to 
why this ship ... a naval vessel of a particular type for an area 
which was required to be patrolled by the navy, should have been 
transferred tý what is a peacetime department? (i. e. The Canadian 
Coast Guard). 
Pearkes replied, accurately, that there were other means of patrolling 
'Debates, 11 November 1957, p. 944. 
2 Ibid, pp. 1151,1157. 
3 lbid, p. 1103. 
4 lbid, 3 January 1958, p. 2823. 
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northern waters. In this sense there could be little argument, for 
Labrador, flying the colours of the Canadian Coast Guard could carry out 
patrol duties and show a federal presence in the North just as well as she 
could flying the white ensign. The opposition members appear to have 
failed to grasp the esserfce of the problem. They peppered the Minister 
with questions about how the RCN proposed to train its personnel in future 
for the specialized conditions found in arctic waters. The Minister's 
reply that other ships, namely frigates and destroyers from the Atlantic 
coast, 
' 
would be used, ignored therealimport of the questions. Surely 
the concern of members of the opposition was with the ability of the navy 
to operate in ice, which destroyers could not do. In any case, the ques- 
tion that remained unasked was why should the navy have an operational 
capability in the North in the first place. No professional sailor in 
Canada had been able to answer that hypothetical question and as a result, 
Labrador was given up. The sterile public discussion of the navy in the 
North, however, continued into the early 1960s. 
Charles Lynch, one of Canada's leading political commentators, 
commenting on the RCN's year end review of activities, for 1960, noted 
that: 
There were no cruises, however, along Canada's longest sea coast--the 
northern one. Since the government took away the icebreaker Labrador 
and gave it to the Department of Transport, the Navy has lackid a 
vessel capable of 2 operating 
in the northern seas, even for flag 
showing purposes. 
In point of fact, soon after Lynch's article appeared, the RCN considered 
anew the desirable characteristics of an Arctic Patrol Vessel. The staff 
paper in question was written with a view to the return of Labrador to the 
'. Ibid. 
20ttawa Citizen, 28 December 1960. 
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to the navy where her mission would be: 
To assist in the maintenance of sovereignty over Canadian terri- 
torial waters in the Arctic and icebound environments and, by sup- 
porting reseirch, to improve the Canadian defence capability in 
those areas. 
To date, no Canadian government has felt it necessary to have the 
navy again operate a polar icebreaker. The needs of sovereignty have been 
maintained by Canadian icebreakers in the colours of the Canadian Coast 
Guard. Inter-departmental co-operation has apparently satisfied specific 
research and support requirements. In this respect, Canada is not unique. 
Most nations that operate icebreakers do so under the aegis of a coast 
guard or some similar organization. The subtle difference between an ice- 
breaker manned by a naval crew and the same vessel manned by what is essen- 
tially a non-service department, has not been seen as an important aspect 
of Canadian northern policy. 
By 1960, it was unrealistic to postulate any military role for a 
northern patrol vessel other than "flag showing" which is a legitimate and 
traditional military function. If war were to come to the polar sea, it is 
clear that the engagements in 1960 would have been fought under the ice, 
not in it. 
2 The entry into service of USS Nautilus in January, 1955 
ID Hist, 73/243, "Draft Ship Characteristics Arctic Patrol Vessel" 
I February 1961. 
2 The idea of using a submarine for under ice polar exploration may 
have originated in the-seventeenth century with John Wilkins, the Bishop 
of Chester who wroteof the "many advantages and conveniences of a sub- 
marine as 'tis safe-from Ice and great Frosts which do so much to endanger 
the Passage toward the Poles"'. See Vilhjalmur Stefansson, The History of 
the Idea, in Sir Hubert Wilkins, Under the North Pole (London, Brewer, 
Warren Putnam, 1931). Two German -explorers working independently, 
Anchutz-Kamfe in 1901 and Maybaum in 1903 actually undertook construction 
of submarines with the intention of attempting to reach the pole under the 
ice, surfacing for air and battery recharging in leads oý polynas. Neither 
attempted the voyage. See "A New Plan for Reaching the North Pole". 
Geoqraphical Journals Vol. 17, No. 4,1901, pp. 435-436 and A. W. Maybaum, 
I'm Unteseeboot zuL_RLrdpol (In a Submarine to the North Pole) Berlin, 
np. 1903. Stefansson claimed that by the early 1920s he had thought out 
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represented a new potential for polar operations. Being nuclear powered, 
the boat was practically unlimited in submerged range. Surfacing in leads 
would be done only if the captain wished to do so, and not through necess- 
ity. The early nuclear boats were capable of speeds in excess of 20 knots 
and could submerge to a very great depth and remain highly manoeuvrable. 
With these characteristics it was thought that a nuclear boat could safely 
pass beneath the deepest ice ridge. There were a few naval and political 
enthusiasts in the mid 1950s who were strong advocates of attempting a 
submerged polar transit, but the United States Navy approached the idea 
with care. The dominant viewpoint cautioned against risking the only 
nuclear powered vessel in the fleet in a completely unknown area. 
By 1957, however, the polar advocates were beginning to gain in- 
creasing numbers of supporters, and that summer, Nautilus made her first 
polar attempt and managed to beat within 180 miles of the Pole before 
being forced to turn back by sub surface ice pressure ridges. Undaunted, 
solutions to most of the practical problems associated with submarine 
operations in the Arctic. He claimed that his publishers forced him to 
excise sections dealing with a polar submarine voyage from drafts of "The 
Arctic as an Air Route of the Future" in the National Geographic August, 
1922 and The Northern Course of Empires 1922. See Wilkins, pp. -V and 14-17. 
In 1931 Si"r Hubert Wilkins, he British arctic explorer actually attempted 
an undersea voyagle to the pole, but damage to the submarine in transit to 
the edge of the pack prevented the vessel from submerging. See "Sir Hubert 
Wilkins' Submarine Expedition 193111 Polar Record, Vol. 1, No. 8, January 
1932, P. 5- 
The first actual under-ice submarine voyages were carried out by the 
Imperial Russian Nayy in Vladivostok Harbour in 1905 and 1908. See V. G. 
Redanskiy, "Pervyye podlednyye plevoniya podvodnykh lodok na Dol'nem 
Wostoke", Izvestiyo V-qesozuynoqo Geoqrafic Leskoqo. Obshchestua, Vol. 100, 
No. 4,196Z, pp. 368-370. During the Russo-Finnish War, a Soviet submarine 
made a thirty mile transit under the ice of the Baltics see V. V. Tikhomirou, 
Nebo zakryto J'dami, (The Sky is Covered With Ice), Moscow; 1965. German 
U-Boats operating against allied arctic convoys to Russia made use of the 
edge of the polar pack as a shelter from destroyer attacks. Following the 
end of the Second World War, the United States Navy-lEarried out a few 
experiments with conventional submarines operating on the edge of the arctic 
pack. No major polar transits were attempted, or it would appear, even 
contemplated. 
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she tried again the following year and on 3 August, sent her now famous 
message, "Nautilus 90 North". In subsequent years, the United States Navy 
established other important milestones in under-ice operations. In March, 
1959 the 
_USS 
Skate actually managed to surface at the pole. In 1960 and 
in 1962, USS Seadraqon and USS Skate, respectively, made submerged tran- 
sits of the Northwest Passage. 
In addition to the United States, other nations who had developed 
nuclear submarines also undertook polar cruises. In 1962 the USSR sub- 
marine Lenisky Kamsomol 
2 
succeeded in reaching the pole, and in 1971 HMS 
Dreadnought, did likewise. 3 What is important to this study is the impact 
on Canada and the Canadian North of the opening of the polar seas to year 
round naval operations, and the potential commercial and scientific ad- 
vances following on from developing technology. 
The military was quick to grasp the strategic significance of the 
successes of the nuclear submarines. Even before Nautilus had reached the 
pole, an American officer, experienced in both submarines and polar work, 
had noted that, "in spite of the natural defences posed by the elements, 
the Soviet Union is extremely vulnerable from the North". He argued that 
nuclear attack submarines could play havoc with Soviet shipping along the 
northern route whilst remaining virtually invulnerable to attack them- 
selves. 
4 Commander Anderson, the Captain of Nautilus, foresaw an even 
I See Commandpr William R. Anderson Nautilus 90-Nort_h (London: 
Hodder and Stoughto6,1959); Commander Jamýs Calv rt, Surface at the Pole 
(London: Hutchison & Co., 1961); G. P. Steele, Seadragon: Northwest 
Under the Ice (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1962). 
2 M. S. Korenevskiy, Kurs-nord, idem podo 1'dami (Course - north we 
are going under the ice) (M6-scow: Izdatellstuo "Sovetskaya Rossiya". 1967). 
3 P. Wadhams, "British Submarine work in the Arctic, 1971", Polar 
Record, Vol. 15, No. 99, September 1971, p. 923. 
4Commander G. W. Kitteredge, "Under the Polar Cap: A Voyage That 
Must be Made", USNI Proceedings, Vol. 84, No. 2, February 1958. 
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more significant strategic role for nuclear submarines operating in the 
Arctic Ocean. He wrote that: 
When the nuclear powered, missile firing submarine became a reality, 
the Arctic, dominating over three thousind miles of Soviet coast- 
line, would be an ideal launching spot. 
The polar cruise of the USS Skate in 1959 was reported to be, in 
the main, a scientific expedit-ron, during which experiments were made to 
check the feasibility of submarines breaking through the ice of the polar 
pack. 
2 The military significance of such a capability, although unstated 
in the article cited above, was that if gaps in the polar pack could be 
found, then a submarine could launch strategic missiles from a polar war 
station. The American strategic thinking of the late 1950s and early 
1960s was closely tied to existing technology. Thus in 1958, a US Navy 
officer who had served in submarines during the Second World War and in 
arctic icebreakers in the post-war period wrote: 
With our lesser interest in the far north and the greater distances 
of centers of population and industry from the Arctic, any threat3 
to the free world from Soviet under-ice submarines is negligible. 
The author was writing before the operational deployment of submarine 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The cruise missiles of the day were 
very limited in range and a launch from anywhere under the polar pack could 
not have reached the continental United States. 
Other Americans were less sure of their invulnerability. In 1962 
following the development of nuclear submarines armed with ballistic miss- 
iles (SSBN) one wrote to the effect that while the Soviet Union remained 
1 Anderson, p. 43. 
2 Lcdr. W. H. Layman, "Skate breakthrough at the North Pole", 
USNI Proceedings, Vol. 85, No. 9, September, 1959. 
3 Cdr. R. D. McWethy, "Significance of the Nautilus Polar Cruise", 
USNI Proceedings, Vol. 84, No. 5, May 1958, p. 35. 
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much more vulnerable to an attack from submarines in arctic waters, a 
Soviet SSBN could, in theory, transit the Arctic Ocean. make its way 
through the Canadian Archipelago, enter Hudson Bay and from there effec- 
tively engage targets as far south as Norfolk, Virginia, or St. Louis, 
Missouri. ' Here too the7author was writing in terms of the range of the 
first generation of SLBM. Subsequent developments have since negated the 
necessity to approach the "enemy" so closely. The theme of the article 
cited was that the NATO countries with northern frontiers should combine 
to develop a capability for anti-submarine warfare in the Arctic. In that 
area, conventional ASW surface ships and aircraft, operating alone or in 
conjunction with each other were completely ineffective. The writer 
envisioned aircraft as the main means of anti-submarine defence in the 
North, but he also felt that anti-submarine nets might be necessary for 
Hudson Bay. 2 
The year 1960 marks the "end of the era of experimental submarine 
3 
operational procedures in the Arctic" . By 
oped the necessary equipment and experience 
ice in summer and winter. In addition they 
shallow waters as well as among icebergs ani 
mid November of the same year, the USS Geor 
Ballistic Missile submarine departed on the 
this date the USN had devel- 
to operate nuclear boats under 
had worked in both deep and 
J through island passages. In 
ie Washington, an American Fleet 
first deterrent patrol, armed 
with 1,200 mile-range Polaris Al nuclear missiles. Given the limited range 
of the first generation SLBM, it is not unreasonable to speculate that her 
1G. V. Brown, "Arctic ASW", USNI Proceedings, Vol. 88, No. 3, 
March 1962, p. 55. 
2 Ibid. 
3Richard Boyle, "1960: A Vintage Year for Submarines", USNI 
Proceedings, Vol. 96, No. 10, October 1970, p. 38. 
201 
war patrol area may have been in-the arctic seas. The United States has 
naturally never revealed the location of patrol stations nor the targeting 
program of the sea-based deterrent, but the Soviet Union appears to have 
assumed that the American boats might well be in the Arctic Ocean from 
whence they could strike-at Soviet strategic forces located deep in 
Siberia. It would seem that the Soviet Navy quickly began to develop the 
procedures to react to this possible threat from the North. When the 
Soviet Union announced in 1963 that the Leninsky-Komsomol had reached the 
North Pole the previous sumer, th-e-pu-rpose of the cruise was stated as: 
to go under the arctic ice to the North Pole and there to take a 
battle station having the mission of preventing the underwater rocket- 
carrying ships of the 'enemy', from using the ice of the North Pole 
for launching a rocket strike 
Before one can fight in an area one must have the ability to operate there. 
In all probability the Soviet Navy was going through the learning process 
that the USN had endured between 1957 and 1960. The Soviet Union prob- 
ably quickly mastered the art, for Soviet literature is full of reports 
of various under-ice cruises in the mid 1960s. It is also reasonable to 
assume that hunter-killer submarine attack procedures in the Arctic Ocean 
were also worked out. That this was done was implied in a Soviet article 
written in 1963 wherein a journalist embarked on an arctic patrol wrote: 
Other submarines, we know, are creeping up to the North Pole from 
the other hemisphere. They are looking about for placed from which 
Polaris missilesfcoul5 be launched. They should realize that this 
is playing with ire. 
Since the Soviet Union could be expected to deploy their own SSBNs by the 
mid 1960s, and since they too were gaining vital polar experience with 
their attack boats in the intervals it appears that the United States Navy 
'Cited in Ibid., p. 39. 
21. Nekhamkin, "On Board a Nuclear Submarine" Soviet Union, 
No. 159,1963, p. 41. 
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carried out hunter-killer experiments in the Arctic in 1962. In that 
year 
Significant tactical exercises were conducted with both submarines 
(USS Skate and USS Seadragon) proceeding in company over a track of 
about 1,800 miles in the Central Arctic .... 1 
Weapons and sonar 
tests were conducted in the Beaufort Sea .... 
Military operations of Soviet and American submarines in Arctic 
waters have been cloaked in secrecy since the early 1960s. The following 
analysis, therefore, is purely speculative. It would seem likely that 
during the period when SLBM ranges were in the order of 1,200 to 1,500 
miles, both nations probably deployed SSBNs into the Arctic, and at the 
same time continued to develop their ability to detect and destroy op- 
posing SSBNs with hunter-killer submarines. Despite all the progress that 
has been made in polar operations, however, the perpetual ice cover of the 
Arctic Ocean renders that area7-a-much more hostile environment for sub- 
marines than more temperate seas. Security for an SSBN, and hence the 
entire sea borne deterrent of both the United States and the Soviet Union, 
lies in the ability of the submarines to reach and maintain station in a 
patrol area undetected. Each succeeding generation of SLBM has opened up 
vast ocean areas as suitable patrol stations. A missile range increase 
on the magnitude of 1,000 miles roughly equates to another million square 
miles of ocean becoming a suitable launch area. Given these consider" 
ations, it is likely now that neither American nor Soviet missile sub- 
marines need to use the Arctic Ocean. When an Ultra Long Range Missile 
System (ULMS) becomes operational, the sea based deterrent forces should 
be in the enviable position of being able to engage their targets as soon 
as they leave their home ports. 
Despite the tremendous developments that hayýe, been made in ASW 
lBoyle, "A Vintage Year", p. 39. 
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since the end of the Second World War, it is still generally conceded 
that the submarine has the advantage in war operations. This is particu- 
larly true with respect to SSBNs who have no interest in shipping lanes 
or tactical targets. All these ships need is a place to lurk, and the 
ice free oceans of the world represent a fantastic hiding ground. Contem- 
porary ASW resources consist oý fixed underwater sonar arrays, surface 
ships, aircraft, and submarines. Of these, only ASW submarines are ef- 
fective in the High North, although experiments with fixed array sonar in 
ice filled waters continue. At present, ASW forces would be at a disad- 
vantage in the polar seas since only a few of the standard resources can 
function there. Therefore, a major technological breakthrough in conven- 
tional ASW might well force SSBNs to seek again refuge under the polar 
pack. In the same vein, the Arctic Ocean could be important to nuclear 
submarines of the deterrent forces of both sides as a transit zone for the 
redeployment of forces, or as a secure means of permitting an SSBN to take 
up its war station. Any attempt by either the United States or the Soviet 
Union to interfere with'the transit routes of the other would have serious 
effects on deterrent stability and would represent a major shift in stra- 
tegic perceptions and, perhaps, intentions. Such a move could not ration- 
ally be made lightly nor is it likely that it could be made quickly be- 
cause of technical limitations imposed by the arctic environment. 
While the nuclear submarines of the United States and the Soviet 
Union conquered the'ýrctic Ocean, the Royal Canadian Navy sat on the 
sidelines, a seeminjly disinterested spectator. After the transfer of 
. 
Labrador to the Coast Guard, the only Canadian warships to appear in the 
North were on summer training cruises into Hudson BaX, and after 1962, 
even these ended. Deeply committed to anti-submarine warfare, the RCN 
concentrated on developing variable depth sonar, helicopter carrying 
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destroyers, and a high seas hydrofoil. None of these could be used in 
ice filled waters, so with a few exceptions the navy forgot about the 
North and concentrated on the North Atlantic. 
The United States Navy established a policy of co-operation with 
Canada that reflected the, fact that their boats were operating in Canada's 
back yard, if not in territoria'l waters. (At the same time, Canada's 
declared territorial limit was three miles, and since no commercial or 
military use had ever been found foir the Northwest Passage, the Pa_rry 
Channel route via M'Clure Strait could have been classified as high seas). 
When the USS Sargo reached the North Pole in the dead of winter 1960, 
Commodore 0. S. C. Robertson, Labrador's original commanding officer, was 
aboard. This officer was also in USS Seadragon in the capacity of ob- 
server and adviser when that ship made her historic transit of the Passage 
through the Canadian Archipelago in the summer of the same year. 
Canada took note of the early pioneering nuclear submarine voy- 
ages and applauded their successes. Similarily, a few Canadians expressed 
concern over the threat of Soviet SSBNs prowling about the arctic coast of 
North America. The massive Soviet submarine fleet had often been seen as 
a serious threat to North America. When Nikita Khrushchev in one of his 
more bellicose statements said that rocket firing submarines located in 
Hudson Bay could demolish targets anywhere in North America, Canadians 
were forced to admit that they did after all, have a third ocean front. 
A joint Canadian-Amd'rican defence research station located at Churchill 
was reported to be working on technical aspects of under-ice submarine 
detection, but the problems far outnumbered the feasible solutions. 
I 
A few voices cried in the wilderness that Canada should obtain a 
'Vancouver Sun, 9 November 1959. 
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small fleet of nuclear submarines for the purpose of arctic patrol and 
conventional operations. Chief among these was Michael Forrestal, the 
long-time Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Halifax, 
Canada's principal naval base. Throughout the 1960s Forrestal repeatedly 
called for a start to be made on a Canadian nuclear fleet--if not home 
built, than purchased directly-from the United States. It is probable 
that Canada had neither the technology nor the industry to build nuclear 
submarines at anything like an acceptable cost. Attack submarines might 
have been purchased from the United States at any time after the mid- 
1960s, but again, the cost was seen as being prohibitive. In any case, 
it is most unlikely that Canada would have obtained such a costly weapon 
system mainly for northern patrol work at a time when the governments of 
the day showed little interest in the North. The advisability of acquiring 
nuclear submarines was debated in the House of Commons at some length in 
1959, but there was no mention of the Arctic Ocean in the debate. The 
government's position was that the concept of using a nuclear submarine 
in the anti-submarine role had yet to be proven, and in the interval, 
Canada was watching closely developments in the United States and Great 
Britain. ' In the main, it would appear that Canada was prepared to leave 
to the super powers the heady world of nuclear war in the polar seas. 
The non-military potential of nuclear submarines in the North is 
as interesting as possible war scenarios. Once the major navies proved 
that polar operation's were feasible, a whole world of peaceful appli, - 
cations of this knowledge emerged. The most important of these envisioned 
new intercontinental shipping routes, the use of submarines for'resource 
exploitation, and finally, as a platform for pure scientific research in 
'Debates, 2,3 July 1959, pp. 5371,5384,5430. 
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the Arctic Ocean. Of the three, only the last has been developed to date. 
The most intriguing idea relates to the use of the polar seas as 
a commercial route. The western world has been fascinated with the idea 
of sailing between the Atlantic and the Pacific via the Arctic Ocean for 
nigh onto five hundred ye-ars. It is only within the 1960s that the means 
has existed to make this dream-a reality. That the means was finally at 
hand was apparent immediately upon Nautilus' completion of her historic 
voyage. The ship was awarded the first Presidential Unit Citation ever 
granted in peacetime, reading in part: 
This voyage opens the possibility of a new commercial seaway, a 
Northwest Passage between the major oceans of the world. Nuclear 
powered cargo submarines may in the near future use this route to 
the advantage of world trade. 
The prospect of a new and important sea route was developed by Commander 
Anderson, writing in the National Geographic. He noted that the surface 
route from Tokyo to London was 11,200 nautical miles but a nuclear powered 
submarine sailing via the Arctic would only travel 6,500 miles. Similarly, 
Seattle to Oslo is 9.500 miles by the conventional route but only 6,100 
by the pole. While Anderson was prepared to argue that the route had been 
proved workable, he did not feel that commercial exploitation could begin 
until additional studies were made in all seasons. He also felt that 
various alternate routes should be explored. 
2 
Several nations undertook design or feasibility studies of 
nuclear-powered submarine cargo ships. The Electric Boat Division of 
General Dynamics Corporation, the builders of Nautilus and Skate, received 
a contract from the U. S. Federal Maritime Administration to consider the 
'Cited in Richard Boyle, "Arctic Passages of North America", USNI 
Proceedings, Vol. 959 No. 1, January 1969, p. 49. 
. -- 
2Cdr W. R. Anderson, "The Arctic As A Sea Route Of The Future", 
National Geographic, Vol. 115, No. 1, January 1959, p. 24. 
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design of a 20,000 ton and a 40,00 ton capacity submarine tanker. The 
Japanese announced in 1959 that they were considering a 100,000 ton de- 
sign. Despite this theoretical interest, however, no submarine freighter 
or tanker has yet been launched. The reason for this undoubtedly lies in 
economics. While the polZir route may offer a time and distance saving on 
the order of thirty to forty per cent, the capital costs of actually 
building a nuclear-powered commercial vessel are much higher than costs 
of a conventional surface ship. In addition, even if a commercial sub- 
marine were launched as a nationai-v-en-tu-re, the insurance rates for a ship 
plying the polar route, for the first few years at least, would probably 
be ruinous. A sea route that no ship can afford to use has limited com- 
mercial importance. 
Much the same situation exists with respect to the second contem- 
plated use of commercial submarines--that of a means of exploiting mineral 
resources of the North. Richard Boyle suggested in 1969 that nuclear sub- 
marines could be used to move northern oil and other minerals that might 
be found in the Canadian Arctic to southern markets. 
1 Lieutenant Commander 
J. T. Strong of the United States Navy argued much the same case in 1961, 
noting in particular that the mineral resources of the Queen Elizabeth 
Islands in the High Western Arctic could best be exploited by nuclear sub- 
marine freighter. 
2 Commodore 0. S. C. Robertson wrote in 1966 that if oil 
were discovered in the-Canadian Arctic, the most economical way to move it 
3 
to market might well be by means of a submarine tanker. In 1970 with the 
'Boyle, "Arctic Passages", pp. 50-52. 
2J. T. Strong, "The Opening of the Arctic Ocean", USNI Proceedings, 
Vol. 87, No. 10, October 1961, p. 64. 
3 0. S. C. Robertson, "Transport by Submarine in Arctic Waters", 
North, Vol. 8, No. 5, September-October, 1966. 
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development of the Alaskan North Slope oil fields well underway, General 
Dynamics proposed to the five major American oil companies involved in the 
project that they acquire a fleet of submarine super tankers to transport 
the oil to the continental United States. By 1970 General Dynamics, con- 
cepts had grown tremendously over the comparatively modest vessels they 
were considering a decade previously. They were now talking of ships 900 
feet long each capable of carrying 170,000 tons of oil. In order to fully 
exploit the ten to thirty billion barrel North Slope resource, General 
Dynamics suggested that a fleet of eighteen of these monsters would be 
required by 1980. The advertised advantages of the submarine super tanker 
were the facts that oil could be handled at sea temperature and that pre- 
cise delivery schedules could be kept. On the negative side, however, 
there were many serious problems-that had to be solved before the sub- 
marine tanker could be considered as a workable alternative to other 
proven means of oil shipment. Since the North Slope waters were rela- 
tively shallow, it was suggested that loading points for vessels would 
have to be many miles off shore, and a complete new technology would have 
to be developed for such installations. 
1 Like proposals for oil carrying 
dirigibles and mammoth aircraft, the submarine tanker has remained only 
a concept--a concept that has not proven to be economically attractive 
when compared to the traditional means of transporting oil such as surface 
tankers and pipe lines. The same arguments may be laid at the feet of 
proposals and desig6s for nuclear submarines configured as freighters or 
as ore carriers. They offer a number of theoretical advantages, but 
promise to be economically competitive only if a series of very formidable 
1J. E. Truitt, "Moving Alaska's Oil by Submar-Ine Tanker", Navy, 
Vol. 75, No. 3, March 1970, pp. 80-81. 
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technical and human problems can be solved first. 
' 
The third aspect of the peaceful use of nuclear submarines in the 
North has been developed to a considerable extent. As an American oceano- 
grapher said, the development of the nuclear submarine represents "a major 
breakthrough ... in the-techniques of Arctic exploration and oceano- 
2 
graphic research" . The early American penetrations into the northern 
seas were all almost purely exploratory or scientific in nature. In par- 
ticular, the 1959 Skate expedition involved an extensive program of pure 
scientific research. 
3 Commander Anderson maintained that much scientific 
data was collected in the 1957 and 1958 cruises and that during the 1959 
polar transit, more than 11,000 individual soundings were recorded. In 
additiong both Nautilus and Skate measured salinity, temperatures, and ice 
thicknesses along their courses, "giving valuable clues to the movements 
4 
of water in the Arctic Basin" . While these studies, and others were 
primarily made with a view to perfecting the military techniques of sub- 
marine under-ice operation, it is undeniable that the basic data could 
have many other commercial and scientific applications. 
Mr. A. E. Molloy, a member of the United States Navy Hydrographic 
Office, suggested that the nuclear submarine represented the ideal arctic 
research platform since it could go more or less anywhere and provided a 
controlled environment independent of outside support. He maintained that 
more was learned about-'the Arctic Ocean between 1957 and 1960 than had 
'See P. R. Crowe, "The Submarine Ore Carrier", Paper delivered at 
The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, London, 28 March 1962. 
2E. C. La Fond, "Arctic Oceanography by Submarines", USNI Pro- 
ceedings, Vol. 869 No. 9, September 19609 p. 91. 
31bid. 
4Anderson, "The Arctic as a Sea Route of the Future". p. 21. 
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been learned in the previous 75 years. He advocated a carefully thought 
out research program to accommodate the needs of the Defence Department, 
other government agencies, and private institutions. He suggested that 
a nuclear submarine be specially fitted as a floating (submerged ?) 
laboratory able to support surveys, basic research, and applied research. 
1 
While Molloy's thesis certainly has merit in terms of increasing knowledge 
of the polar seas, the USN has not rushed to dedicate a hundred million 
dollar nuclear submarine exclusively to research work. What continuing 
research that is done, it would appear, tends to be ad hoc programs under- 
taken by embarked scientists during the course of multi-mission cruises. 
It is unlikely that any other department of government and certainly no 
private institution would be in a position to purchase a nuclear sub- 
marine for research purposes. Even if funds were made available, main- 
tenance and crewing would remain as major obstacles to the nuclear sub- 
marine laboratory concept ever becoming reality. It is possible, how- 
ever, that in the next few years, the early nuclear boats will come to 
the end of their operational military life and may thus become available 
for research purposes. Still, the perplexing technical problems of an 
aged reactor, and the more mundane matters of maintenance and staff would 
remain. Like the nuclear freighter and the nuclear resource transporter, 
the nuclear submarine laboratory remains a theoretical possibility con- 
founded by the realities of economics and technology. In many ways, the 
"boom" of interest i. n the peaceful use of nuclear submarines in the Arctic 
that characterized the late 1950s and the 1960s, has turned out to be the 
"bust" of the 1970s. To the North, that is an old story. 
'A. E. Molloy, "Arctic Science and the Nucleifr Submarine", Arctic 
Vol. 2, June 1962, pp. 87-91. 
CHAPTER VIII 
NATION BUILDING II: 
The Post War Years: 1945-1964 
The generation after the Second World War marked the high point 
of military presence and activity in the Canadian North. Yet in reality, 
little of this activity was directly related to a specific military 
threat. During the bomber era, infantry troops trained to snuff out 
I'lodgements" and the radar stations of the Distant Early Warning Line 
kept their long polar watch. These two organizations, however, accounted 
for but a small portion of the military activity in the region. A host 
of other programs brought the soldiers, sailors and airmen of Canada and 
the United States in the North. 
As has been seen, the long-neglected North was thrust into promi- 
nence with the coming of the Cold War. With this prominence came an 
honest military interest in the area. It was generally recognized in all 
branches of the service that existing knowledge of the North was imperfect 
and that special techniques and equipment were required to operate there. 
In the absence of specific operational roles, many military elements set 
about learning how to live and work in the isolated northern environment 
against the day when a wider military threat might develop. As a cor- 
ollary to these programs, steps were taken to establish necessary support 
facilities to permit these activities to be carried.. Qut with greater 
efficiency and safety. 
An important by-product of this activity was a major contribution 
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by the military to general knowledge about the North and the establishment 
of many important components of social infrastructure. It would be a 
serious error to assume that all these military contributions to northern 
development were coincidental. There are three categories into which all 
military activity during the 1945-1964 period could be grouped. The 
first is that small class of activities that were undertaken for purely 
military purposes and the development spin-off was truly accidental. By 
far, the largest category is the second class wherein military projects 
were executed in a manner designed to optimize developmental aspects. The 
third group are those government designated activities undertaken purely 
to meet the needs of national development, and which promised no particular 
value to the military. 
The Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System 
The outbreak of the Second World War disrupted the NWT & YRS, as 
it did most other Canadian institutions. In the autumn and winter of 
1939, calls were made upon the system to support mobilization by providing 
. men and materials. In the final analysis the system was a train- 
ing facility for the RC Sigs and in the crisis of war, the army did not 
hesitate to draw upon the distant posts to fill its needs. on the other 
hand, the RC Sigs had acquired aresponsibility to the residents of the 
Northwest. People had come to depend upon the radio facilities over a 
period of sixteen years and the entire network could not be abandoned 
overnight. Those stations whose closure would not cause a breakdown in 
the whole system or whose services could be provided by alternate means 
were closed and their equipment and personnel were withdrawn to the South. 
At the remaining stations personnel cuts reduced the. -level of services 
that could be provided, meteorological services suffering particularly in 
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The entry of the United States into the war and the defence projects 
undertaken by that nation in the Northwest provided an impetus that took 
the system out of its initial war time slump. To support the Canol proj- 
ect, the United States Corps of Signals established a communications net- 
work, but it soon became evidefft that the American equipment did not have 
the power or the reliability to handle the traffic on the net. The tem- 
porary expedient of patching into the nearest NWT & YRS station for onward 
transmission of messages was adopted; but in 1943 the two governments 
agreed that because the RC Sigs were already established at key locations 
in the Mackenzie Valley and had long experience in northern operations, 
the Canadian system would provide the main communication grid for Canol. 
Accordingly, the Corps installed a powerful station at Norman Wells capable 
of transmitting direct to Edmonton and later took over an American station 
that had been established at Fort Providence. By the end of the year the 
NWT & YRS was operating fourteen stations and the System was again in the 
process of expansion. 
The System's role in supporting flying operations was greatly 
expanded the following year. Flying activities relating to the Alaska 
Highway, Canol, and the North West Staging Route continued unabated and 
civil aviation in the Mackenzie underwent a resurgance. The increased 
level of air activity produced a demand for more and better weather fore- 
casts and the RC Sigi was requested by the Meteorological Department to 
open stations at Fort Good Hope and Port Radium, and to increase the 
frequency of weather reports from all other existing stations. 'Manpower 
'Moir, 
p. 282. 
2A History of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System, 
pp. 19-20. 
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requirements in 1944 were not as critical as in 1939 in the sense that 
the requirements for a few dozen men to operate the NWT & YRS were insig- 
nificant to an army of over a half million men. The RC Sigs also took 
over small stations that had been established by the Americans at Wrigley, 
Hay River and Embarras. These developments brought the system back to 
its pre-war level of nineteen stations. The following year, the main 
stations at Edmonton, Fort Smith, Fort Simpson and Norman Wells received 
powerful new 10 KW low frequency transmitters, thus further increasing 
the System's capacity to support the anticipated northern boom that it was 
thought would follow the end of the war. 
During the war years, the system continued, in the main, to follow 
its traditional pattern of supporting contemporary activity in the Canadian 
Northwest. The Canol project-replaced the mining activities of pre-war 
years as the main user of facilities. The system also continued to pro- 
vide its traditional weather forecasts and commercial facilities for the 
permanent residents of the North. Wartime programs provided Canada with 
a surfeit of trained signallers. During the war there was no suggestion 
made by the RC Sigs that the system's continued value lay in the training 
it provided to military communicators. The system had become a thing 
unto itself--a service to the Northwest, which, by tradition, was provided 
by the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. 
With the coming of peace, the NWT & YRS continued in its now well 
established pattern of serving the North. Any military, commercial or 
governmental group that required quick and efficient communications turned 
to the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. One could graph the level of 
development activity in the Northwest simply by studying the various 
expansions and contractions that the northern signals system underwent 
over the years. While the post-war experiences of the System differed 
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somewhat from pre-war and wartime activity in the specific nature of ser- 
vices provided, on the whole, meteorological forecasting, air support, 
communications for other departments of government, and commercial traffic 
occupied the bulk of the signallers' time. 
During 1946, all the wartime stations continued in operation and 
new sites were opened at Snare River, north of Yellowknife, and at Baker 
Lake. 
1 The Snare River station was short lived, but its establishment 
illustrated again the flexibility of the army to respond to reasonable 
requests. A major hydro-electric power project was to be carried out on 
the Snare to provide the energy-starved mining interests in the Yellow- 
knife area with a source of cheap and reliable power. To facilitate the 
construction phase, a radio station was required and on 8 July 1946, the 
RC Sigs was on the air from the new site. The project was completed in 
late 1948, but the signallers stayed on until mid 1949 at which time a 
conventional land line between the power plant and Yellowknife was 
completed. 
During 1948 and 1949, the System was drawn further into the web 
of the Meteorological Service. The first year weather stations were in- 
stalled at Brochet in northern Manitoba, and at Fort Reliance at the 
eastern tip of Great Slave Lake. Both of these stations were transmitting 
weather data by freeze up, but their establishment was costly in both men 
and support equipment. The RCAF had to be called on to fly in construc- 
tion crews, operators, and equipment, although a barge brought in most 
of the heavy plant to Fort Reliance. Both of these locations were note- 
worthy because of their isolation. At Brochet the population consisted 
of two traders, four missionaries, a game warden and. -a fluctuating group 
'Ibid. Unless otherwise noted all data in this section is taken 
from this source, pp. 24-58. 
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Of UP to fifty Cree and Chipewyan Indians who came and went with the 
hunting and fishing seasons. At Fort Reliance, the entire population 
consisted of two members of the RCMP who used the post as the base of 
patrol operations at the east end of Great Slave. The following year, 
the NWT & YRS reached its-nadir of isolation when it responded to a 
Meteorological Service request to establish a post at Ennadai Lake. At 
Ennadai, there was nobody except the four man signals detachment. This 
forlorn post was on the air with regular weather broadcasts by October 
1949, but perhaps its most important function during the years the RC 
Sigs operated the station was the humanitarian role it played in support 
of the local natives. 
The Kazen River Band of Caribou Eskimos had traditionally hunted 
in the general region at Ennadai Lake, but during the winter of 1949-50, 
disaster struck when the route of the annual caribou migration changed 
and the herds by-passed the area. The 45 members of the band were facing 
starvation by April 1950 when their plight became known to the soldiers 
of Ennadai. The signallers radioed Churchill for assistance and later 
arranged for the air evacuation of the band to Neutlin Lake, a hundred 
miles to the southeast, where game and fish were plentiful. Before the 
natives could be moved, however, they had to be collected and concen- 
trated at a central pick-up point. The soldiers ranged the area bringing 
in their starving charges who subsisted on army emergency rations until 
the aircraft arrived. Had the Ennadai Lake station not been established 
it is most likely that the whole band would have died of starvation. 
By 1951 the Eskimos had drifted back to their traditional hunting 
ground. In the intervals the government had taken steps to provide them 
with rifles, ammunition and traps. Rather than relying upon the caribou 
for their entire subsistence, the natives were now able to bring furs 
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into Ennadai where the signallers baled them up and shipped them to the 
RCMP at Churchill. There the police sold ihe furs, bought food, ammu- 
nition and supplies with the proceeds and shipped these to Ennadai where 
they were distributed. This change in the economic base of the Eskimo 
livelihood, from completeýdependence upon the caribou to a barter economy 
based on fur trapping, was probably an undesirable side effect of the 
changed caribou migration patterns. The alternative: cultural purity-- 
and starvation--was even less acceptable in the middle of the 20th cen- 
tury. Although many of the so called "benefits" of white society have 
ultimately proved to be culturally devastating to northern native peoples, 
there can be no question that the Ennadai station personnel were on more 
than one occasion instrumental to the survival of the Kazen Band. Medical 
services were provided to the best of the detachment's ability and in the 
spring of 1954, the detachment commander nursed the band through a devas- 
tating influenza epidemic. Weather conditions precluded a doctor's 
landing at the post. Instructions for treatment were radioed to the 
soldiers who brought their charges through the crisis without a single 
loss. 
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, like the war in 1939, put 
severe demands upon the personnel of the System. By this date the orig- 
inal purpose of the System to provide otherwise unavailable training to 
army signallers had long since become meaningless. In reality the System 
was a drain on RC Sigs resources. Since the beginning of the Second 
World War, the Corps had been operating the necessary trades schools to 
support all their work. Before a man could be usefully employed in the 
North he had to be highly trained to operate an ever_increasing array of 
complex equipment. It was also necessary to provide additional instruc- 
tion in meteorological reporting, and in the operation of the diesel 
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generating plants that provided the electricity at many of the more remote 
locations. still, the RC Sigs clung onto the System. They had a job to 
do and were doing it well, but sometimes it was only possible to keep 
operating by curtailing services or by placing heavy long-term demands on 
the operators. 
The requirements for troops for Korea reduced the System to the 
point where it was operating with only 75 per cent of its authorized 
establishment. As the demands of an expanding regular army would take up 
the recruit signaller output for the foreseeable future, authority was 
obtained to employ civilians to fill some of the vacancies. Qualified 
civilians who were willing to live in the North were hard to find. The 
NWT & YRS' position was made even more difficult by the Department of 
Transport which was expanding its northern radio services and was author- 
ized to pay much higher salaries. Faced with these manpower problems and 
a steadily increasing volume of radio traffic, the Department of National 
Defence decided to cut back on some of its stations. Agreement was 
reached with DOT whereby that Department took over operation of some of 
the more isolated stations whose sole function was weather reporting. 
Embarras Lake was turned over in mid 1952 and the others were slated for 
hand over as soon as DOT could hire men to run them. Ennadai Lake went 
in 1954 and along with it the inevitable responsibility for the Kazen 
River Eskimos. Wrigley went the following year and Brochet followed in 
1956. 
In February 1955 construction began on the Distant Early Warning 
Line. A tremendous airlift was required to support the construction of 
the western portion of the project in Canada, from Cambridge Bay to the 
Alaska Border. As a result, weather messages, air movement messages, 
and construction related messages increased dramatically. Three hundred 
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thousand more signals were handlea in 1955 than during the previous year, 
the vast majority of these attributable to the radar construction project. 
The communications tempo grew with construction activity the following 
year when a hundred per cent increase in all classes of message traffic 
was recorded, despite the-fact that the western part of the construction 
phase was completed by the end of July. At the beginning of 1957, the 
DEW Line's own internal radio system came into operation and this relieved 
much of the remaining pressure from the NWT & YRS. Much to the disgust of 
many veterans of the RC Sigs, the civilian firm holding the DEW Line con- 
tract offered fabulous salaries by the standards of the times and hired 
numerous civilian and military operators away from the NWT & YRS. 
That another program would emerge to replace the DEW Line traffic 
was perhaps inevitable. In 1957, the project was the construction of a 
new townsite for the village of Aklavik. Aklavik, sited in low lying 
ground in the Mackenzie Delta was subject to regular floodings and was an 
unsuitable site for further urban growth which the Department of Northern 
Affairs and National Resources wished to foster in the area. Accordingly 
it was decided to relocate the community to higher ground 35 miles to the 
east. The new town was named Inuvik in 1958, but during 1957 it went by 
the more prosaic title of Aklavik East Three. The radio traffic associ- 
ated with this major construction project was largely responsible for the 
system recording its. all-time high of messages passed in one year--3,172,628. 
The cost of operating a system that could handle this volume of 
traffic however, was proving to be increasingly unacceptable to the 
Canadian Army. By 1957 this amounted to 1.5 million dollars annually. 
In 1957 commercial traffic had brought in a revenue of 200,000 dollars, 
and had government messages been computed at the commercial rate, another 
five million dollars would have been realized. Unfortunately, from DND's 
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point of view, all revenues went to the Receiver General of Canada and 
not to the Department of National Defence. A detailed traffic analysis 
carried out in 1956 revealed that DOT was the major user of the System, 
with over ninety per cent of all messages being concerned with that de- 
partment's affairs, DND on the other hand, accounted for only four per 
cent of the total message traffic and most of these related to the in- 
ternal administration of the System. In an attempt to redress this 
financial anomaly, DND requested that it either be relieved of responsi- 
bility for running the network, or else that costs be shared by DOT. A 
cabinet decision taken in September, 1957 directed that the Army hand over 
the System to DOT. 
It would appear that those signallers who had been involved with 
the NWT & YRS for many years-reqretted the government's decision when it 
dawned upon them that they were to leave the North and give up control of 
the System that had been so important to northern life for over three 
decades. The actual handover was done on a station-for-station basis and 
took over two years to accomplish. In September, 1958 the detailed inven- 
tories and procedures for handover were complete and Fort McMurray, 
Alberta joined the DOT net. Before the year ended, Fort Chipewyon, 
Fort Smith, and Hay River were transferred. By the end of 1959, Dawson 
and Mayo, the two original stations, and Port Radium and Fort Resolution 
remained. On 25 March-, the last station, Resolution, changed hands and 
the Northwest Territories and Yukon Radio System quietly vanished from 
the northern scene. 
By all accounts, most northerners were sorry to see them go. At 
lMoirs p. 284. Like most post-war documentsý, - official correspon- 
dence relating to the decision to transfer the System to DOT, the 
arguments used and the amy reaction to the decision are not open sources. 
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a ceremony held at Yellowknife in November 1959, northerners of all per- 
suasions and backgrounds said their formal good-byes. Letters poured into 
System Headquarters from airlines, transport companies, mining firms, 
other departments of government and private individuals, all thanking the 
RC Sigs for the work of years and expressing regret that the soldiers were 
leaving. Their contribution to northern development, northernlife, and 
northern society over the years was not insignificant. 
On the whole, the signallers of the NWT & YRS entered fully into 
the spirit of northern life. They gave much more than basic communi- 
cations services, which were extremely important in themselves. Signallers 
acted as postmasters, and magistrates. They ran airfields and weather 
stations. Between 1949 until 1958 when the Canadian Broadcasting Corpor- 
ation took over the job, signallers voluntarily ran a rebroadcast service 
of commercial radio programs in the larger communities. Signallers sup- 
ported search and rescue operations and vice-regal visits to the North 
with mobile and efficient communications to the "outside". Upon occasions 
they acted as special police constables and, more mundanely as doctors, 
nurses and midwives. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals gave much to 
the North. The full story of their accomplishments is yet to be 
chronicled. 
1 
The Alaska Highway 
When peace came in the summer of 1945. the future of the great 
wartime highway to Alaska was by no means clear. By the terms of the 
I The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals Museum at Vimy Barracks, 
Kingston, Ontario, holds most of the original documentation produced by 
the NWT & YRS. Unfortunately, to dateg none of the holdings have been 
catalogued. I have brought to the attention of the Public Archives of 
Canada that in the monthly diaries kept by all statibn commanders, and 
other documents, there lies the raw material of a major social history 
of the Canadian Northwest. 
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original international agreement, the United States was committed to 
maintaining the road for six months after the war's end at which time it 
was to be transferred to Canadian control. Canada had the option of in- 
corporating the highway into the national road grid, but was not legally 
committed to do so. The Dominion had the choice of simply abandoning it 
on the grounds that it was a wartime measure that the return to peace had 
rendered superfluous. If Canada did opt to keep the road in operation it 
had been agreed that there would be no "discriminating conditions-in re- 
lation to the use of the road as between Canadian and U. S. civilian 
traffic". ' 
The singling out of civilian traffic is important. In the orig- 
inal negotiations, the PJBD had recommended certain post-war rights for 
U. S. military traffic to and from Alaska. The Canadian government had 
declined to commit itself to the post-war military situation, but stated 
that it was prepared to give due consideration to any future PJBD rec- 
ommendation on the subject. The matter was dropped from the original 
agreement. The United States government raised the issue again in March 
1943, expressing "a desire to extend the interpretation of the original 
2 
agreement in regard to post-war military use" . Canada again declined 
to do so. Towards the end of 1944, the American government began pressing 
Canada to agree to take over and maintain the highways but in July 1945, 
Canada was still considering the proposition. 
3 
In the interval the Canadian Army in the form of the Royal Canadian 
ID Hist, 348-013 (DI)o U. S. Defence in Canada, "United States 
Defence Projects in Northeast Canada"O General Staff Memorandum 11 July 
1945 Chenceforth "U. S. Defence Projects"). 
2 Dziuban, p. 221. 
311U. S. Defence Projects". 
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Engineers (RCE) entered the debate. The military case was that if and 
when the highway were taken over by Canada, it should become an army 
responsibility. The Royal Canadian Engineers, it was argued, could run 
the system efficiently and at the same time use it as a means of peace- 
time training for gaining experience "in connection with large scale 
engineering works". 
' Despite all the prophecies of post-war development 
that had accompanied the construction of the highway during 1942-43, it 
was still not clear in Canada that the advantages in keeping up the road 
would have merited the cost. The government's focus of interest remained 
the Northwest Staging Route, which, it was thought at the time, would 
develop into a major routeof international air traffic in the post-war 
world. The importance of the highway in supporting airway operations had 
been clearly demonstrated during the war, thus providing an incentive to 
the government to keep it in operation. 
The other side of the coin was American concern over the future 
security of Alaska. It was evident that the United States did not want 
to have to embark on another crash construction project if the changing 
international situation were to produce a new threat to the northern 
territory. A bill introduced in the United States House of Represen- 
tatives in the summer of 1945 was interpreted in Ottawa as reflecting 
the official American position, when it called for the creation of a 
board to be known as, the Alaska International Highway Commission. Another 
American official spoke to the effect that 
A properly controlled air route to Alaska is considered indispens- 
able to the permanent defence of the continent. --. The only feasible way to properly provide these necessary items to a 
controlled airway (i. e. fuel suppliess auxilliary strips, weýther 
stations, etc. ) is a highway generally along thp, -same route. 
'Ibid. 2 Cited in "U. S. Defence Projects". 
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It is evident that the United States was Prepared to bring con- 
siderable pressure to bear on Canada to keep the route open, for the high- 
way was seen in the United States as an important feature in the defence 
of Alaska. Inasmuch as it was possible to differentiate between national 
defence and continental defence, the road was not significant to Canada. 
However, the magnitude of Amerfcan interest when compared to that of her 
northern neighbour was such that Canada, in all probability, had little 
choice but to go along with American wishes. From that point of logic, 
it was but a short step to give responsibility for the highway to the 
Canadian Army. Here there was also a strong precedent, in the form of the 
NWT & YRS, for military involvement in the operation of basic northern 
services. 
In October 1945, "the Canadian Army was authorized to take over 
the maintenance responsibility of the Highway until such time as this 
responsibility might be assumed by a civilian department. 
" The official 
handover date was fixed for I April 1946. In the interval the Canadian 
Army began to come to terms with the burden it had so willingly taken on. 
In January and February, advance parties were dispatched to the North to 
familiarize themselves with the road and to study the American system of 
maintenance. In Ottawa, staff officers were deciding upon the size of 
the force that was required and the myriad of other technical problems 
that had to be solved prior to the actual change of control. By mid- 
February, the outlide plan for the take-over was complete. The Alaska 
Highway became known to the Canadian Army as the Northwest Highway System 
(NWHS). Arrangements were made to take over American equipment, accommo- 
dation facilities, and stores. Contracts were made with civilian agencies 
'DND Report, 1946,, p. 25. 
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to provide needed services. Land-leases were re-negotiated. It was 
estimated that the capital cost of just the take-over would be in excess 
of 5.7 million dollars. 
' The American experience had indicated that it 
would be wise to permit the troops to bring their families with them to 
the North, and plans were made to build married quarters in a new suburb 
2 
on the plateau above the townsite of Whitehorse. 
Meanwhile, in the North, the engineer advance party was surveying 
with some dismay the job they were faced with. The senior officer of the 
group, Lieutenant Colonel J. R. B. -jones wrote of his first impressions: 
We took over a strange unknown ribbon of road covered with snow. We 
knew the vehicles and equipment left to use were old and worn and 
needed immediate replacement (they aren't replaced yet). We had no 
no married quarters and I, like most of the army up there, had been 
home only a few months after 5 or 6 years separation. It looked 
grim. We read the records of how the rivers rose suddenly in the 
spring and took out dozens of bridges, we were told of flash floods 
that spring from mountain slopes to wash out miles of highway. It 
looked grimmer. We took another look at the old and decrepit road 
machinery, the tremendous task of sorting out warehouses full of 
unlisted tools and spare parts, and the way ouS proposed establish- 
ment had been pared down. It looked hopeless. 
At the time of take-over, the Alaska Highway was still a military 
road. Civilians wishing to use the route had to show evidence that their 
trip was really necessary and also meet certain rigid standards of vehicle 
serviceability prior to being given a travel permit. In early 1946, the 
only hotel north of Fort Nelson was at Whitehorse--six hundred miles 
distant. There was a similar lack of garages and filling stations. 
D Hist, M'. 352 009 (D88), Financial Policies NW Hiqhway Systems 
"Report to CGS by QMG" 13 February 1946; "Minute to Cabinet", 12 January 
1946. 
2 Lieutenant Colonel J. R. B. Jones, "The Alaska Highway", ms 
unpublished, February 1948. 
3 Brigadier J. R. B. Jones, "The Contribution; of the Armed Forces 
to the Economy of the Yukon" (Speech to Whitehorse Board of Trade), 12 
January 1960. 
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The engineers' task was in reality much more complex than just 
maintaining the 1221.4 miles of highway that lay in Canada. Over 200 
miles of access roads leading to the seven emergency landing strips spaced 
along the highway also had to be kept open, as did the airfields them- 
selves. There was also a- requirement to keep open during summer the 120 
miles of secondary road from Haines, Alaska to the point where it joined 
the Alaska Highway at mile 1016. The NWHS troops were also responsible 
for providing support to RCAF units operating the North West Staging 
Route. This included supplying rations, hauling ground freight, and 
maintaining vehicles. At Whitehorse, the army provided a wide range of 
services and utilities for the use of RCAF and other departments of 
federal government. 
1 
To do the job, the army-was allocated about 670 personnel 
vacancies, of which 450 were to be filled on a permanent basis by civilian 
employees. 
2 The NWHS Headquarters located at Whitehorse included an oper- 
ational wing which dealt with bridge and road design and an administrative 
wing which concerned itself with personnel and logistic services for the 
system as a whole. Under this headquarters came several units, the most 
important of which was the Highway Maintenance Establishment (HME).. HME, 
with tts. headquarters also in Whitehorse was, as the name indicates, 
primarily concerned with the actual maintenance of the road. The highway 
was- divtded into three sectors, and in each sector there were static 
inaintenance camps every sixty or seventy miles. The men working in these 
camps carried out road patrol, grading, and minor repairs. The sector 
superintendents and the staff of the maintenance camps were all civilian. 
Jones, "The Alaska Highwayll, 
2D Hist, 112.352.0oo CD881, "Letter, D. S. D. to D. Org", 17 
January 1946. 
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Major repairs and construction were initially the responsibility 
of the Road Maintenance Company, RCE. This military unit had a'reconnais- 
sance and survey section as well as a bridging platoon and a road con- 
struction platoon. All new construction as well as emergency work beyond 
the capability of HME fell to this unit. In addition to the operational 
units, NWHS included a full range of support service units such as ord- 
nance, service corps, electrical and mechanical engineers, medical and 
dental units, and engineer works. The organization, in fact, closely 
resembled that of an, independent brigade, with the combat arms being re- 
placed by the units and detachments of the Highway Maintenance Establish- 
ment. 
During the years that the army operated the NWHS there was an on- 
going program of improvement of the road and a similar upgrading of sup- 
port facilities and accommodation. There was a lot of work to do. The 
original survey in 1942 had been pushed through under the urgency of the 
moment. In many cases the road simply followed local trails which were 
admittedly not in the best location. The actual road turned over to 
Canada was, in fact, only an improved pioneer road, and was a far cry 
from the high quality road that the American civil authority had orig- 
inally planned. Many sections had been built over unstable ground and 
would eventually have to be relocated to avoid sagging, frost boils, 
slides and icing areas-. The majority of bridges were of temporary native 
timber and culverts were built of nativeunpeeled poles. All of the 
buildings were classified as "temporary construction" and were not suit- 
able for long term use. 
' 
It is important to note that the system imprcLvement was a gradual 
'Major A. B. Yates, "Maintaining the Alaska Highway",, The Royal 
Engineers Journalt 'Vol. 58, No. 11, March 1954. 
228 
process. There was never any question of deploying masses of workers or 
spending tens of millions of dollars in a crash program to revamp the 
system. One year some of the wooden trestle bridges might be replaced 
with concrete pilings: another 
0 
year might see a ten mile stretch of road 
relocated to a more suitable location. Gradually, corrugated steel cul- 
verts were installed all along the highway. While the existence of the 
highway fostered a modest amount of economic development and resource 
exploitation in northern British Columbia and the Yukon, there was no 
great boom of development as some optimists had forecast when the road 
was built. The two great northern barriers to development--distance and 
isolation--again combined to limit the profitability of most enterprises. 
It could be argued that the most important result of the mili- 
tary's running the NWHS was social. In southern Canada, military commu- 
nities are traditionally self-contained. It was realized that the situ- 
ation in the Yukon was considerably different from that in the South, 
and the military shared its resources with the civilian community to a 
high degree. Military camps in southern Canada usually have their own 
schools for dependent children but because the school situation in the 
town of Whitehorse was so poor, DND funds were diverted to help build a 
public elementary and high school and a separate (Roman Catholic) school. 
Children from the army and RCAF townsites were bussed daily into 
Whitehorse to the common schools. In addition, the Department of National 
Defence paid 250 dol lars a year for each "military" school child. In the 
same vein, rather than constructing a military hospital on the base, the 
available monies were used to help construct a new hospital in Whitehorse. 
DND shared in the operating costs of the hospital as,, well as providing 
key personnel in the operating rooms, laboratories, and X-ray departments. 
In the area of recreation, military personnel and their dependants were 
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encouraged to participate in and support such varied activities as sports 
teams, drama clubs, and Scouts. 
1 
At the small maintenance camps scattered along the highway, the 
social impact of the "military way of doing things" was even more sig- 
nificant. Each camp included a foreman, a mechanic, and from three to 
five heavy equipment operators. These, all civilians, usually with their 
families, lived in modern quarters provided by the army. Each mainten- 
ance camp eventually provided the core of a small, balanced community. 
Private enterprises in the form of gas stations, motels, and restaurants 
sprang up at maintenance camp sites. These sites were attractive lo- 
cations for an entrepreneur to locate himself and his family. The army 
had sited a recovery vehtcle and ambulance at each camp and these were 
available to the general public in time of emergency. The Department of 
National Defence built a small school at each camp site if one did not 
already exist. The territorial government provided the teacher and the 
facility was used by all the children in the community. Each maintenance 
camp was provided with a curling rink, a recreation hall, and a schedule 
of weekly movies. These facilities, so important to combatting the mon- 
otony of northern isolation, were open to anybody living in the community. 
2 
The most important issue relating to the highway during the years 
the military operated in the North was the question of paving. The matter 
arose as early as 1948 and has periodically emerged for debate ever since. 
In 1948, a Departmerk of Transport official observed that on a national 
scale the highway was only of "limited commercial usefulness". This 
factQrs coupled with the very high cost Of paving such a long road in 




isolated country indicated that paving was not practical at the time. 
The DOT spokesman further stated that it was "very improbable that the 
task would ever be undertaken except as a defence measure". The Depart- 
ment of National Defence maintained that paving was not necessary for 
defence purposes. 
' Canada, at the time, anticipated little security 
threat in the area and indeed, the combat capability of the troops of the 
NWHS was minimal. The army was simply running what was rapidly becoming 
a commercial highway for the training value it provided to the engineer 
troops involved. In point of fact, the unpaved state of the Alaska High- 
way was not a major factor in limiting its commercial usefulness. The 
problem lay in the very poor quality of the "feeder roads" of Northern 
Alberta and British Colombia that restricted access to the main highway. 
It was argued that if the provincial roads could be improved, the commer- 
cial use of the Alaska Highway would increase whether or not it was paved. 
2 
Periodically, the United States offered to share in the costs of 
paving. In July 1958, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Diefenbaker 
discussed the possibility of some sort of joint arrangement but no de- 
cision was reached. A bill was introduced in the United States Senate 
the following year which called for the United States to share costs of 
paving with Canada and to open negotiations to make the necessary arrange- 
ment. 
3 The extent of American economic involvement in Canadian develop- 
ment had already been criticized by numerous responsible Canadians. It 
would appear that any decision to permit the United States to pay for the 
Alaska Highway would have been (and probably still is) most impolitic. 
In any case, the matter never came to the point of formal negotiation. 
lEdmonton Bulletin, 23 August 1948. 
2jbid. 3ýWindsor Star, 24 February 1959. 
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In August, 1959, the Minister of National Defence stated in an interview 
that "Canada has received no firm proposal from the United States on 
sharing the costs of paving the Canadian section". 
' 
Over the years the NWHS came to take on a distinct raison dIttre 
of its own. It would appear that less and less attention was paid to the 
original reason for army involvement with the Highway. The Royal Canadian 
Engineers increasingly saw the job of maintaining the Highway in simple 
terms of a job that they had been given to do and which they took pride 
in doing well. One of the claims of HME was that the Alaska Highway was 
the firest road of its type in the world. The frequent articles that 
appeared in the Canadian Army Journal-by engineer officers on the subject 
of the NWHS reflected the job satisfaction that came with involvement 
with the route. In addition, Whitehorse, where the vast majority of mili- 
tary personnel of the NWHS were stationed, was an extremely popular post- 
ing for married soldiers and their families. With year round road, rail, 
and air communications, Whitehorse did not suffer from the isolation and 
monotony that characterize most other northern communities. The organ- 
ized recreational opportunities, schools, hospitals, and sh6pping facili- 
ties of the community were good by national standards, and the higher 
cost of living was offset by a special northern allowance. For those 
families that enjoyed hunting, fishing, camping, and hiking, the Yukon 
truly was the "sportsman's paradise" of the tourist brochures. 
The Department of National Defence, on the other hand, was some- 
what less, enthused about the NWHS. The main reason for this attitude 
was the tncreasingly high cost of maintaining the road and all its elab- 
orate supporting facilities. In 1946 it was thoughtjhat the military 
'Montreal Gazette, 19 August 1959. 
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presence would only be required for a few years, but year after year, the 
soldiers stayed. In 1954, the Minister, Brooke Claxton, announced in the 
House of Commons that the Department of National Defence and the Depart- 
ment of Public Works were discussing the advisability of the latter taking 
over the road. The Minister observed that the road was "more and more 
becoming essentially a civilian operation", and he admitted that it would 
be "more economical and practical for it to be taken over by the Depart- 
ment of Public Works". 
' In January the following year, when an opposition 
member inquired if any progress had been made on the transfer of the NWHS 
to some other department, the Prime Minister replied that "no such de- 
2 
cision has been taken" . 
If the Liberals were lukewarm to the continued involvement of the 
military with the Alaska Highway, the Progressive Conservatives were 
bitterly cold to the prospect. When the latter came to power in 1957, 
George Pearkes, the new Minister of National Defence, began to search for 
a means of shifting responsibility. He was not particularly successful. 
In 1959, he stated publicly that any other department could have it for 
the asking! He stated that DND was "anxious to be rid of the responsi- 
bility of maintaining the 1,200 mile Canadian section of the Alaska 
Highway". He reiterated the argument that the road, built as a defence 
measure during the Second World War, was not now significant from a de- 
fence standpoint. He went on to add that increased civilian use of the 
road had forced DND into spending large sums to maintain it. 
3 
Getting the Department of Public Works (DPW) to take over the 
1. Debates,, 21 June 1954, p. 6421. 
21bid, 14 January 1955, p. 330. 
3Montreal Gazette, 19 August 1959. 
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road, however, proved to be a major obstacle. Mr. Pearkes eventually 
changed his views, for the following year, the Commander of the NWHS 
reported that the "Minister was kind enough to say that we would probably 
continue in the job as no other department could do it as well". 
' It was 
evident, however, that the Army's responsibility for the Alaska Highway 
would end sooner or later. To defence planners, the continued mainten- 
ance of the Alaska Highway in the interests of national development was 
seen as being a costly anomaly in DND programs. In October 1963, the 
Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson decided to withdraw the military 
from the Alaska Highway. 
The Joint Canadian-United States Arctic 
Weather Station (JAWS) Program 
Immediately following the end of the Second World War, the United 
States began to consider the possibility of establishing a chain of 
weather stations in the High Arctic. Congressional approval for such a 
project was obtained in February 1946 and the United States government 
immediately approached Denmark and Canada to obtain their concurrence. 
The Danes quickly agreed to the establishment of a meteorological site 
at Thule, Greenland. Canada had a long hard look at the program prior to 
agreeing to support it in early 1947. In the interval, the United States 
had set about establishing the Thule base and the USAAF, with Canadian 
approval, had undertaken aerial reconnaissances in the high reaches of the 
Canadian Arctic in seiarch of likely sites, with RCAF aircraft participating 
in the search. 
2 
In the three following years, ships of the United States Navy, 
'Jones, "The Contribution of the Armed Forcesto the Economy of 
the Yukon". 
2D Hist, 75/50 , Royal Canadian Airforce Operations in the Arctic Islands, undated monograph, 1948?. 
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United States Coast Guard, and aircraft of the United States Air Force 
established weather stations manned by Canadian and American civilian 
meteorologists at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island, Mould Bay on Prince 
Patrick, Isaachsen on Ellef Rignes, and Eureka on Ellesmere. The Royal 
Canadian Air Force began "to participate in the program in 1950 when the 
last and most northerly station was established at Alert on the northern 
tip of Ellesmere Island. Operating out of the American base at Thule, 
USAAF and RCAF aircraft flew in all the necessary materials to put the 
Alert station in operation by early summer. In the early years of the 
JAWS stations operation, the military establishments of both countries 
shared the resupply duties, with the United States bearing the lion's share 
of the burden. Summer sea supply (for those stations that could be reached 
by ship) was the responsibility of a United States Navy task group, sup- 
ported by RCAF ice reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial annual resupply was 
shared by both air forces, as were regular flights for mail delivery, 
emergency medical evacuation, and delivery of perishable items. 
1 The RCAF 
established a small unit at Resolute Bay in 1949 to control air operations 
in the High Arctic, the airstrip there having been built in 1947 by per- 
sonnel of the JAWS station and later improved on by United States Army 
Engineers. 2 
The JAWS sites were not built exclusively for meteorological 
studies. They were also designed and sited to provide a base for magnetic 
and geophysical studies and other scientific research projects. The 
'Meteorological Division--Department of Transport--Canada; U. S. 
Weather Bureau--Department of Commerce--United States " Joint Canadian- United States Arctic Weather Station Programme: A Review of the Estab- 
lishment Operation of the Joint Arctic Weather StatioFs ... 1946- jq-: _5T7ii_. d. 1951? ). 
2 R. W. Rae, "Arctic Experiences of Life Begins at Forty Below" 
Journal of the Royal Meteorological-Society, Canadian Branch, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, February 1950,0. -1. 
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station airstrips and the associated, equipment also provided more air 
navigational aids and emergency landing fields in support of flying in 
the Far North. During the first five years of the JAWS operation, the 
Royal Canadian Air Force frequently provided transportation for visiting 
scientists using the JAWS-sites as base camps. From 1949 to 1951 the 
National Museum of Canada workd'd out of Resolute, Mould Bay, and Alert 
doing archeological studies and zoological collection. The RCAF ferried 
the researchers to and from the si-tes for the entire program. Similar 
support was provided to the Department of Agriculture for its "Northern 
Insect Survey" of 1949 and 1951, a task shared with the USAF. The USAF 
alone provided transportation for a geographical study at Eureka in 1951. 
This general pattern of the RCAF providing transportation to 
remote northern centers for__researchers from other departments of govern- 
inent and even universities continued throughout the 1950s. By the 1960s 
howevers commercial aviation companies operating on a scheduled and 
charter basis had established themselves in the High North. It has 
always been politically unacceptable in Canada to permit the Department 
of National Defence to engage in national development work when civil 
departments or private enterprises were in a position to fill the need. 
The RCAF withdrew from the private transportation business in the Arctic. 
By the 1970s, ice reconnaissance flights, mapping operations, regular 
service to the DEW Line sites and the by then "Canadianized" Arctic 
weather stations werb all in the hands of commercial aviation companies. 
Mapping the North 
In 19191, a Canadian government committee reported that to map the 
whole country would cost 180 thousand million dollars and take 3,600 
years. The actual Job was completed in the year of Canada's centennial 
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at considerably less cost. 
I Aviation applied to mapping made the differ- 
ence. A program to provide aeronautical charts on a scale of eight miles 
to the inch, and sixteen miles to the inch (1: 1,000,000) was initiated 
in 1944 and continued into the 1950s. This project was further modified 
in 1947 when the Cabinet Defence Committee assigned the Department of 
National Defence and the Department of Mines and Resources the-project 
of mapping all of Canada on a four mile to the inch (1: 250,000) scale. 
Again war inspired technology was to play an important part in the peace- 
time development of the Canadian North. In addition to long range air- 
craft, wartime needs had nurtured the development of wide angle aerial 
photography, stereo modelling, and Shoran, a navigational aid for bombing 
that turned out to be an ideal means of fixing control points for mapping. 
The mapping of all of Canada and particularly the North became a major 
peacetime project for the Army and Air Force. The RCAF took about 75 per 
cent of all the aerial photographs required and provided air support to 
the Army Survey Establishment which surveyed the entire Western Arctic, 
in the process of turning out one third of the required map S. 
2 
The two traditional northern constraints, distance and climate 
played their usual part in creating difficulties for the map makers. Only 
Whitehorse, Norman Wells, Yellowknife, Churchill and Frobisher Bay had 
landing strips that could accommodate the four-engined Lancaster aircraft 
of 408 (P) Squadron. Fuel for aircraft operating at the rate the squadron 
did during operations could only be prepositioned economically if it were 
brought in by surface delivery. This necessitated planning months or 
years in advance. An emergency situation such as the search for a lost 
R. C. McNeill, "Putting Canada on the Map'l, Sentinel, Vol. 6. 
No. 3, March 1970, p. 16. 
2B. W. Waugh, "Arctic Mapping", in lbid, p. 44. 
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commercial pilot out of Whitehorse in 1951 used up 75,000 gallons of 
gasoline and disrupted the year Is program-1 
Photo mapping operations could only be started when the snow 
cover had receded enough to permit the aircrews to identify geographical 
features. It was discovered that late May and June were the best times 
for operation--the period between the departure of the snow and the 
departure of the ice. With open water came clouds--cumulus over the main- 
land and stratus amongst the islarýds of the archipelago. The northern 
weather stations proved to be an invaluable aid in locating areas that 
were free of cloud, but it was not uncommon for an aircraft to range as 
far as seven hundred miles from its base to find an area suitable for 
photographic work. Once the aircraft arrived in the area, however, it 
was faced with the usual problem of locating itself exactly, a task made 
doubly difficult by the myriads of lakes and rivers in the North, the 
lack of distinct land marks and inaccuracies in the preliminary survey 
charts. Year after year the mapping process continued. In addition to 
air photographs, it was necessary to install, maintain and extract work 
parties at each of the many Shoran sites that were required for control 
purposes. The usual procedure was for an amphibious aircraft to fly the 
party into the nearest suitable body of water from whence they would man- 
pack their equipment onto the selected height of land where "they re- 
mained like bearded eagles for the summer". 
2 
By the end df 1967 the task was completed. The entire project 
included a total of 925 map sheets. About one third of the country was 
also covered in the 1: 50,000 scale, the standard scale Of military 
1 R. I. Thomas, "Arctic Air Photography: RCAF Photo Equipment and 
Techniques". The Canadian Surveyors Vol. 11, No. 4, April 1953, p. 19. 
McNeill, p. 19. 
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tactical maps. At this point the responsibility to meet national map 
requirements was removed from the Department of National Defence and 
given exclusively to the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. 
Civilian aviation companies on contract now provide aerial photograph 
for mapping purposes. The Canadian Armed Forces retained a Mapping and 
Charting Establishment, but their responsibilities were limited to pro- 
viding maps for specific military requirements. 
The mapping of the North carried out by the Royal Canadian Air 
Force and the Royal Canadian Engineers between 1947 and 1967 provides a 
classic example of the military establishment in peacetime undertaking 
projects of national development that required skills relative to mili- 
tary operations. When the state of the art developed to the point where 
a civil branch of government could take over, and when future operations 
could be carried on as profitable, but still reasonably economic ven- 
turesý, the military gave up the role and moved on to other fields. It is 
almost axiomatic that if a nation wishes to claim a land, protect it, 
develQp it, and conserve it, just where those lands are and what they 
consist-of must be known. One of the first steps in such a process is 
accurate mapping. The Canadian military establishment left their southern 
bases annually, came into the North, did the job and departed. That it 
took the better part of a century to even get around the task and twenty 
years to finish it emphasizes only further the vastness and remoteness 
of the Canadian Norih. There are undoubtedly still thousands of lakes, 
hills, and streams that show on the maps of the North that have never been 
physically visited by a human being. We only know that they are there 
because a few years ago, an RCAF aircraft flew over them and took a 
photograph which later became the basis of a map. 
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Military Aviation in the North 
For the air force, the post-war North did not represent a poten- 
tial aerial battleground. The Canadian decision not to develop nuclear 
weapons immediately eliminated the RCAF from the arena of strategic bombing. 
Those aviation writers who, in_the mid 1940s, envisioned chains of inter- 
ceptor bases strung across the high latitudes proved to be very wide of 
the mark as to what was necessary_pr what was even feasible. At the height 
of the Cold War and the threat of the manned bomber, the North provided 
useful tactical depth for the purposes of early warning and delineation 
of lines of attack. Since there were no strategic targets in the North 
that required point or area defence as provided by fighter aircraft, 
Canada was content to deploy her air defence forces south of the 55th 
Parallel of Latitude. (The United States, on the other hand, stationed 
s-ubstantial interceptor units in Alaska and at Thule, Greenland). 
The Royal Canadian Air Force's "polar passion" manifested itself 
i, n a wide range of air support operations. In doing SO. the RCAF, and 
later the various air elements of the unified Canadian Forces, played an 
important role in northern development. Flying activities were under- 
taken in support of other elements of the armed forces, for defence re- 
search projects and for other branches of government. Upon occasion, 
non-governmental activities were supported with military air resources 
when it was not possible to obtain comercial services. Of the three 
servi-ces, the air force during the post-war period developed the closest 
ties with the counterpart American service. Numerous missions were 
undertaken in support of USAF projects, or were attempted on a joint 
basis, In recent yearst for nationalistic reasons, -Canada has been more 
tnclined to avoid these co-operative ventures than in the immediate post- 
war years. The main pattern that characterizes the extensive air force 
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involvement in the North is that aircraft operate in northern regions 
for periods up to several months, but these detachments have all been 
temporary. Support personnel and equipment on the other hand, were 
stationed permanently in the North to facilitate ongoing operations. 
In 1946 the specific future requirements for RCAF activity in the 
Arctic were unclear. As a result, the air force undertook a program to 
learn as much about the area as possible. Canada was not the only nation 
showing an intense interest in polar regions and the potentials of trans- 
polar aviation. In addition to using-RýAF aircraft, Canadian Air Force 
officers flew as crew members and observers on several British and 
American exploratory flights. The general theme of most of the military 
aviation in the Arctic during this year was the establishment of the 
basis for future operations, whatever that might encompass. 
The USAF was particularly concerned with the problems associated 
wi, th aerial navigation in high latitudes and, with Canadian co-operation, 
conducted a series, of long range flights throughout the Arctic in late 
winter and spring. Three B-29 bombers were modified for long range oper- 
ations: all armaments were removed and auxiljary fuel tanks were fitted 
into the bomb bays. The majority of the flights were connected with 
experimental work relating to long range aid to navigation (LORAN) which 
had been installed in Canada to support Exercise Musk-Ox. Flying out of 
Edmonton and Fairbanks, the aircraft, some with RCAF crew members, made 
dozens of sorties over the Arctic Archipelago, and ventured as far north 
as-the pole itself. In addition to the data gathered in support of the 
LORAN program, "the navigators of the detachment began accumulating data 
that would assist future flying operations". 
' 
lK. R. Greenaway and S. E. Colthorpe, An Aerial Reconnaissance 
of Arctic North Americae (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1948), p. XI. 
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It would appear that An Aerial Reconnaissance of Arctic North 
America, the aviators' handbook which was eventually produced from the 
detachment's efforts, was a self-generated project. The aircrews had 
quickly realized that the problems of polar flying were much greater than 
had originally been antic7ipated. Inaccurate mapping, unreliable magnetic 
compasses, and fragmentary weather forecasts all combined to produce a 
navigator's nightmare in a hostile land. The Arctic Pilot, produced by 
the Admiraltyhad been drawn up to aid surface navigators in the North; 
Greenaway and Colthorpe set out to produce the aviator's equivalent. 
These American and British air expeditions are interesting because they 
showed the feasibility of long range aviation around the pole. 
' It must 
be remembered, however, that both types of aircraft were extensively 
modified, having ranges in excess-of 5,000 miles and the ability to stay 
aloft more than twenty hours. 
Trans-polar operations were one thing; flights within the Arctic 
Archipelago were another. In 1946, the RCAF undertook an adventurous 
flight program within the Western Arctic. Operation Investigator sent 
a Canso Amphibian and two single-engined Norsemen on floats, and a total 
crew of eleven men into the Arctic to locate, examine, and report on 
suitable air bases for float and ski based aircraft. Investigator marks 
the first occasion that the RCAF made a conscious effort to obtain some 
flying experience and an understanding of flying conditions in the area 
of Banks and Victoria Islands and the Boothia Peninsula. During the high 
summer months of July and August the three aircraft ranged far and wide 
over the western Arctic. They saw herds of caribou that they estimated 
to number in the millions, overflew and marvelled at--pingos in the 
1R. H. Winfield, "The Royal Air Force North Polar Research Flights, 
194511, Polar Record, Vol. 5, No. 33/34,1947, p. 12. 
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Mackenzie Delta, met Eskimos who had travelled with Stef4nssom, located 
mysterious and abandoned settlements and boats. 
I Reading their report, 
one gets the impression that they had a marvelous time. 
In 1947, the RCAF began a program in co-operation with the 
Department of Mines and Resources to carry out a magnetic survey of the 
North in an attempt to locate precisely the magnetic pole. 
2 The operation 
was a definite success. Both the_pilot and the navigator of the Canso 
flying boat were decorated for the skills they displayed in flying about 
the pole. The program continued with RCAF support in subsequent years. 
Aerial navigation in the Arctic was a precarious activity at the 
best of times. The hostile environment coupled with direction keeping 
problems associated with the proximity of the magnetic pole and the 
paucity of support facilities made northern flying a demanding profession. 
The scarcity of navigational aids was another negative factor. Thus, 
operation Beetle, a joint Canadian-American plan to install a Loran (Lo, 
Range Aid to Navigation) low frequency beacon system in the Arctic was 
received with enthusiasm by the RCAF when it appeared in 1946. 
Operation Beetle3 is of interest to this study for several reasons. 
In many ways it was typical of the joint Canadian-American projects being 
undertaken by the military in the North at the time. Secondly, it 
1D Hist, 75/35, A. H. Warren, "Operation Investigator". 
2 RCAF, Directorate of Public Relations, Release No. 7218, (held 
in DInfo Morgue). 
3 Documents bn Operation Beetle are fragmentary. In the main they 
consist of a jigsaw puzzle-like collection of messages, operation orders, 
administrative instructions and memoranda, collected in two file folders 
held jn D Hist, North West Air Command - Operation "Beetltý,, 181-009 
CP6561 and D6556). A, minor supplementary source exists in the form of the 
operations Record Book of the three stations: 214 RCAF (LF) Loran 
CMonitoring) Unit Saw-mill Bay, NWT, 5 RCAF (LF) Loran (Slave) Unit, 
Cambrtdge Bay, NWT and 4 RCAF (LF) Loran (Master) Unit, Kittigazuit, NWT- 
All subsequent references to Operation Beetle are from one or more of the 
above mentioned sources. 
243 
underlined the complexity of northern operations. Despite the experience 
of the Northwest and Northeast staging routes, the problems encountered, 
particularly in the construction phase, underlined that lessons of the 
past were not widely known, and that the full magnitude of the northern 
problem was not well understood. Thirdly, there were many delays in the 
construction phase attributable not only to lack of basic data about the 
area of operations, but also to the absence of detailed planning and co- 
ordination between all agencies involved. A fourth aspect deserves some 
attention. The available RCAF documents do not reveal any consideration 
being made of the utility of the system for the purpose of domestic 
civilian flying. On the other hand, the potential to civilian aviation 
having the proper equipment to utilize the facility is obvious. In a 
wider sense, the role that the stations come to play in the northern 
infrastructure was significant. 
The project required a total of four stations--one on the Alaskan 
coast and three in Canada. The first problem was to select the sites for 
the installation for the technical requirements of the Loran equipment had 
to be weighed against terrain and accessibility. The reconnaissance flight 
took over two weeks, held up by the seemingly inevitable weather delays 
and aircraft unserviceability. Eventually, Cambridge Bay on the south 
coast of Victoria Island was selected as the site of the master unit. A 
secondary, or slave unit, was to be built at Kittigazuit in the Mackenzie 
Delta. No suitable site on arctic coast could be found for the moni- 
toring station which would keep the signals from the other stations in 
phase, so the reconnaissance party selected Sawmill Bay on the southeast 
corner of Great Beer Lake for the third site. 
The construction of the stations in the Mackenzie presented no 
particular problem since the sites were on relatively well established 
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northern inland water routes. Cambridge Bay, however, was well beyond 
the northern frontier and the tremendous problems that were encountered 
in its construction, despite the military's surprise at the difficulty, 
were typical. The first step was to transport the ls500 tons of equip- 
ment to the site. All of-the stores had to be moved by air for it was 
discovered that no commercial carrier was willing, or able, to undertake 
a sea transport contract during the brief summer shipping season. 
Cambridge Bay, however, had no airfield. Before the construc- 
tion could begin; before movement of material could begin, a light ski- 
equipped aircraft had to fly in and a ground party had to mark out suit- 
able ice landing strip for a C47 Dakota to-land. The Dakota flew in a 
small bulldozer to improve the ice strip to make it capable of accepting 
the heavy C54 aircraft of the USAAF assigned to move the equipment. Storms 
and a breakdown of the bulldozer lengthened this relatively minor task, 
which took most of April to complete. 
The assembly of material had to be completed before break-up in 
mid-June rendered the airstrip unusable. The isolation of the site and 
the inexperience of the construction crew in working in the arctic environ- 
ment combined to stretch out the construction phase to almost the last 
minute. Several cases of snow blindness occurred. The troops did not 
know how to live comfortably in tents, so the main air flow had to be 
halted while pre-fabricated barracks were flown in. When the RCAF flew in 
two heavier bulldozer to assist in airfield maintenance, the equipment re- 
mained idle until a specialist able to assemble it was located in southern 
Canada and flown into the Arctic to do the job. It was not until October 
1946 that the Beetle Loran system became operational, 
The command and control arrangements in this international military 
venture are of interest. The functional and administrative commander of 
245 
the system was the Canadian Air Officer Commanding, North West Air 
Command with headquarters at Edmonton, Alberta. On the sites, the situ- 
ation was somewhat more complex. Command of the station was vested in an 
RCAF officer, but the technical control, was held by the Senior United 
States Technical Officer. United States military and civilian personnel 
at the units were required to "conform to rules, regulations and instruc- 
tions as issued by the commanding officer, but came under their appro- 
priate service or civilian authority for purposes of discipline". 
Such a dual system could not have worked had there not been a real 
spirit of co-operation between Canadian and American forces. What diffi- 
culties there were tended to -be minor and easily smoothed over. Canadian 
commanders complained that the USAF specialist tradesmen were initially 
extremely reluctant to undertake routine housekeeping chores about the 
station. In the absence of general duties personnel to fuel stoves, chop 
ice, and carry. out garbage, it was inevitable that all personnel would 
have to participate. It was reported that the USAF tradesmen quickly saw 
the logic of the housekeeping needs. 
The on-site situation catered to Canadian sensibilities on the 
issue of sovereignty. In this joint undertaking, bases located in Canada 
were to be commanded by Canadians. The Canadian command element was more 
symbolic than a military necessity. During the two years that the system 
was jointly operated? Canadian station commanders often complained of a 
tendency on the part of visiting American senior officers to ignore the 
Canadian station commander and to go directly to the American technical 
chief. This phenomenon may be partially attributable to the fact that 
visiting officers were usually on a technical inspection and hence their 
interest would primarily lie with the Loran operation itself. On the 
other hand, the blithe assumption by individual American servicemen in 
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the late 1940s and 1950s that the Canadian Arctic was really the American 
Arctic was a common occurrence in the North. 
The Beetle system was not destined to have a long life. Canada, 
as planned, took over full operation of the system in October 1948. Two 
months later the usefulness of the entire network was seriously questioned. 
An extensive test program that continued until the spring of 1949 revealed 
that due to errors in the siting of stations and the low power of the 
equipment, "the operational usefulness of Beetle was deemed as nil". Most 
of the staff and technical equipment was removed immediately. A few people 
were left at each station as "housekeepers" awaiting a final decision on 
the future of the stations. On February 1950, the decision was made to 
close out all the stations completely. Kittigazuit and Saw Mill Bay were 
abandoned outright, the local RCMP agreeing to drop in occasionally to 
check on the security of the remaining buildings and stores. The Cambridge 
Bay facility was turned over to the Department of Transport for use as a 
weather station. 
It remains to examine the role played by these stations during the 
brief three years of operations. Although nothing was made of it at the 
time, an examination of unit historical reports and war diaries reveals 
that the station did much more than simply send out or monitor a Loran 
signal. The facilities available at the station were used by other el- 
ements of the armed forces for staging purposesq by other departments of 
the federal government, by private companies and individuals and to a 
certain degree, by local natives. The very fact of the existence of a 
support facility often made other unrelated development-oriented activi- 
ties possible. The Cambridge Bay site was co-locatýO-with an RCMP de- 
tachment and a Hudson's Bay Company store served the needs of the semi 
nomadic natives of the Queen Maud Gulf. While Kittigazuit was isolated, 
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it was only a relatively short distance from the Beaufort Sea Eskimo 
community of Tuktoyaktuk. Sawmill Bay existed in solitary splendor. 
Native Training Programs 
The subject of northern education is vast, complex and conten- 
tious. By the late 1950s, the_government had replaced the church as the 
agency with prime responsibility for northern education, and the Edu- 
cation Division of the Department-of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop- 
ment (DIAND) developed a comprehensive program of elementary, secondary 
and vocational training. In some instances, however, there was a require- 
ment for special training that was not available through the regular 
school system. In many such cases, DIAND turned to the Department of 
National Defence for assistance. 
When a government program of building community airstrips and 
roads was begun in the Eastern Arctic, the Royal Canadian School of Mili- 
tary Engineering was contracted to run a special heavy equipment oper- 
ators course for thirty Eskimos who later returned to their own communi- 
ties for wage employment. When diesel electric generators began to be 
installed in northern communities, DIAND reasoned that the operation, 
servicing, and maintenance of these plants could well be turned over to 
local residents, rather than having to import a technician from the South. 
Accordingly, the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineer School 
undertook to provide.; the necessary training. Over a period of three 
years, ninety Eskimos attended the special four-month long courses the 
Army ran. The growing bureaucracy of the North created a demand for qual- 
ified clerical workers. The Army again responded and ran a three month 
course at the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps Scho6l for ten Eskimo men. 
All candidates, it was reported, found employment in offices when they 
returned to the North. 
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The Army was not the only service involved with training native 
northerners in modern skills. The Royal Canadian Navy ran a series of 
special courses on both coasts in response to DIAND requests. A half 
dozen Eskimos were trained as marine engineers at HMC Dockyard at Halifax 
in preparation for employment on ships of the Canadian Coastguard. On the 
west coast, fourteen Eskimos ýn the process of purchasing modern fishing 
boats were given training in the maintenance and repair of their vessels. 
A further two dozen received a codrse in boat building and repair from 
the RCN prior to establishing their own boat building business at Inuvik. 
1 
There are indications that running these courses were not par- 
ticularly simple tasks for the military. The standard military course 
had to be modified to meet the specific needs and background of the 
Eskimo candidates. Demonstrations of techniques had to be letter perfect 
or else, it was discovered, the students tended to copy errors of pro- 
cedure. Instructors at the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering School 
teaching generator maintenance were somewhat dismayed when they dis- 
covered the Eskimo cultural characteristic of youth yielding to the 
authority of age. On the first course that the School ran, it was dis- 
covered that only a few of the candidates had what the military would term 
the acceptable minimum technical background for the course they were to 
follow. Two of the students were illiterate and most of the others had 
only previously worked-as manual labourers. 
2 Still, the military and 
their students persi"Sted and the DND training program, on the whole, was 
a success. DIAND only used the military facilities for a relatively short 
lEleanor A. Ellis, "Education of the Eskimo for Wage Employment", 
Canadian Geographical Journal, Vol. 73, No. 5, November 1966, pp. 152- 
2R. H. Lee, "Army Trains Eskimos", Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, Fall 1960. pp. 218-132. 
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period. By the late 1960s trades training schools had been fully devel- 
oped in and for the North and there was no longer any need to call on the 
military. The Eskimo training program represents another example of the 
military contributing to the national development of the region beyond 
the frontier. In the early days the military did the work. When adequate 
civil facilities were developed at a later date, the Department of National 
Defence withdrew from the project. 
_ 
Northern "Garrison Towns" 
The general withdrawal of the military from the North in the early 
1960s had an inevitable impact upon those communities where sizable mili- 
tary bases had been established to support various northern programs. The 
two main "garrison towns" of the North--Whitehorse and Churchill--were 
the hardest hit in the withdrawal process although a host of smaller RCAF 
stations ceased operation in the same time frame. Frobisher Bay was 
operated by the RCAF between 1950 and 1956 when it was turned over to the 
Department of Transport. During the 1959-1963 period of Strategic Air 
Command operations there was a small RCAF detachment at the settlement, 
but this too closed when the Americans left. Resolute Bay was manned by 
an RCAF detachment starting in 1951, providing flying support for RCAF 
for northern operations. It too was turned over to DOT in 1964. Churchill 
was probably the hardest hit by the military re-posturing of the 1960s. 
In 1946, a Combined Experimental and Training Station had been established 
by the Department Of National Defence near the site of the World War II 
Crimson airbase. All three Canadian services, the Defence Research Board, 
and the United States Army eventually established detachments at Churchill 
to support arctic training, equipment trials, and, -reuarch. The military 
population in the area further increased during the 1961-63 period when 
the Strategic Air Command tankers operated from the base. Fort Churchill 
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as the military base was designated to distinguish it from the townsite 
some four miles distant, had been selected as Canada's main northern base 
in 1946 for a number of reasons. The most important of these recognized 
the vital necessity of accessibility in the North. Churchill offered 
year round rail access, an airstrip, and a deep water port during the 
summer shipping season. In addition, from a military training point of 
view, it offered both bushland and barren ground terrain in which to 
train. 
The Canadian Army ran the base and provided support for the other 
military branches located there. Operationally, Churchill was the north- 
ern center of army sponsored environmental studiess operational research 
development, and combat and survival training. The RCAF ran the airfield 
facility with the exception of the meteorological facilities and the 
radio range which were handled by DOT. Air force northern experimental 
projects and operational training were carried out from the base which 
also had an air search and rescue role. The Royal Canadian Navy's activi- 
ties were limited to a radio facility which did communications research. 
' 
The Defence Research Board (DRB) ran a Northern Laboratory within the base 
complex and undertook numerous small projects, all contributing to the 
major role of the laboratory: "To solve ... problems which are encoun- 
tered by the forces whilst fighting and surviving in the north". DRB was 
concerned with the effects of the arctic environment on the performance 
2 
of personnel and materials in the field. The small United States Army 
detachment carried out engineering tests of all types of material and 
equipment under arctic conditions. The section functioned as a lodger 
I DNID (Army) Department of Public Relations, "Fort Churchill Round 
Up", February 1956. (Held in DInfo morgue). 
2A. M. Pennie, "Defence Research Northern Laboratory", Canadian 
Army Journal, Vol. 10. No. 1, January 1956, pp. 47-48. 
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unit at Fort Churchill. and drew support services from the Canadian Army 
on a cost recoverable basis. 
This wide range of activities led to the build up of a garrison 
at Fort Churchill of over 600 military personnel, many of whom were 
married and had their families with them. Over one hundred Americans of 
the SAC squadron added their numbers to the group during 1959-1963. The 
total population of the military base was approximately 3,000, including 
dependants and 450 civilian employees. It was reported that the base was 
a close knit community and was virtually self contained, having its own 
churches, schools, social groups, athletic facilities, banks, and all the 
commercial shops one might expect to find in a community of that size. 
1 
No studies have been undertaken to determine the economic, Cultural, and 
social impact of the Fort Churchill facility upon the civilian community. 
It would appear that to a large extent, contacts between the two communi- 
ties were limited, although there undoubtedly would have been a certain 
economic multiplier effect falling to the townsite from the military's 
presence. 
In 1964, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force ceased 
to operate the Fort Churchill facility. Housekeeping responsibilities for 
the base itself were transferred to the Department of Public Works, while 
the Department of Transport took over the entire airfield works. This 
change of responsibi)ities did not gO unnoticed in the House of Commons. 
In October of the previous year when rumours began to circulate that the 
base might be closed, Robert Simpson, the MP for Churchill, had asked 
the Minister for information, his primary concern being for the jobs of 
2 the civilian_employees. In December, the Minister. officially announced 
'Regina Leader Post. 11 February 1957. 
2Debates, 14 October 1963, p. 3526. 
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the closing, a decision that drew sharp criticism from the Conservative 
opposition. Simpson continued to focus on the importance of the garrison 
to the total life of the community, stating that Manitoba had been shocked 
by the decision and asked for a reconsideration on the grounds that suf- 
ficient allowance had not been made for the economic, cultural, social, 
and medical impact of the closing on the local community. Douglas 
Harkness, a former defence minister, dealt more with the purely military 
aspects of the change, claiming that the move might well herald the end of 
cold weather training and research. Lucien Cardin, the Associate Minister, 
countered by saying that only the administrative garrison was being with- 
drawn and that both the army and the air force would continue to use 
Churchill as an advanced staging base for operations and exercises in 
defence of the Eastern Arctic, drawing the necessary support from the 
departments that were taking over the base. 
' 
At almost the same time as it was announced that the Churchill 
base would be closed, the decision was finally made to transfer responsi- 
bility for the Alaska Highway to the Department of Public Works. Eric 
Nielson, the Member for Yukon, reacted in much the same manner as his 
Churchill colleague. He expressed concern over the effect of the with- 
drawal on the civilian employees. On the whole, however, there was little 
Conservative opposition to the move; indeed they had considered it them- 
selves when they were in office. Harkness heralded the army's withdrawal 
as being "long overdue". Nielson, while not arguing against the logic of 
the transfer of responsibilities, expressed regret at the impending loss 
of the milttary community because of its traditional social, economic, 
2 
and personal contribution to the Yukon. Not everybOy was sorry to see 
I Ibid, Pp. 5456,5483,5526,5577,5578. 
2 Ibid, 5-6 December 1963, pp. 5483,5551. 
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the army go. To many northwestern businessmen, the paving of the highway 
had been a long-standing development objective. It was generally accepted 
that as long as the Department of National Defence continued to run the 
system, that this would not be done. The mayor of Dawson Creek claimed 
that the transfer was "an important step towards paving the routell. 
1 
The withdrawal of several hundred troops and their families from 
Whitehorse did not have the same effect on the community as did the de- 
parture of a similar sized group from Churchill. The maintenance of the 
Alaska Highway was an ongoing commitment of the Canadian government, no 
matter which department actually administered the facility. The civilian 
maintenance workers' jobs remained secure, and many new administrative 
appointments, formerly held by soldiers, were thrown open to civilians. 
In addition to the phased withdrawal of the garrison, the economic boom 
of mineral development that the Yukon was enjoying in the mid 1960s did 
much to soften the economic blow to Whitehorse. 
After 1964, with the exception of the small detachments at each 
of the four DEW Line main sites, the only continuing military presence in 
the North was in the form of five supplementary radio stations at 
Churchill, Whitehorse, Frobisher, Inuvik and Alert. These stations had 
been established in the 1950s for the stated purpose of carrying out 
communications research in the North. 
2 During 1967-68 it was decided to 
close out the first three of these stations. Unlike the transfer of 
I, Edmonton Journal, 26 October 1963. The transfer of responsi- 
bility for the road, in e final analysis. had little impact on the 
basic economic factors relating to highway paving. In 1980, the route 
ts still unpaved. 
2 The Department of National Defence has never- released any details 
on the exact nature of the work alone by the Supplementary Radio System 
b-eyond stating that some of the equipment used is "classified". I have 
arbitrarily excluded the Supplementary Radio System in the North from 
this- study. 
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responsibility for the NWHS or the NWT and YRS to another branch of 
government, the closing of these stations marked the end of a program 
and the absolute loss of population to the communities affected. 
The closing out of the Churchill radio station saw a hundred 
servicemen and their fanilies, a total of 250 people, leave for the 
South. In the process Churchil"I lost its only dentist in the person of 
the base dental officer. 
' In 1967-68, the RCAF followed the army in its 
exodus from Whitehorse. The WhitJhorse airfield had been run by the 
Department of Transport since 1964; those RCAF members who had remained 
in Whitehorse had been employed at a communications research facility 
similar to the RCN's establishment at Churchill. The station accounted 
for a total of about a thousand people. There were 225 service personnel 
who, with their families numbered about 800. In addition the station had 
permanently employed approximately seventy civilians, most of whom were 
married. To the community of Whitehorse, the closing of the station was 
a serious blow. The Yukon Research and Development Institute commented 
that: 
the air force departure will be felt in sports activities, social 
events, and will limýt the number of woman workers and part time 
help available here. 
This statement underlines effectively the impact of the loss of 
a major industry in any small town. The pure financial loss of jobs and 
local purchases represents only the tip of the iceberg. The economic 
multiplier effect ofa reduced population, the loss of military dependants 
from the work force, the weakening of local cultural, social and rec- 
reational organizations all combined to create a severe stress on the 
'Winnipeg Free Press, 13 September 1966. 
2Whitehorse Star, 29 August 1966. 
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community. In the isolation of the North, this effect may be even more 
acute than it is in the more developed regions of the country. Certainly 
the subject merits further study. 
CHAPTER IX 
RESURGENCE 
The Military in the Contemporary North 
The surge of enthusiasm and interest that characterized military 
involvement in the Canadian North after the end of the Second World War 
did not last. Starting in the late 1950s and extending well into the 
mid 1960s, developing technology and changing national priorities combined 
to reduce military activity in the region. The process of withdrawal 
began under the Conservative administration of John Diefenbaker, the 
leader with the "Northern Vision": 
A Canada of the North. This is the Vision. Canadians realize your 
opportunities! This is the message I give you, my fellow Canadians. 
Not one of defeatism. Jobs. Jobs for hundreds of thousands o 
Canadians. A new Vision! A new hope! A new soul for Canada! 
T 
Diefenbaker's visi0h . remained 
just that. The few "roads to resources" 
that were started were either never finished or took decades to complete. 
The North did not come alive with domed cities, nuclear power generators, 
and hundreds of thousands of Canadians working in resource industries. 
In his vision of a developed North, Diefenbaker saw no place for the mili- 
tary, either as a protector or as a builder. Defence policy during the 
1956-1963 time frame that has come to be known in Canada as the Diefenbaker 
Years, was dominated by the three "Ns" of NORAD, NATO and nuclear weapons. 
Lester Pearson's Liberal administration during the following five 
lCited in Gerald Clark, Canada The Uneasy Neighbour (Toronto: 
U of T Press, 1965), P. 337. 
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years completed the process of withdrawal. The 1964 White_Paper on 
Defence that charted Canadian defence policy for the Pearson years em- 
phasized internal change within the military establishment. This lead 
first to integration and later to unification of the armed forces, ab- 
sorbing much of the time and energy of Canada's military leaders. 
By 1965, military actiVity and presence in the North had sunk to 
a post-war low. No naval ships plied the northern waters. The air force 
had given up its periodic reconnaissance and surveillance flights over the 
Arctic Archipelago and Basin the previous year. No northern exercises were 
undertaken by land combat units. No long, or even short term, national 
development projects occupied military signallers or engineers. The aerial 
tanker squadrons of the United States Strategic Air Command were gone. 
The only military personnel to be found in the North were the handful of 
airmen at the four DEW Line main sites keeping the long polar watch, and 
the communications research specialists manning the supplementary radio 
stations at Inuvik and Alert. The occasional RCAF cargo aircraft made a 
resupply trip to the Arctic Weather Stations or the radio sites. Beyond 
that, the military was gone, and so it remained for four years. 
The withdrawal of the military from the North was largely unre- 
marked by the Canadian public. What comment there was tended to focus on 
the national development role formerly filled by troops. In the House of 
Commons in 1964, an opposition member, Mr Haber Smith, argued against the 
government's decision to withdraw military forces from Whitehorse and 
Churchill. Since the services provided by the military would have to be 
taken over by some civil department of government, Smith felt that any 
saving in the defence budget would be chimerical. 
' Another opposition 
1. Debates, 12 May 1965, p. 3171. 
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member, Mr Ormiston, argued to much the same effect three years later 
claiming that there was a lot to be gained in terms of defence capability 
by having the Department of National Defence run certain public facilities 
in the North. ' In point of fact, total national interest in the North 
waned during this period. - It was one thing to make brave statements about 
"last frontiers" and "Canada's northern destiny"; it was another actually 
to confront the associate hard economic realities. There was no major 
economic development to speak of; shipping remained local and limited. 
The 1968 federal election-re-turned the Liberals, now led by Pierre 
Eliot Trudeau, to power with a substantial majority. The Canada which 
Trudeau was to lead was a nation with a buoyant economy and an enthusiastic 
sense of nationalism flowing from the centennial celebrations of the pre- 
vious year. Trudeau himself had a strong sense of national priorities and 
led a generally supportative country into new areas of concern and in new 
directions. Nowhere was this more true than in the Canadian North. 
Unlike Lester Pearson, his predecessor, Trudeau was keenly 
interested in northern development. Canada's North: 1970-1980, produced 
by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) was 
issued as the cornerstone of the government's integrated northern policy. 
The document posited four northern goals: the provision of a higher 
standard of living for northern residents, the maintenance and enhance- 
ment of the northern environment, the encouragement of economic devel- 
opment and the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and security in the 
North. 2 By themselves, no thoughtful Canadian was likely to argue with 
these goals. They were generally well received, but Canadians as a whole 
l1bid., 7 April 1967, p. 14677. 
2Canada. DIAND, Canada' North: 1970-1980 (Ottawa: Queen's 
Printer, 1972), P. 10. - 
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reserved final judgement until the government revealed specific programs 
to meet these goals. For the Department of National Defence, the last 
goal--maintenance of sovereignty and security--had strong overtones of 
possible military involvement. Even the first three goals could have been 
extended to encompass military effort were the government to decide to re- 
vive the dormant nation-building role of the Canadian Forces. 
At the same time, as the giývernment was developing its northern 
policy, a major review of defence policy was initiated. Although a White 
Paper on the subject was not issued until the summer of 1971, the Prime 
Minister had indicated as early as April 19691 that he intended major re- 
visions in defence policy. The Prime Minister ranked Canadian defence 
priorities as the protection of sovereignty, the defence of North America, 
fulfilment of NATO commitme-nt-s, and international peacekeeping roles. In 
a sense, this did not represent a major departure from the previous (1964) 
White Paper which had ordered defence priorities as the direct protection 
of Canada, NATO commitments, and peacekeeping. However, it was clear that 
it was Trudeau's intention to change the emphasis. During the Pearson 
years, NATO and UN peacekeeping had received the lion's share of Canadian 
defence attention and resource allocation despite their second and third 
places in the ranking of priorities. The direct protection of Canada 
consisted of forces assigned to NORAD. The threat of invasion, however 
small, distant, or short lived was assessed as being so low as to warrant 
.: I 
being ignored. 
The notion of protection of sovereignty as a military role is the 
key to the Trudeau thesis. The Prime Minister indicated that it was his 
intention to reduce substantially the Canadian contribution to western 
I P. E. Trudeau, "A Defence Policy for Canada", External Affairs 
May 1969. 
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European defence in NATO. What was not immediately apparent was whether 
or not there was a direct link between the need to protect sovereignty 
and the NATO force reduction. Equally unclear was the specific nature of 
the role to be played by the Canadian Forces in protecting sovereignty, 
and the extent to which the government was prepared to commit men and 
money to meet sovereign challenges. The underlying question, which was 
frequently raised in the House of Commons and in public discussion during 
1968 and 1969, was just what specifically was Canada sovereign of in the 
North, who was challenging this sovereignty and in what ways. 
in May 1969, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of 
Commons on Canadian northern sovereignty. In the view of his adminis- 
tration, there was no question over Canada's territorial claims. He said: 
Canada's sovereignty over its Arctic regions, including the islands 
of the Arctic archipelago, is well established and ... there is 
no dispute concerning this matter. 
He went on to add that the nation was equally secure with respect to the 
resources of the northern continental shelf since 
The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf provides that the 
coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights 
for the purposes of exploring it and exploiting its natural re- 
sources .... No country has asserted a competing claim 
to the 
resources in question .... 
When he came to deal with the waters of the Arctic Archipelago, however, 
the Prime Minister was forced to admit that the Canadian claim to sov- 
ereign jurisdiction was not quite so well established. He cited the 
Conservative Minister of Northern Affairs who had said in 1963 that 
The area to the north of Canada, including the islands and the waters 
between the islands and areas beyond are looked upon as our, own 
Mr Trudeau noted, however, that 
Not all countries would accept the view that the waters between the 
islands of the archipelago are internal waters over which Canada 
has full sovereignty. The contrary view is indeed that Canada's 
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sovereignty extends only to the territorial sea around each island. 
I 
By 1970 Canadian northern perspectives were terribly confused. 
The government's position was that there was no challenge to Canadian 
sovereignty over northern 
- 
lands--either continental or archipelagic. 
Similarily, territorial waters-and the arctic sea bed were seen as being 
firmly within Canada's sovereignty. Certainly no nation had challenged 
that position in at least two generations. The only possible area where 
Canada could be challenged was in the matter of the commercial and peace- 
ful use of the Northwest Passage. At the same time, Canada's Armed Forces 
had been given the primary mission of protecting sovereignty with par- 
ticular emphasis on the North. Yet, by the government's own admission, 
the only possible challenge to Canadian claims--and that in a very specific 
and restricted area--was mounted not by an international rival or threat, 
but by the United States, Canada's closest ally and major trading partner. 
Given this perplexing set of circumstances, it is little wonder that the 
Canadian public at large and the Canadian Forces in particular had some 
considerable difficulty in coming to grips with the role of the military 
in the "new north". Before examining the nature of the Canadian military 
response and its impact on the North, it is of use to note the extent of 
public confusion that attended the new military priority and the govern- 
ment's sudden concern for northern sovereignty. 
2 
1 Debates, 1ý May 1969, p. 8720. 
2 Much of the public concern, which bordered on near-hysteria in 
some cases, over northern sovereignty between 1969 and 1971 focussed on 
the two voyages of the American supertanker Manhatt-*, ýn into the Arctic to 
study the feasibility of transporting crude oil from the Alaskan North 
Slope in icebreaking tankers operating year round thr_Qugh the Northwest 
Passage. Canada supported both voyages by providing-Coast Guard ice 
breakers as escorts for the Manhatt2n, but was clearly unhappy over the 
prospect of actual oil transp6rting activities being developed without 
a Canadian input of Pollution controls and safety standards. The issue 
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As early as March 1969, John Diefenbaker had confused the debate 
by demanding of the Prime Minister a statement on the government's pos- 
ition on sovereignty in the Arctic. The reason for the former prime 
minister's concern was that he had received reports that some American 
maps showed the ownershiV of the arctic islands as being in question. 
No American administration of this century has ever questioned Canadian 
ownership of the islands lying north of the continental land mass, yet 
here was a question hauntingly similar to the 1919-22 debate, raising the 
spectre of American designs on the lands of the Canadian North. Stanley 
Knowles of the New Democratic Party made reference in the House to reports 
that the Governor General was "to make a tour of the northern part of 
Canada to assert our sovereignty there". 
2 The Prime Minister denied the 
assertion of sovereignty as one of the purposes of the trip, claiming that 
"our sovereignty in the northern part of Canada is very well established". 
Still, the damage had been caused. The popular press largely ignored or 
rejected the government's statement on northern sovereignty and continued 
centered around the status of the Northwest Passage. Canada claimed the 
passage to be internal waters. The American view was that the passage 
was an international strait. Agreement between the North American allies 
was never reached and to a large extent the matter remains in limbo. The 
imperative for resolution diminished considerably when Humble Oil aban- 
doned the tanker project and decided, for a number of reasons, to build 
a trans-Alaskan pipeline to move the oil to market. Maxwell Cohen has 
produced probably the best short analysis on the impact of the "Manhatten 
Incident" on Canadian public opinion. He wrote: "Manhatten's two voyages 
made Canadians feel that they were on the edge of another American 'steal' 
of Canadian resourceý and 'rights' which had to be dealt with at once by 
firm governmental action. In a sense ... the kind of 'panic' atmos- 
phere in Canada in 1969 and 1970 on the Arctic question was unfortunate. 
To a large extent, it was part of the near paranoia that was infecting 
much of the Canadian view of its continental prospects in Canadian- 
American relations". See Maxwell Cohen, "The Arctic and the National 
Interest", International Journal: Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs, Vol. 26, No. - 1, Winter 1970-71, p. 72. 
1. Debates, 7 March 1969, p. 6337. 
21bid., 27 March 1969, p. 7190. 
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to harp on territorial sovereignty. 
An article appearing in the Ottawa Citizen in January, 1970 read 
in part that "A defence team toured the Arctic and recommended that this 
year's training exercises be held in the high Arctic, for the first time 
on some of those Arctic islands involved in the sovereignty debate 
(emphasis added)". 
1 In 1972 the issue was still being bandied about. 
Another article appearing in the CLttawa Citizen maintained that "If you 
are not able to occupy a vacant piece of land, it is difficult to claim 
it as your own". The article went on to develop the thesis that Canada 
did not have much of a claim to the Arctic because it had not been fully 
occupied, but that the issue had been academic until the late 1960s when 
the "Arctic suddenly bloomed as the "fount of riches". The writer inter- 
preted the revision of defence priorities as a Canadian response to 
"doubts being expressed abroad concerning the extent of Canadian terri- 
tory in the North". 
2 
Again, it must be stated, public concern for a threat to Canadian 
territorial claims in the North was purely in the minds of these Canadians. 
No state with even the vaguest interest in northern affairs had raised the 
slightest question over Canadian territorial sovereignty--least of all the 
United States who was often painted as the chief villain in the scene. 
The government at no time claimed that it was the role of the military to 
establish sovereignty; rather the forces' role was to protect a sover- 
eignty long since established. Government efforts to clarify the situation 
were either ineffectual or fell on deaf ears. 
In many cases, the government contributed to the confusion. At a 
lJohn R. Walder, "Defence Department lacks guidance on Arctic 
policy", Ottawa Citizen, 12 January 1970. 
2, Ottawa Citizen, 27 June 1972. 
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press conference held in the North in 1971, Donald Macdonald, the Minister 
of National Defence, made the following statement: 
The defence of (northern) Canada had not been adequately dealt with 
in the past. The Manhattan incident pointed out to us the challenge 
involved in a foreign presence in our Arctic territories. 
He continued 
We have to be here and we have to be seen to be here. And we may 
have to be more concTrned with our allies in this regard than with 
Russia for instance. 
Fortunately for the Canadian government, this statement, which can only 
be described as incredible, Elicited no significant comment in either the 
United States or Canada. The implication however subtle, is clear. The 
Minister of National Defence was threatening the use of military force 
against the commercial ventures of the United States. A cynic might well 
observe that Canada proposed the use of military forces to defend against 
her enemies and the same military forces to protect sovereignty from her 
friends. 
The 1971 White Paper on Defence, Defence in the 70s, stated that 
Defence policy must, however, also take into account the possibility 
that other challenges to Canada's sovereignty and independence, 
mainly non-military in character, (emphasis added), may be more 
likely to arise during the 1970s. Z 
The crux of the matter lies in the appropriateness of a military response 
to a non-military challenge. Implicit in the logic of Defence in the 70s 
is the signalling of the intention to use military forces in an oper- 
ational role below the threshold of violence while still retaining the 
option to use force in extreme situations. 
Although the White Paper provided few details, it stated that the 
main task for the Forces in the protection of sovereignty would be 
'Cited in 
, 
Edmonton Journal, 17 May 1971. 
2Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s: 
White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, -T-9-71-17- 
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surveillance. It was admitted, however, that such surveillance would of 
necessity be extremely limited. Operations by existing Argus long range 
patrol aircraft, configured as they were for anti-submarine warfare, was 
limited by light and weather (and the absence of suitable northern bases). 
Surveillance by the ships- of Marltime Command was limited to the few ice 
free months of the year (and then only in certain waters). Ground sur- 
veillance by soldiers was seen as simply impracticable because of the huge 
size of the area involved. 
The implication here was of great significance to the Canadian 
Forces. While Canadian force levels in Europe were being halved, the 
withdrawn troops were not to be committed to the protection of sover- 
eignty--the Forces were to be reduced. Similarly, the new role, it was 
implied, would have to be fulfi-l-led with equipment and facilities then in 
the Forces' inventory. 
I No new "northern-sovereignty" equipment was to 
be obtained--no special reconnaissance aircraft or surveillance equipment 
for existing aircraft for the air force; no ice-capable or under-ice 
ships for the navy; no all terrain vehicles for the army. 
In a summary of the sovereign threats to Canada's North, the 
Prime Minister said: 
There is not now, nor is it conceivable that there ever will be from 
'Defence in the 70s stated that studies would be made on "the 
desirabil'ity of reconstituting the Canadian Rangers; --- establishing 
a special training sthool for all personnel assigned to the North; .* 
and the adequacy of existing equipment ... with particular emphasis oý 
over snow vehicles", p. 24. In all cases, the final decision was that 
nothing was required in any of these areas. By 1971, Northern Region 
Headquarters had developed a full plan for activation of an "Arctic Ranger" 
unit, but the plan never received approval, undoubtedly due to the costs 
associated with the requirement for a regular force cadre of command and 
support troops until such time as native northerners, -could take over these roles. No High Arctic Base was established, agains'probably due to cost 
factors. No new vehicles were obtained and the Amy's medium marginal 
terrain vehicle development project was cancelled in 1975. 
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any source, challenges to Canadian Sovereignty on the mainland, in 
the islands, in the minerals lying in the cont i nental shelf below 
the Arctic waters, or in our territorial seas. 
In the government's view, while protection of sovereignty was the first 
military priority, the threat to that sovereignty was minimal and, under 
existing conditions, did not warrant a major commitment of men, resources, 
and money. To protect sovereignty in the North, the government adopted 
a policy that is strikingly analagous to the situation that existed in 
Canada at the time of the 1922 Eastern Arctic Expedition. In the 1920s, 
Canada established sovereignty in the Arctic with a symbolic presence of 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In the 1970s, Canada prepared to 
protect that same sovereignty with a symbolic presence of the Canadian 
Armed Forces. 
In a simplistic manner, presence was equated to protection of 
sovereignty. To this end, a number of programs and projects were in- 
itiated, some of them quite innovative in their approach. Land, air and 
sea components of the Armed Forces were all involved in this return to 
the North. With a few notable exceptions, however, the number of Canadian 
troops stationed permanently in the North was not increased. The Depart- 
ment of National Defence argued with effect that 
it is felt that our operational units can most economically and 
effectively be stationed at southern base i and moved to the North 
when required for a particular operation. 
The exceptions, discussed below, were small installations designed to 
control and co-ordinate northern training and operations. 
In 1970, Maritime Command, the integrated forces equivalent of 
the navy9 sent its ships into northern waters for the first time since 
1 
, 
Debates, (MitchellSbarp quoting a speech of the Prime Minister 
given on 24 October 1969), 20 January 1970, p. 2713. 
2Canada, DIAND, Government Activities in the North, 1970, p. 94. 
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1962. The navy clung tenuously to its anti-submarine orientation, for 
the main purpose of the deployment was 
to allow (Maritime) Command sailors and airmen to gain experience 
in northern operations, mainly in the anti-submarine field. 
The secondary objective was "to provide a tangible presence in the Canadian 
North". 
' It could be argued that the degree of meaningful northern oper- 
ational experience to be gained by sailing into the relatively well- 
travelled waters of Hudson Bay and-Strait at the height of the summer 
shipping season was probably quite limited. The true focus of sovereign 
contention was the Northwest Passage well to north of the ships, operating 
area. Still, it was a start. The operational support ship, HMCS Pro- 
tecteur, three destroyer escorts, and a submarine cruised and exercised 
in the Bay and Strait, visited Churchill, and, at the request of the 
Department of Northern Affairs, undertook resupply tasks at Coral Harbour 
on Southampton Island, at Rankin Inlet on the west coast of the Bay, and 
at Frobisher Bay on Baffin. In addition to NORPLOY, as the naval northern 
deployments have come to be called, Maritime Command also began to take 
its first tentative steps in regaining expertise in ice filled waters. 
Not having an ice-breaker of its own, the Navy made arrangements to have 
several officers, cadets and ratings attached to ice-breakers of the 
2 
Canadian Coast Guard for "arctic indoctrination". 
Maritime Command's patrol aircraft were even more involved in 
northern operationsi'for theirs was a year-round task. On the average, 
four long-range Surveillance patrols were undertaken each month by Argus 
aircraft flying out of bases in Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and 
1 
j. L. Wilson, "Our Ships Head into the Arct. ic Seas Again" 
Sentinel, p November-December, 1970, p. 6. 
2 Government Activities in the-North, 1970j, P. 94. 
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British Columbia. A total of 1900 flying hours was expended on these 
operations during the year, while the smaller Tracker aircraft accounted 
for an additional 300 hours along the coasts of northern Quebec and 
Baffin Island. To support these greatly increased flying activities, 
Maritime Command established a small detachment at Frobisher Bay to pro- 
vide operational support, hangerage, accommodation, and communications 
for the patrols who inevitably staged through Frobisher at one point or 
another on a northern flight. 
Mobile Command (the "army" of the Canadian Forces) initiated a 
continuing series of arctic indoctrination patrols in April of the same 
year. Named Exercise New Viking, the project took Canadian combat 
soldiers to places in the North where troops had never exercised before. 
' 
The headquarters for the project was permanently established at Churchill 
in facilities loaned to DND by the Department of Public Works. A small 
staff of less than thirty instructors handled a new group of candidates 
every two weeks on a year-round basis. Each succeding exercise followed 
a more or less fixed format. Air Transport Command aircraft would fly 
the troops into Churchill during the winter and to an advanced base at 
Resolute in the summer. The first week of the patrol was devoted to 
verifying an acceptable standard of proficiency and in dealing with oper- 
ational problems that were unique to the Arctic. These latter included 
learning how to dealw'lth the high wind chills of the barrens during 
winter, navigating using the astro compass in areas of high magnetic 
fluctuation, and precautions necessary to protect the northern eco- 
system. Following the work-up week the aircraft would then re-appear and 
fly the troops to an advanced patrol base. These might be any of the 
lGovernment Activities in the North, 1971, p. 84. 
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communities with suitable air strips in the Arctic: Baker Lake, Rankin 
inlet, Frobisher, Coral Harbour, Sacks Harbour or the Arctic Weather 
Stations at Mould Bay, Isaachsen, or Eureka. At the end of the runway 
the troops would shoulder their rucksacks and strike out on their own. 
A typical patrol would cover about fifty kilometers during the week, the 
distance the troops could cover being limited by the fact that they were 
on foot. 
In addition to the New Viking program, Mobile Command repeatedly 
exercised the newly formed Canadian Airborne Regiment in parachute assault 
exercises in the North. In quick succession the Regiment dropped at Coral 
Harbour, Inuvik, Watson Lake, and in Alaska in a joint Canadian-American 
exercise. While the New Viking program emphasized arctic indoctrination, 
the Airborne Regiment clearly was developing and practising combat tech- 
niques in the North. Should the "unthinkable" ever happen and Canadian 
troops be obliged to fight to regain northern territory, the isolation of 
the area made it inevitable that any operation would have to begin with 
the establishment of an airhead: hence the origins and training of the 
Airborne Regiment. 
During 1971 and the early winter of 1972 the extent of military 
presence continued to grow, the programs of 1970 being continued and 
expanded. Argus aircraft flew 43 missions during the year for a total of 
over 2,000 flying hours. In August three ships from Maritime Command 
cruised and showed the flag in Davis and Hudson Straits. New Viking 
serials continued; at year's end, over 2,200 troops had received arctic 
indoctrination. Mobile Command exercises saw the entire Airborne Regi- 
ment dropping at Resolute Bay in December. A few months later, a major 
exercise (by Canadian standards) was attempted at Frobisher Bay. 
Christened Exercise Patrouille Nocturne, it began when an airborne 
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commando group captured the airstrip in the face of light "Fantasian" 
opposition. A massive airlift brought infantry, armoured, and artillery 
units into the air head. A flight of CF5 tactical fighters successfully 
staged into the Arctic to provide ground support for the combat troops. 
In all. over 1,500 troops were_deployed into the Eastern Arctic. In sub- 
sequent years, the same pattern continued. The air force flew its per- 
iodic surveillance missions with the ancient Argus aircraft. An oper- 
ational support ship (AOR) of the navy cruised in northern waters during 
ice free months and the army continued to exercise sub-units and the 
Canadian Airborne Regiment in both summer and winter throughout the North. 
It is evident that the vast majority of those military forces 
that were providing a presence in the North were transients. The oper- 
ational units of the sea, land and air element that periodically exercised 
in the North were not exclusively concerned with the area. In point of 
fact, all these southern-based units were multi-tasked and the northern 
commitment formed only a relatively small part of their operational role. 
In this respect, Canada maintained her traditional posture of using multi- 
purpose units based to southern Canada to perform specific northern-related 
tasks of relatively short duration. It is not clear whether the Canadian 
Forces ever even considered the option of actually stationing combat 
forces of any or all of the three elements in the North on a permanent 
basis. Certainly the cost would have been high, especially if troops were 
to be permitted to bring their families with them with the attendant need 
for housing, schools, shopping, and recreational facilities, etc. Those 
few military elements stationed permanently in the North were "in the 
Northll, o not "of the North". The Supplementary Radio--System stations at 
Inuvik and Alert were primarily concerned with communications research. 
The DEW Line main sites were primarily concerned with continental air 
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defence. 
While the Department of National Defence continued in its time- 
honoured pattern with respect to the employment of operational forces in 
the North, a significant departure from trad. ition was signalled by the 
formation of a headquarters sptcifically devoted to the coordination of 
military activities in the North. The decision to create such a fa- 
cility was announced in September -1969 
by Leo Cadieux, the Minister of 
National Defence; the location of the headquarters, its composition, and 
specific functions remained to be determined. Studies were undertaken 
within DND in consultation with the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development and the two territorial governments. In February, 
1970 four-man liaison detachments were established in Whitehorse and 
Yellowknife, the territoriat cap-iftals. 
The Manitoban press argued that the new base should be established 
at Churchill. Certainly, in pure military terms--communications, accessi- 
bility, location, and terrain, the moribund community had much to rec- 
ommend it. The editorial in question, however, anticipated that a bat- 
talion-size force of operational troops and some air support resources 
were to be permanently stationed in the North. This was definitely not 
the intention of the Department of National Defence. Although the argu- 
ment for the location of the base at Churchill was couched in military 
parameters, the real: reason the Tribune's editor wanted to see it there 
was to help boost the sagging economy of the community. He wrote: 
Establishment of a major three-services base at Churchill will not 
be the economic cure-all for Churchill, but it would go a long way 
toward auling the community back from the brink of ruinous stag- 
nation. 
While Churchill offered many advantages as a base site, it 
'Winnipeg Tribune. 16 April 1970. 
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lacked the key ingredient. The Department of National Defence at the 
time wished to establish a facility that could co-ordinate military 
activity in the North, and at the same time effect the necessary liaison 
with other branches of the federal government operating in the North and 
the territorial governments. The obvious choice, in these terms, lay 
between the two territorial capitals. The Yukon, with its continental 
location, relatively well developed road and air net, and advanced pol- 
itical institutions. figured only peripherally in the sovereignty equation. 
The sovereignty concern centered on the High Arctic of the Northwest 
Territories. The headquarters of Northern Region, by this logic, had to 
be in Yellowknife, and the decision to locate it there was announced on 
17 April 1970. A small liaison detachment of Northern Region was also to 
be maintained in Whitehorse. 
By the autumn of 1971, NRHQ, commanded by then Brigadier General 
Ramsey Withers, was in full operation, approaching its job with a high 
degree of dynamism and enthusiasm for the North. NRHQ was not established 
as an operational headquarters but as a liaison and co-ordination center. 
Elements of other Commands stationed in the North or operating in the 
region remained under the command and control of their parent headquarters. 
NRHQ did have the capability, however, to exercise command over units 
placed under its control for a specific mission. Many of the roles as- 
signed to the headquýrters were typical of those undertaken by any re- 
gional military headquarters in southern Canada--the preparation and 
execution of plans for aid of the civil authority, support of search and 
rescue operations, and the administration of cadets. In some important 
respects, however. the new headquarters was differenr. NRHQ was given the 
responsibility of maintaining liaison between the Department of National 
Defence and the territorial governments and other federal departments 
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operating throughout the North. In addition, the headquarters was re- 
quired to establish and maintain a northern information data bank. to 
support operations and training of all elements of Canadian Forces de- 
ployed into the North. A perhaps inevitable role that fell to NRHQ was 
to be interpreter of theNorth for the rest of the Canadian Forces. The 
new interest in the North resulted in a steady procession of military 
visitors passing through Yellowknife. In particular, members of the 
National Defence College, students of the Canadian Forces College-and the 
Land Forces Command and Staff College became regular annual pilgrims to 
what was to become the fount of military knowledge in the North. NRHQ 
provided a wide range of briefings on general and specific aspects of 
military activity in the North as well as general orientation talks and 
discussions of contemporary northern problems. When appropriate, the 
headquarters arranged for guest speakers from the territorial government, 
DIAND, RCMP, and industry to meet with and talk to the visiting groups. 
Senior officers of CFNR also travelled frequently to southern bases to 
"preach the gospel" of the military in the North. 
In its early years, NRHQ smoothly settled into operation and 
within its limited resources attempted to fulfil its many roles in a 
mandate that included 40 per cent of Canadian territory. The most sig- 
nificant accOmPlishment of the headquarters, however, did not relate to 
the day to day liaison-and support of military operations in the North, 
but rather its attempt to analyse the complex political notion of pro- 
tection of sovereignty as a role for the Armed Forces. The analytic 
model developed by the commander and staff of NRHQ deserves some atten- 
tion as it represents the only serious attempt by Camada to define pro- 
tection of sovereignty beyond some vague notion of "presence". 
The analytic model posited three classes of northern anomaly 
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that might threaten Canadian control over the North. The first was called 
a tactical anomaly and related to acts by foreign military forces which, 
while stopping short of an outright attack on Canada, did, in some way, 
threaten sovereignty. In cluded in this class were such operations as 
overflights of Canadian territqry by military aircraft, transits of 
Canadian internal waters by foreign warships or submarines, and a military 
lodgement--the establishment of a-garrison at some remote location in the 
Canadian North for whatever purpose. The second class, named a commonweal 
anomaly, dealt with natural or man-made disasters that threatened the 
ecological stability or social well-being of the North and its people. 
Included under this grouping were such phenomena as flood, fire, storm, 
pollution and air crash. The third class was called a sovereign anomaly 
and it related to actions by foreign companies or individuals who, with- 
out direct governmental sponsorship, acted contrary to Canadian law. This 
last was by far the most subtle of the three classes of anomaly, but, at 
the same time, it was thought to be the most likely to occur. It included 
such activities as game poaching, unlicensed mineral exploration, or fail- 
ure to meet government standards in any industrial process. Because of 
the size of the North and the paucity of government control agencies, NRHQ 
felt that illegal activities of this type might well be risked on the 
probability that their detection by agents of the Canadian government was 
slight. 
In a further development of their model, NRHQ posited that the 
Canadian Forces should develop the capability to respond to each class 
of anomaly. Response included a surveillance component in order to detect 
the anomaly in the first place, a reconnaissance comoonent in order to 
investigate and define the exact nature of the anomaly, and an enforce- 
ment component wherein military forces were, if so ordered, to neutralize 
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or eliminate the anomaly. It was realized fully that the Forces did not 
have exclusive responsibility for the protection of sovereignty in the 
North, but that many other federal agencies shared in the function. In 
particular, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of Trans- 
port, the Department of the Environment, the Department of Industry, Mines 
and Resources, and of course, DIAND and the territorial governments also 
participated. The ultimate resporLsibility, however, remained with the 
military. 
When one analyses the configuration and equipment of the Canadian 
Forces at the beginning of the 1970s, it is evident that in terms of the 
NRHQ anomaly model, the capacity to protect sovereignty was extremely 
limited. Submarine penetrations of Canadian northern waters called for 
fixed array sonar to detect the incursion and nuclear submarines to re- 
spond. Canada had neither. It is difficult to envisage any sort of naval 
surface engagement in ice choked waters. In this respect Canada was for- 
tunate for Maritime Command had no ice capable ships, let alone naval ice- 
breakers. Only in response to a small lodgment by ground troops, the most 
unlikely event of all, did Canada have a significant capability in the 
form of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and two air portable brigade groups. 
Even there, however, detection of a concealed base lost in the vastness 
of the North would have been extremely difficult, and the standard Canadian 
tactical ground suppqrt aircraft, the Northrop CF5, was extremely limited, 
because of range and landing field requirements, in the northern areas in 
which it could operate. Tactical air anomalies occurring in the High 
Northp while they might have been detected by DEW Line radars, were well 
beyond the range of the southern based CF101 intercenors, and no facili- 
ties existed to permit these aircraft to operate in the North. It should 
be noted, however, that the difference between protection of sovereignty 
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from tactical anomalies and defence of Canada is extremely blurred. In 
all likelihood, should a military response to such a phenomenon ever be 
required, Canada could count on substantial material support from the 
United States. 
Commonweal anomalies presented no particular problem to the forces 
except in the matter of surveil-lance. The chance that an Argus patrol 
aircraft might just happen to be the first at the scene of a disaster was 
extremely remote. The extensive net of RCMP and Ministry of Transport 
posts in the North would no doubt be_tW first to detect and report a 
serious problem. Military reconnaissance aircraft could then be ordered 
to the disaster site to define its dimensions. Helicopters and parachute 
trained personnel could also be deployed quickly into remote areas if a 
ground investigation were required. In respect of labour intensive situ- 
ations such as a flood or a fire, the same capability that allowed the 
military to respond to a lodgment could have been employed in the reaction 
phase. 
Response to sovereign anomalies presented an entire new range of 
problems to the Forces. Detecting a single event in 1.5 million square 
miles in the absence of an intelligence input was most unlikely. A more 
subtle problem was even if a patrol aircraft did detect some hitherto un- 
recorded human activity, there was no guarantee that that activity would 
be recognized as a sovereign anomaly. The very nature of sovereign 
anomalies made it unlikely that the military could play a significant 
role in the investigation and definition phase. Military involvement 
might well have to be limited to providing air transport to the'site for 
RCMP or other government agents. Even this service might not have proven 
necessary since most government agencies either operate their own air- 
craft or have charter arrangements with commercial firms. The enforcement 
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component of response to a sovereign anomaly again raises the question 
of the appropriateness of a military response to a non-military chal- 
lenge. I 
This then was the problem faced by the Canadian Forces when they 
returned to the North in strength. They were singularly ill-equipped to 
meet military challenges in the region. Their precise role and utility 
in responding to non-military chaljenges was not clearly perceived by the 
general public nor, for that matter, by the military itself. However, 
when the government had suggested that the primary role of the Forces 
should be the protection of sovereignty, the media assumed despite re- 
peated political and military denials, that challenges to that sovereignty 
in the form of tactical and sovereign anomalies were either occurring or 
were imminent. With this thad-igh-t in mind there developed a growing public 
clamour that the surveillance capabilities of the Forces be improved. 
There seemed to be a notion that if only the Forces could look harder, 
more often, and with better equipment, that somewhere they would find a 
challenge to sovereignty. 
NRHQ's anomaly model remained a very much "in house" document and 
received only minor distribution and examination within the Department of 
National Defence and hardly any at all in public debate and discussion of 
the North or defence policy. Public attention in the House of Commons 
and in the popular press focussed on the need for presence. By 1972 
government policy with respect to the level of force commitment to the 
'The Montreal Star in an editorial whimsically observed that while 
the Canadian Forces could attack and sink a foreign oil tanker attempting 
to operate in northern waters without proper safeguards in defiance of 
Canadian law, such "an inspiring demonstration of sonreignty ... would 
not do much for the environment". Montreal Star, 27 February 1970. The 
editor might have added that such in act would not have done much for 
United States-Canadian relations either--the former being the only nation 
considering using tankers in the North. 
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protection of sovereignty in the North had become clear. The scale of 
this operational presence was often seen as insignificant when placed 
upon the vastness of the North. 
The main focus of public criticism of northern defence policy was 
not that northern sovereignty was not important, or even not that it was 
the most important priority, but rather that the government should have 
been doing more. Criticism of this nature predominated between 1970 and 
1975. 
The Ottawa Citizen reprinted an editorial that had appeared in the 
Edmonton Journal which openly sneered at the extent to which a military 
presence was being established in the North: 
Any nation casting greedy eyes on our Canadian Arctic had better 
watch out. 
We may seem defenceless but ... an invader will be met with 
the massed might of the Canadian Forces Northern Region with head- 
quarters at Yellowknife. 
On hand to defend our million and a half square miles of forest 
and tundra will be'40 members of the Canadian armed forces, stationed 
in a new office building now being constructed in Yellowknife. 
What's more, we're stepping up the number of sovereignty flights so 
that an Argus patrol aircraft now wings its way across the Arctic 
once a week instead of once every 10 days. 
This is the result, so far, of making the defence of Canada's 
own territorys especiallý the Arctic, the "first priority" of the 
nation's defence policy. 
The Journal editorial missed the point of northern defence programs 
on almost every count. NRHQ existed to co-ordinate the activities of those 
southern-based operational forces who were deployed into the North to 
establish a presence,:. In any case, no argument was developed by the 
Journal as to why combat troops should be based in the North permanently, 
nor where they should be located, or, most importantly what they should do. 
John Gellner, the editor of the Canadian Defence Quarterll and one 
of Canada's inost astute, if somewhat "hawkish", defence critics, examined 
1,0ttawa Citizen, 8 October 1970. 
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the country's new defence priorities in the light of equipment and per- 
sonnel costs. In his view, surveillance of just the Northwest Passage 
and the development of facilities to just monitor sub-surface activity 
would be extremely costly. He noted no inclination on the government's 
part to spend such monies , and_noting, in 1970, that the defence budget 
had been frozen until fiscal 1972/73, dismissed the "new model" of 
Canadian defence as a paper declaration rather than real change until such 
time as monies were made available to purchase north-oriented equi'pment. 
1 
Vice Admiral J. C. O'Brien, then a serving officer commanding 
Maritime Command, went even further in a speech given in March 1970. He 
claimed that "If Canada is serious about asserting its sovereignty in the 
Arctic, it must be prepared to pay a fantastically high price". The 
admiral estimated that it would cost 2.5 hundred million dollars for six 
nuclear powered attack submarines, greatly increased air surveillance, 
the installation of a vast network of navigational aids, greater militar- 
isation of the Canadian Coast Guard and a naval capability to escort 
merchant ships in the Arctic. In O'Brien's eyes such an effort would be 
required to monitor and control the military and commercial activities of 
the United States. He said,, "It's pretty obvious there's only one nation 
we need to worry about encroaching on our sovereignty. The only way to 
combat it is to be there and prove you care". 
2 
The sovereignty patrol aircraft, no matter how configured, could 
only detect surface targets on land or on ice covered seas. By 1970 
Canadians had developed an intense curiosity about what was going on under 
1 John Gellner, "Bold statements but little money", Canadian 
Aviationt October 1970, p. 18. 
ý 2Vice Admiral J. C. O'Brien, "Address to Canadian Naval officers 
Association", reported in Montreal Star, 2 March 1970. 
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the ice pack of territorial waters. While experiments were conducted 
with fixed array sonars in ice-filled waters, such a facility offered 
only a limited capability. Detection was only a third of the sover- 
eignty equation--investigation and, if necessary, enforcement were the 
others. To meet this full requirement there was only the nuclear sub- 
marine. 
' 
It is quite apparent that the Navy would have very much liked to 
have had a modest fleet of these craft. Michael Forrestall, who had been 
advocating nuclear boats for Canada's Navy for a decade, expanded his 
arguments to include the value of such vessels in the North. His argu- 
ments were hard to refute. He said: 
There are many reasons why Canada should have this equipment, such 
as the commercial application, the scientific application and the 
presence within our Department of National Defence and other 2 govern- 
ment circles of knowledge of what is happening in our North. 
Earlier in the same speech he had pointed out that "the nuclear powered 
submarine remains the only piece of equipment that can operate 12 months 
a year in our northern latitudes". Overriding all these arguments, how- 
ever, was the matter of money. The Subcommittee on Maritime Defence of 
the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) 
was perfectly aware of all the many advantages inherent in nuclear 
1 Dr Colin Gray has produced a cogent argument along the line of 
"If a tree falls in the forest, and there is nobody there to hear it, 
is there a noise? " Gray asks the question, Can one state challenge the 
sovereignty of anotft-er if the challengee is unaware of the challenge. 
His reply is negative and with respect to foreign submarine activity in 
the Canadian Arctic, he maintains that unless Canada is prepared to 
purchase nuclear submarines to investigate incursions and to enforce 
Canadian political will, it would be preferable not to deploy detection 
equipment and find oneself in the embarrassing position of knowing that 
Canadian law may be being broken, yet being unable to do anything about 
It. See C. S Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A; Juestion of Releva 
(Toronto: Clýrke, Irwing "b-m-pany, 1972), pp. 149-150. 
2, Debates, 22 October 1970, p. 472. 
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submarines, but had recommended that they not be acquired at that time 
(1970) 11solely on the basis of cost". 
Forrestall argued the case for the nuclear submarines as a means 
of protecting sovereignty. Others simply had no idea of the issues in- 
volved. At the time SCEAND was discussing the advisability of acquiring 
three to five nuclear powered submarines, the Winnipeg Tribune, one of 
Canada's major newspapers, produced a startling editorial entitled 
"Nuclear nuttiness" which read in part: 
... 
(T)here would be other serious implications about Ottawa getting 
into the nuclear submarine business. Asserting sovereignty over the 
Arctic is one thing. Having nuclear submarines with missile capa- 
bility prowling the northern seas is quite another. What would the 
Kremlin do if Canada were to initiate this kind of patrol activity 
within easy striking distance of Soviet territory. 
1 
It was ill-informed comment of this sort that lent confusion to 
the debate on northern defence policies and did nothing to contribute to 
public understanding of the issues. The editor, it would appear, was not 
aware of the difference between a submarine simply fitted with a nuclear 
power plant and a submarine amed with a nuclear weapons system. There 
has never been the slightest suggestion from any responsible source that 
Canada should acquire the latter capability. 
Those who advocated the acquisition of Canadian naval ice- 
breakers or Arctic Patrol Vessels seem to have forgotten about the ships 
of the Canadian Coast Guard that operate regularly in northern waters. 
Captain T. C. PullerL; claimed that a government policy formulated along 
lines outlined in the 1971 White Paper was "sheer hyp, -ocrisy when you 
consider that we don't have the means of employing the ships to. ensure 
an effective presence" in the arctic waters. He advocated the construc- 
tion of a fleet of polar class ice breakers in CanadC for Maritime 
'Winnipeg Tribune, 23 June 1970. 
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Command. 1 
A naval ice-breaker would be a rarity in today's maritime world. 
Most nations with polar interests operate ice-breakers but as part of the 
coast guard, or some othe r civil department of government. For Canada to 
acquire naval ice-breakers in addition to her civil fleet would be a form 
of message to the rest of the northern world. Just what that message 
would be and how it would be interpreted is open to debate. A serving 
naval officer recently wrote thatit-was-questionable if surface warships 
had a role in the Canadian Arctic, He felt that the Canadian Coast Guard 
ice-breaker fleet was perfectly adequate to establish sovereignty. 
2 
The Progressive Conservative Party entered the debate in a modest 
form during the 1974 election campaign, accepting implicitly the Trudeau 
thesis that protection of sovereignty, particularly in the North, was the 
first priority for Canadian Armed Forces. Although defence policy figured 
only marginally as an election issue, the Conservative platform on the 
subject called for a massive increase of military presence in the North. 
They viewed Canada's claim to the Arctic Archipelago as tenuous and sought 
to redress this situation by raising new air and ground forces dedicated 
exclusively to operational roles in the North. To support these units the 
Conservatives advocated the reopening of some unspecified bases that had 
been closed in the past and the establishment of new bases. Continuing in 
the theme of I'somet4ing for everybody", the Conservatives advocated the 
acquisition of advanced technology naval ice-breakers for arctic patrol 
'Capt T. C. Pullen, Canada and Future Shipping Operations in the 
Arctics Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 1973, p. 13. 
2 LCdr R. H. Thomas, "Ships for the eighties"-, Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, Vol. 2. No. 2. Autumn, 1972, p. 16. 
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duties. I 
The frustration of non-government agencies and individuals with 
the Liberal administration's implementation of its northern defence pol- 
icy was admirably summed up by John Gellner in the autumn of 1975. It is 
important to note that there was no quarrel at all with the priority given 
to protection of sovereignty, only the manner and degree to which active 
measure were taken. Gellner cited-the severe inadequacies of the Argus 
maritime patrol aircraft in the northern surveillance role, the lack of 
northern bases to support surveillance activities, and the lack of under- 
sea surveillance in arctic waters. 
Canadian governments have been making that claim for a long time, 
more stridently of late than ever before and rightly so because of 
the growing danger of our sovereignty being put to the test. What 
government has not done and continues to postpone doing is to i vest 
the money and effort whvclý_are necessary to back up that claim. 
Over a seven year period (1969-1975) successive Liberal govern- 
ments, in the face of considerable political and public pressure to do so, 
steadfastly refused to increase the level of Canadian Forces presence in 
the North. During the period there have apparently been no challenges to 
Canadian sovereignty in theNorth either by foreign states or foreign 
companies or individuals. The government could argue that the level of 
activity established at the beginning of the period of northern resurgence 
has been adequate to protect sovereignty and any possible challenges have 
been discouraged by ýhe presence of Canadian military units throughout 
the North. The fact that protection of sovereignty is the top priority 
of defence department roles does not necessarily demand that the bulk of 
'Progressive Conservative Policy Paper #10, "National Defence" 
1974 (Provided by Mr A. Mackinnon, Opposition DefencLT Critic, 3 March 
1976). 
2john Gellner, "How Canada showed it can't control Arctic", 
Toronto Globe and Mail, 17 September 1975. 
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military resources, personnel, and funds be devoted to that priority. 
It could be argued that priorities are more a matter of intent and should 
some concrete challenge develop in the future the government could simply 
devote additional resources as required to meet that challenge and still 
remain consistant within-established defence policy. 
Military effort in the North of the 1970s was not restricted to 
searching for, investigating, ands if necessary, dealing with challenges 
to Canadian sovereignty. The military was also assigned a modest range 
of national development tasks in the region that were in keeping with 
governmental policy or the North as a whole. In the sense that these 
projects contributed to the development of various facets of the northern 
transportation grid and hence helped link the North into the mainstream 
of southern Canada, they could be considered as being contributory to 
northern sovereignty. 
The main project undertaken within this category of endeavour was 
the multi-departmental Northern Airfield Project. 
' The Department of 
Indian Affairs and Northern Development had a long standing program of 
providing remote Arctic settlements with year-round air services. When 
Canadian Forces construction engineer units were made available, the 
project timetable was able to be advanced considerably. Over a five year 
period it was agreed that basic 2,600 foot gravel strips would be built 
at Chesterfield Inlet, -Pond Inlet, Whale Cove, Igloolik and Cape Dorset. 
A few of these communities already had primitive landing fields, but none 
were suitable for year-round use. The agreement was that DIAND would 
fund the project, DOT would define the design specifications and transport 
most of the construction materials to the sites by sea, and Canadian 
1970. 
lSee "Airstrips for the North", Sentinel-, November-December 
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Forces troops would do the actual construction. The 2.600 foot airstrip 
was capable of accepting most of the twin-engined, short-take off-and- 
landing (STOL) aircraft being operated commercially in the Arctic at this 
time. At four of the sites DND provided the funds for lengthening the 
strips to 4,000 feet to accept the heavy Hercules C130s of Air Transport 
Command. ' 
The Northern Airfields Project was a useful undertaking in that 
it satisfied a number of needs all at the same time. First and foremost, 
it contributed to the development of the northern infrastructure and 
lessened the isolation of the communities it touched. This in itself was 
the basic stuff of sovereignty. The summer construction season is the 
time of maximum human activity in the North. The troops actually on the 
ground and the military transportation and resupply flights to the sites 
provided a military presence where one had rarely been seen before. By 
adopting a policy of incorporating local labour into the military work 
force, the engineer units provided an opportunity for wage employment at 
a time when the Eskimo culture was unstable. The 4,000 foot strips in- 
creased military flexibility in the area by providing landing sites for 
the main troop lift and transport aircraft of the Canadian Forces. They 
also offered an expanded range of forward bases for air search and rescue 
operations. The project did not conflict with civilian construction 
contracts in the North, for it was not a question of a military contractor 
or a civilian contractor. With the limited amount of money available for 
the work it was a question of a military contractor or nothing. The 
federal government put the needs of the North ahead of southern commer- 
cial interests. 
1"Northern Airstripe, Canadian Aviation, January 1973. 
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In a separate but similar program, the Canadian Forces undertook 
bridging projects on the Dempster Highway which was being built to link 
the Yukon with the lower Mackenzie Valley. Bridging the Ogilvie River 
between Inuvik and Fort McPherson' began in 1970 and following its com- 
pletion in 1971 the troops turned to the Eagle River in 1973. Like the 
airfields projects, funds were provided by DIAND while the Department of 
Public Works did the design work &nd the Canadian Forces provided the 
actual skilled work force. 
2 While both the bridging and the airfield 
projects were initially planned for a specific number of sites, they both 
were open ended in the sense that when the first phase was completed the 
program could well be extended to other localities as part of a continu- 
ing development process. 
These programs went a long way towards meeting the recommen- 
dations of the Military Engineers Association of Canada which argued that 
"The Canadian Military Engineers of all ranks be employed in Northern 
Development Work and pre-engineering studies of future projects of National 
importance". By reopening this field to military engineers (they had lost 
it with the army withdrawal from the Alaska Highway) it was thought that 
a professional engineering challenge would develop which would help at- 
tract the "right calibre" of personnel to military engineering trades in 
peacetime. It was also seen as a means of exposing troops to exacting 
tasks under difficulý conditions and to providing the opportunity to de- 
velop skills that ha da definite military application. 
3 On the negative 
I DND Canadian Forces Press Release_, 15 April 1970. The'Dempster 
was one of John Diefenbakerlýllroads to resources" started in 1955. It 
was finally opened to traffic in 1979. 
ýIbid., 30 Mly 1973. 
3 Cited in Lt Col J. G. Wasteneys, "The Place of the Military 
Engineer in Meeting the Challenge of the Canadian North", Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. I Summer 1972, p. 18. 
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side of the program was the fact that due to the reduction in force size 
that accompanied the new defence orientation, the requirement to deploy 
field engineers into the North during the summer construction season 
degraded the level and scope of the Army's traditional collective train- 
ing during the same period. 
Not all of the subsidiary northern proStits related to national 
development in terms of engineering. One related to people, but in this 
instance, the military's new-found enthusiasm for the North led it into 
embarrassing difficulties. Prior to the resurgence of the 1970s very few 
native northerners showed any interest in regular military service, nor 
did the Department of National Defence made any effort to recruit in the 
North. The lack of northerners in the Canadian Forces at a time of high 
military involvement in the area was striking and in response to a question 
in the House, Leo Cadieux announced a major effort to "increase (Eskimo) 
participation in the armed services". 
' 
In May 1971, the Department of National Defence launched a program 
aimed at recruiting a hundred young northerners into military trades that 
were required at the Supplementary Radio System bases at Inuvik and Alert. 
Only a handful of candidates came forward and of these, less than a dozen 
managed to complete basic training. The military's problems did not end 
there. The successful candidates were posted to Inuvik where they all 
experienced extreme stress in coping with the often conflicting demands 
of military and traditional culture. Within a year, all those who re- 
mained in the Forces had to be transferred to southern bases. 
In retrospect, the entire program was not well thought out and 
illustrated, once again, how much southerners still. had to learn about 
lDebates, 17 April 1970, p. 5991. 
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the North and its peoples. Commenting on the military potential of 
Eskimos, one senior officer said, "He has his own culture but is the sort 
of man who could become Western very easily, become one of us". 
' The vast 
majority of Eskimos wishe d to retain their own culture; that minority 
which wished to opt out and join the mainstream of Canadian life probably 
wished to do so in the more comfortable surroundings of southern Canada. 
In a press interview, one-general officer said: 
the ones we're looking for are mobile and have a self-navigating 
capability and roam a lot .. -. . They have an ability to find 
themselves and get to a pre-determined destination. They can take 
a trip of 800 or 1,000 miles and kno Y exactly where they are ... 
with no gear, maps or charts .... 
Another added that "we want the boys to go back up there because they know 
their native area ". 
3 Statements such as these ignored some very funda- 
mental northern realities. First one does not "know the area" of the 
entire North as one can know a town or county in southern Canada. In any 
case, the relevence of the admired skills is hard to fathom since the 
Eskimo soldiers were slated to be stationed at permanent static bases. 
No Eskimos lived, or had ever lived within hundreds of kilometers of Alert 
at the northern tip of Ellesmere; Inuvik was the largest city in the 
Mackenzie Valley. A more fundamental flaw in the military's logic lay in 
the fact that if the 18-23 years olds the Forces were attempting to re- 
cruit had the basic educational qualifications to join the Canadian Forces, 
the attaining of thi5 education would of necessity have removed them from 
the traditional nomadic life wherein these much-vaunted skills would have 
been learned. Conversely, the older Eskimo who had followed the 




traditional life was most unlikely even to speak English let alone have 
any formal education. 
A more serious problem might have arisen had the Forces been able 
to find the sixty research communicators they sought for the potential 
impact on northern commurrities of such a program would have been severe. 
The nature of the communications research trade is highly technical and 
requires a substantial formal education in tradesmen. When one considers 
that, at best, the total Canadian Eskimo population was less than 25,000, 
one could honestly ask if Eskimo communities could afford to lose their 
best educated young people to serve in the Forces. The matter would have 
been particularly acute when one considers the developing set of Inuit 
priorities of that period. There was a perception that Eskimos should 
produce their own lawyers to-argue their land claims, their own admin- 
istrators- and politicians to run their communities, their own business- 
men to run their cooperatives, their own teachers to instruct their 
children. Surely, in terms of the federal government's northern goal of 
meeting native peoples' aspirations these latter professions should have 
taken precedence over military service that would have taken Eskimo 
soldiers out of the mainstream of Inuit life. In this sense it is fortu- 
nate for the North as a whole that few Eskimos have come forward seeking 
a military career. 
This study concludes in 1975. By that time Canadian Forces had 
reýestabjished themselves in the North to an unprecedented degree. While 
there were fewer troops permanently stationed in the region than there 
had been in the late 1950s, Canadian servicemen from all three services 
were continually being exposed to the northern envirqnment. The estab- 
lishment of a Northern Region in the Forces' organization underlined the 
fact that, for the first time, the Department of National Defence was 
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prepared to admit that the North had an intrinsic value to the country 
as a whole and that a military presence was required in the area. The 
Canadian Forces have recognized and accepted the uniqueness of the North 
which is the first step in understanding the area. Within the limits 
imposed by available equipment-and funding, they learned how to live and 
to a limited extent operate "North of 60", and found the chall-enge of 
doing so an interesting one. 
The impact of the renewed military presence on the North has been 
slight. No sovereign challenges have taxed the Canadian Forces. No 
threat of military conflict looms on the northern horizon. No Eskimo or 
northern Indians serve Canada in the military in the North. Northern 
construction projects undertaken by the military have significantly im- 
proved the northern transportation grid, but no great commercial or 
industrial development has accompanied this greater capacity for man to 
move in the vastness of the North. In 1968, the new Trudeau adminis- 
tration and Canadians in general, felt that, finally, the often antici- 
pated but never realized massive northern development surge was about to 
occur. In many ways the matrix of alternatives as perceived in 1975 was 
even more complex than it was seen to be in 1968 particularly with respect 
to cultural and ecological stability versus exploitation of non-renewable 
resources. As Canadians learn more and more about their last frontier, 
hitherto unknown relAtionships, conditions and constraints come to light. 
Given all these uncertainties, the specific future role of the military 
in the North is understandably unclear. 
Over a century ago, a British soldier, Captain W. F. Butler, 
travelling in what was then "The North" called it "We Great Lone Land". 
That image is still valid. 
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
The Land of Tomorrow 
Canadian history, in the years since the formation of the- 
Confederation in 1867 may be seen in terms of successive or overlapping 
imperatives. Initially there was the western imperative to establish 
and develop the nation along the east-west axis. At the same time, but 
extending well into the twentieth century, there was the imperial 
imperative driving the nation to define and develop its position within 
the British Empire and Commonwealth. Following-the end of the Second 
World War, what could be called the continental imperative developed 
wherein Canada attempted to define her place and protect her national 
identity in the pervasive cultural, economic and defence relationship 
with the United States. At present, a national imperative drives 
Canadians to determine the manner in which the country will or will not 
develop politically with particular emphasis on the place of the French 
speaking province of Quebec in the nation. 
These imperatiVes captured and dominated the collective focus 
of virtually every segment of the nation. Political, economic, cultural, 
intellectual, military and popular interests for extended periods were 
on the issue of the imperative. Conflicts between various interest 
groups were rife and were encounted at virtually every stage of the 
resolution process. Ultimately, all of these imperatives, except the 
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last, which is ongoing, were resolved in a manner that was satisfactory 
to a majority of the Canadian population. 
There has never been a northern imperative. 
The Canadian North is the land of tomorrow. So it was when the 
region was ceded to the country in the 1870s and 1880s, so it was into 
the present, so it is for the foreseeable future. The romantic image 
of the North as the last frontier is popular in Canada. This is an 
attractive image. Few nations in the modern world are blessed with an 
internal frontier that offers a human challenge to develop, to create 
and to protect--if not this day, this year, or this generation--then 
Tomorrow. 
Canadians have historically seen the North as being too distant, 
too hostile, too isolated or too barren to warrant the full focus of the 
national interest. Two results follow from this perception. The first 
is that in the absence of detailed scrutiny and interest, the North is 
historically and contemporaneously seen in simplistic terms--not only 
in the popular mind, but in the various foci of power in the nation. 
The North was initially seen as a wasteland barrier, later as a strategic 
approach, and currently as an ecologically sensitive potential source of 
raw materials. The northern reality is infinitely more complex. 
The second implication of the lack of a northern imperative is 
that those few Canadians who have been involved with the North have 
never quite determined what to do with it. The land of tomorrow calls, 
but the call is not clearly understood. Should the North be exploited, 
developed, conserved, protected--or all of these? And if all, what is 
the resolution between exploitation and conservation_-or development and 
protection? And what of the handful of people who make up the races 
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who have lived in the North since prehistoric times? 
In reality, the issues are so complex, and the data base upon 
which to make decisions so slender, that thoughtful northern decision 
makers have come to realize that it is best to proceed with extreme 
caution, if at all. At the level of national government, the historic 
preference is for symbolic acts or programs designed to keep options 
open as opposed to the initiation of major projects that carry with them 
extensive commitments of resources to a unique course of action. 
The notion of symbolism is fundamental to an understanding of 
the development of the Canadian North and the role that the military 
has played in the drama. The list of symbolic acts is long--from 
Captain Bernier's flag raising expeditions at the turn of the century, 
to the establishment of RCMP posts in the Arctic after the First World 
War, to the presence of small Canadian military staffs on the DEW Line 
main sites, to the contemporary patrol activities of Canadian land, sea, 
and air forces in the North. All of these were designed to keep open 
national options by providing a modest statement of continuing interest 
and, through presence, theoretically reaffirming control of the area. 
The analysis of this study has focussed upon three mains areas-- 
national development, protection of sovereignty and defence. The analy- 
sis is complicated by the fact that none of these areas is discrete- 
all overlap. For exa#le, the creation of a military base in the North 
inevitably has implications in the realms of national development and 
protection of sovereignty. The analysis is further complicated by the 
fact that the American perceived needs for the defence of the United 
States, even though these needs were also often in the interest of 
Canada, have been the moving force in the undertaking of virtually all 
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of the major defence related activities in the North. The manner in 
which these American sponsored projects were agreed to, executed, and 
conducted has always been limited by Canadian perceived needs to protect 
sovereignty in the North. Although Canadians on the whole have done 
little to develop the North, they are historically extremely jealous of 
their northern property and northern prerogatives and tend to be ada- 
mantly opposed to any foreign activity that would limit future northern 
options. Again, the image of the land of tomorrow is paramount. 
The raising, deployment, and work of the Yukon Field Force, like 
the gold rush that provoked it, must be dismissed as an historical aber- 
ration. There can be no question that the deployment of the Force was 
an exercise in the protection of sovereignty. In terms of the national 
political and economical perspectives of the day, the gold rush was not 
seen as a short term phenomenon but the beginning of a major commercial 
development process. The presence of the Force in the Yukon was de- 
signed to have a deterrent effect on any potential social unrest and 
hence political instability in the area. That it was probably not 
necessary is not germane to the argument. 
The military activity in the North during the inter-war years is 
exclusively related to national development. By global standards, or 
even Canadian standards, this process of development was exceedingly 
slow. There was nothing that happened over the twenty year period that 
could not, and in fact was not done in months or at most a few years 
during the American inspired northern thrust during the Second World 
War. The military contributions to a northern infrastructure and trans- 
portation grid were significant in terms of the totaý development of 
the time, but relatively insignificant in terms of the totality of the 
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entire North. There was minimal development north of the continental 
land mass and no military input at all. 
The entry of the United States into the Second World War created 
the greatest sustained level of activity that the North has ever seen. 
While the original intent of all the American-sponsored projects was 
defence related, the ultimate use of the northern projects in most cases 
was offensive. No axis power ever attempted or, as far as is known, 
ever considered attacking North American targets via the Canadian North. 
The United States used the Canadian North to carry the war to the enemy. 
Military facilities flooded the Yukon and Mackenzie Valley but 
spilled over throughout the continental north and even reached into some 
of the southern islands of the Arctic Archipelago. At the time, it was 
anticipated that the defence-projects, particularly the air routes, 
would have major post-war international commercial implications. Tech- 
nological progress negated this development, but the air routes proved 
to be important to subsequent national development within the Canadian 
North. 
The United States, its troops, its money, its construction firms 
and its employees dominated the North. All of what the United States 
did--or caused to be done, occurred beyond the sight of ordinary 
Canadians; much of what they did occurred beyond the sight of even the 
Canadian government, -despite not 
insignificant attempts to regulate and 
monitor these activities. The American withdrawal at war's end, while 
called for in the various agreements that had initiated projects, was 
primarily pragmatic. Immediate or projected defence needs did not 
require maintenance of existing facilities. Had thp, -immediate post war 
situation offered the United States commercial opportunity or presented 
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an identifiable military threat in the Canadian North, there is little 
doubt that the United States would have pressed for, and probably 
achieved continuing or even extended rights to maintain their facilities 
on Canadian soil. That this situation did not arise is a positive 
benefit in terms of Canadian sovereignty; in terms of national develop- 
ment, progress in the North probably would be more extensive today had 
the United States continued to be-involved and prepared to commit money 
and resources on a scale available to a major world power. 
The Canadian military presence in the North during the war was 
small in an absolute sense and completely dwarfed by the Americans in a 
relative sense. A handful of aviators in the Northwest and the peri- 
patetic soldiers on the army northern exercises accounted for the total 
Canadian military presence in the North. The government and the aviators 
themselves were conscious of the balancing effect of the RCAF presence 
in the Northwest Staging Route. One is tempted to draw the same analogy 
with respect to the army's northern exercises, particularly Musk Ox, but 
the documentation to support such a conclusion simply is not there. In 
its absence, the army's first attempts to deal with the North as a poten- 
tial combat environment must be likened to an experiment in pure research. 
The essential military notion of the Cold War period in the North 
is that western strategists and defence planners saw the region not as a 
valuable land that worranted protection, but as an approach to urban, 
industrial and military targets in North America. Rather than requiring 
defence in itself, the North was seen to provide strategic depth to the 
continent's defences. All joint Canadian-American defence projects, 
plans, and training exercises had at least a symboliC and often real 
Canadian control component reflecting the lessons learned by Canadians 
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in their dealing with the American military during the war. 
These defence activities, particularly the construction and 
operation of the DEW Line had a tremendous impact on the development of 
the North in the vital area of extension and improvement of the air and 
sea transportation grid. Pure national development military projects 
such as the maintenance of the Alaska Highway and the continued oper- 
ation of the NWT and Yukon Radio System still reflected the limited 
degree to which Canadian governments were prepared to commit military 
resources to northern development. The virtual withdrawal of the mili- 
tary from the North during the 1960s reflected the spiraling intensifi- 
cation of defence technology, changed Canadian defence priorities, and 
finally, the development of the civil sector to the point where appro- 
priate civil or commercial authorities were able to take over the bulk 
of national development roles within the North. 
The resurgence of Canadian military interest, involvement and 
presence in the North that characterized the 1970s must be attributed 
solely to the Trudeau administration's concept of protection of sover- 
eignty as the primary role of the nation's defence forces. There is a 
tendency to regard the complex political notion of protection of sover- 
eignty as some form of diluted military capability. It seems clear, 
however, that the Prime Minister's intent was to extend the role and 
missions of the Canadian Forces. He said, "Our first priority in our 
defence policy is the protection of Canadian sovereignty, in all the 
dimensions that it means". 
' In the same speech, Trudeau emphasized that 
the first defence priority for Canada was not NATO. In point of fact, 
I Speech, Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau to Alberta Liberal Asso- 
ciation, Calgary, 12 April 1969. John Gellner maintains that Trudeau 
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no Canadian government had ever maintained that NATO was the first pri- 
ority, but it was generally agreed that priorities or not, the greatest 
threat lay in Europe and the North Atlantic and hence the Forces were 
equipped and devoted the bulk of their training for operations in those 
theatres. 
Simplisticly, defence implies the protection of the nation by 
the use, or threat of use, of mili-tary forces against opposing military 
forces. Protection of sovereignty, on the other hand, considerably 
extends the responsibilities of the national military establishment for 
it requires, in addition to their classical role that they establish a 
presence in any area where sovereignty may be challenged, conduct sur- 
veillance throughout the area, carry out detailed reconnaissance and 
investigations of suspected anomalies, and ultimately, enforce the 
national will with the use of military force if necessary. The imposi- 
tion of such a responsibility takes the military into such diverse areas 
as fisheries protection, shipping surveillance, ecological monitoring, 
airspace surveillance, and generalized "showing the flag" operations on 
the national frontiers. It is important to note that many if not all of 
these extended roles hold the potential to bring military forces into 
contact and possible conflict with foreign elements that are private or 
commercial in nature, rather than official or military. 
The programs.: and projects undertaken by the military during the 
1970s were traditionally symbolic but on a more intense level than here- 
tofore attempted but still, in the final essence--symbolic. The creation 
brought to office an indifference to defence matters-and a "strong anti- 
NATO bias" and that increased Canadian commitment tO-NATO starting in 
1975 should not be seen as a modest Canadian response to growina Warsaw Pact capabilities. but as a means to Pursuinq the political goaT of 
extended economic involvement with the European Economic Community. 
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of a military region to encompass the North symbolized military intent 
and commitment. In reality, what the northern headquarters could ac- 
complish was severely limited by its location, small size, lack of dedi- 
cated forces, and the sheer magnitude of the North itself. The army 
ventured into the Arctic on maj-or exercises prior to 1975 but these were 
more demonstrations of the capability to establish a presence rather than 
the capability to conduct extended-operations at any distance from a 
suitable airhead. Smaller but more frequent exercises characterized the 
rest of the decade but again, while Canadian soldiers appeared all over 
the Arctic, they were, by equipment and training, closely restricted to 
the close environs of a northern community. In the same vein, deploy- 
ments tended to be on the order of two or three weeks only, and hence 
troops could not hope to begin to come to grips with the full range of 
problems attendant upon extended northern operations. Rather than de- 
velop a small cadre of troops highly trained in northern operations, the 
Canadian military establishment opted to produce a large number of 
soldiers who had northern exposure and indoctrination. Symbolic pres- 
ence was seen as being adequate to meet the requirement to protect 
sovereignty in the North. 
The same may be said of the case of the Argus anti-submarine 
warfare aircraft on long range northern surveillance patrols. Given that 
the aircraft was nolý equipped with any significant number or quality of 
remote sensors and was restricted to a mere handful of paved airfields 
at which it could routinely land, the Norpats also were primarily sym- 
bolic. What was important was not that the aircraft were conducting 
fully effective surveillance (which they were not), -fut that the govern- 
ment could claim to be conducting a rational program aimed at protecting 
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Canadian northern interests. This symbolic program satisfied popular 
concern for the security of the North. That the various programs could 
not stand close scrutiny and analysis was not particularly important to 
the government. The voices of a few critics were lost in the general 
indifference to the North. 
The annual appearance of a naval fleet support ship in the 
eastern reaches of the Northwest Passage at the height of the annual 
shipping season similarly seemed to satisfy limited Canadian concern. 
In some inchoate way, presence is adequate for Canadian governments and 
the Canadian population at large. That presence does not imply a sig- 
nificant operational capability has either not dawned on the nation, 
or, again in the absence of a northern imperative, it does not seem to 
matter. 
The Canadian Forces, equipped as they were during the 1970s, were 
only marginally capable of conducting combat operations in the high 
reaches of the Arctic--in those lands and waters bordering and north of 
the Northwest Passage. The navy had no ice breaking or even ice capable 
ships. Nuclear submarines, probably the most versatile all-season 
vessel for arctic operations, were never even seriously considered. The 
air force's radius of operations in the Arctic was similarly proscribed. 
Both current and projected fighters and patrol aircraft require long 
paved airfields but An the entire Arctic Archipelago, only Frobisher Bay 
on the south end of Baffin Island offered such a facility--grace A la 
United States Air Force in the 1950s. The army alone had a very limited 
combat capability--provided that they could be deployed into the objec- 
tive area. Cross country movement on the magnitude. & several hundred 
of miles was never attempted although theoretically some of the general 
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purpose vehicles and equipment in the army inventory might have been 
able to permit such an operation in certain types of terrain and weather 
conditions. 
It is fair to say that the military has had a much greater ef- 
fect on the North than the North has had on the military. Much of the 
existing northern transportation grid, the most important segment of 
social infrastructure, was originally developed by the military. It is 
important to note that the major developments were by-products of defence 
related activities, and that these activities were usually American 
sponsored. The roads, maps, charts, construction techniques and air- 
fields built or paid for by the United States during the Second World 
War and Cold War were the single most important factor in the opening 
of the Canadian North. Otheir-pfoJects, conducted by Canadian military 
forces for pure national development purposes--communication systems, 
road construction and maintenance, airfield construction and native 
education programs are simply not of the same order of magnitude in 
comparison to the massive defence projects of the Americans. 
One will look in vain, however, for any evidence that the Cana- 
than military presence in the North has been a significant factor in the 
continued retention of the North by Canada. The often feared challengers 
to sovereignty have simply not appeared. The uninhabited lands are such 
for the very good reason that nobody has ever discovered a human reason 
to live there. International law and geographical contiguity are the 
prime forces in preserving Canadian possession. The sovereignty- 
threatening aspects of American military forces in the North are offset, 
not so much by a symbolic Canadian military component-, but by the treaty 
arrangements made in Ottawa and Washington. 
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In reality, the North has had extremely litt7e effect on the 
Canadian military establishment. It has never been perceived necessary 
to deploy significant numbers of troops into the region or to acquire 
specialized equipment for operations there. This is true with respect 
to protecting Canada from attack across the pole, or to defending the 
North itself. A handful of Canadian military officers and defence 
scientists from all services have developed well deserved national or 
even international reputations as northern experts, but on the whole 
these men and women have been apart from the main thrust of conven- 
tional military concern, interest, and wisdom. 
It is no great exaggeration to say that much of the North, in- 
cluding most of the Arctic, has always been beyond the range of Canadian 
military power. That this power is very minor on a global scale, or 
that it usually has the implicit back-up support of the United States 
is not germane to the argument. Although this fact is generally per- 
ceived at government and defence planners level, it is probably not as 
well perceived by the Canadian population at large. The "fire proof 
house" mentality is almost a race characteristic of Canadians. 
The future of the military in the North is by no means clear. 
Certain areas of potential involvement, however, may be eliminated from 
consideration with a fair degree of confidence. The Canadian North 
generally, and the Arctic in particular, will probably never be a theatre 
of large scale military operation of any sort. The lack of indigenous 
support structure, the distance from established bases, and the predomi- 
nantly hostile climate all combine to place absolute limitations on the 
size of forces that could feasibly be deployed into. -Me 
North. 
Military operations lower in the spectrum of conflict are possible 
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and will undoubtedly continue to be so. The two most likely situations 
are attacks on resource extraction facilities or the establishment of one 
or more divisionary lodgements in conjunction with a crisis situation 
between NATO and Warsaw P-act forces in Northwest Europe. Given the mani- 
fest impossibility of establistving fixed defences throughout the North 
to protect all possible targets, the Canadian response would inevitably 
be limited to counter attack forces designed to eliminate or at least 
neutralize hostile elements. The more mobile and capable such Canadian 
forces are the smaller they could be. While the protection of sover- 
eignty is the first priority for the Canadian Forces, it is generally 
agreed that the greatest military threat resides in Northwest Europe. 
It would be folly in the extreme for Canada to be obliged to commit the 
bulk of her forces to northern defence in a war situation to defend 
targets or areas of only marginal military importance. Unless the es- 
sential military characteristic of the Canadian North--isolation--is 
recognized and appropriately equipped and trained forces are developed 
to take advantage of this fact, Canada could be obliged to respond to a 
military threat with conventional forces using conventional tactics. 
The future of the national development role of the military in 
the North is somewhat more ambiguous. Major projects such as the oper- 
ation of the NWT&Y Radio System or maintenance of the Northwest Highway 
System are probably. things of the past since civil capability and the 
size and level of sophistication of other departments of government are 
significantly increased over interwar or immediate post war standards. 
There is probably room for military engineers to engage in short term 
construction projects such as bridge or airstrip building although such 
participation is not by any means a precondition of northern development. 
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Projects by military engineers offer troops the opportunity to partici- 
pate in construction work of a type and in an environment that is not 
generally available in routine training. On the other hand, the oppor- 
tunity to participate in such activities take troops away from normal 
all-arms training in conventional military operations. The pros and 
cons of both options probably balance. 
The continued use of military forces to monitor sovereignty-- 
threatening non military activities by other states is questionable. 
Certainly, if the program is to be continued the long range patrol air- 
craft of the air force must bear the brunt of meaningful activity. While 
the forces may be able to conduct northern surveillance, it remains to 
be shown how they could develop into a force capable of carrying out 
detailed reconnaissance or investigation. The vague notion that the use 
of military force is a feasible or appropriate response to private or 
commercial denials of national sovereignty is just that--a vague notion. 
The periodic presence of elements of all three of the armed ser- 
vices in the North will probably continue. These deployments are seen 
in the popular Canadian mind as protecting sovereignty. There is no 
evidence that these activities have in any way served to deter unauthor- 
ized foreign activity in the Canadian North. On the other hand, they 
serve the needs of Canadian peace of mind and provide a vehicle to give 
substantial numbers pf troops at least an exposure to the northern en- 
vironment. Within the limitations of general purpose equipment available 
to the forces, these indoctrination exercises should be continued with 
emphasis on the Arctics particularly the archipelagic regions. 
In the final analysis, the time has long pasgied when Canada in 
general and its military establishment in particular can afford to ignore 
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the North, regard it as a barrier, or rely upon the United States to 
secure. The world grows more crowded; resources grow more scarce; 
global rivalries remain undiminished. The Canadian North contains both 
space and raw materials. If the area is to develop in the manner in 
which Canadians wish it tD, and not be driven helter-skelter by inter- 
national pressures, the Canadian military must be able to respond to 
the full range of potential threats in the coming decades. Although no 
man or organization can ever fully master the North, Canada's soldiers 
if they are truly to be "Keepers of the North" must make every effort to 
do so. It is a noble challenge. 
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